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1.1 Background and purpose of the study 
This thesis blends computational modelling with the study of market evolution 
processes. On the one hand, computer simulation has been an old, but unpopular, 
companion to social science research (Cyert and March 1963, Cohen et al. 1972).1 
Nevertheless, the 1990s appeared to show an explosion in the use computational 
models in the social sciences (Samuelson 2005), particularly due to the emergence 
of suitable computational software (Samuelson and Macal 2006) to perform social 
simulation research. Such computational techniques include system dynamics and 
systems modelling (e.g., Sterman 2000, 2002; Larsen and Lomi 2002), discrete-
event simulation (e.g., Law and Kelton 1991; Gilbert and Troitzch 2005), micro-
simulation techniques (e.g. Orcutt 1990; Brown and Harding 2002), cellular 
automata (e.g., Lomi and Larsen 1997, 1999; Ginsberg et al. 1999; Dooley 2002; 
Davis et al. 2007) and agent-based modelling (ABM) (e.g., Epstein and Axtell 
1995; Klos 2000; Tesfatsion 2006). In addition, a number of works favour using 
simulation approaches for theory development in the organisation and economic 
sciences. Such works refer to modelling advantages, statistical issues and validity 
(Harrison et al. 2007), organisational change (Van de Ven and Poole 2005), 
organisational behaviour, structure and learning (Vriend 2000; Ashworth and 
Carley 2007), ABM platforms assessment (Robertson 2005), sociological theory 
building (Sawyer 2003), sensitivity analysis in policy models (Miller 1998), market 
self-organisation (Vriend 1995) and economic organisations research (Chang and 
Harrington 2006), among others.  
On the other hand, features of market evolution have been a subject that 
organisational ecologists have studied extensively (Carroll and Hannan 2000). 
Ecologists have used the resource space imagery to represent consumer distributions 
and heterogeneity. However, explicit firm-level analyses, modelling firm-level 
                                                     
1
 Simulation modelling has been often called the “third way” of doing science (Axelrod 
1997, Harrison and Carroll 2001, Harrison et al. 2007), due to their distinctiveness vis-à-vis 
classical inductive and deductive approaches (Epstein 1999). 
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decision-making, have been scarce in their spatial representation. This is in sharp 
contrast with the tradition to explicitly model firm-level (optimising) behaviour that 
is standard in Industrial Organisation (IO) applications, where equilibria 
implications are explored under different types of market structure (Tirole 1988). It 
has been argued elsewhere that a good understanding of the fate of economic 
organisations should integrate the above-mentioned approaches (Boone and van 
Witteloostuijn 1995). Over the years, the examples of micro-modelling in OE have 
been the exception rather than the rule (van Witteloostuijn 1988, van Witteloostuijn 
et al. 2003), though. 
We acknowledge the importance of such a connection in understanding market 
evolution processes (the OE framework), since direct competition (the IO 
framework) is definitely a key element in the study of implications of different 
market structures. Thus, we aim at developing a micro-foundation framework that 
links the two theoretical approaches in analysing specific types of market 
evolutionary processes. As van Witteloostuijn and Boone (2006) argue, such a 
connection can be carried out through the concept of the “space”, the place where 
firms are supposed to compete. Specifically, we aim to study how the (external) 
influence of different consumer distributions in a (product characteristics) space 
affects the viability of the participating firms in the market, and consequently, 
contributes to shape the (evolving) market structure. This micro-foundational 
endeavour links three elements: (a) the evolutionary approach, through the 
consideration of entry rates and exit processes, (b) the spatial representation of the 
product characteristics space and the way consumers are distributed in this space, 
and (c) firm-level behaviour through the inclusion of basic microeconomic 
principles. 
The choice of a computational approach derives from the objective of our work, 
which deals with evolutionary modelling and concentrates on explaining the path-
to-equilibrium processes, rather than the final equilibrium per se. The choice of a 
computational approach not only derives from a mere expected mathematical 
intractability of conventional game-theoretical tools, but also on a methodological 
logic that argues that computational modelling is a fitter tool to study socio-
economic systems behaviour (Sterman 2002), especially when those systems are 
characterised by elements such as the ones mentioned above (Epstein 2007). Thus, 
3 
  
ABM becomes a suitable candidate for our micro-foundational enterprise.  
Throughout our modelling framework and results, we aim at (i) a theoretical 
reconstruction from a micro-based, computational viewpoint of market-partitioning 
processes, (ii) an understanding of effects of different space types, and (iii) an 
understanding of endogenously changing spaces, represented by either variations of 
the consumer spatial distribution or its spatial features. Beside the micro-
foundational endeavour, we offer new insights about (i) the strength of pure 
selection-based processes in market partitioning, arguing that entrepreneurial 
processes may reinforce the high concentration/high density outcome of partitioned 
markets, (ii) the survival of the inefficient firms and the trade-off between cost 
efficiency and spatial location, illustrating that cost inefficiency can be compensated 
by location at the space fringe, away from scale-based competitors, (iii) the 
consideration of changing spaces through consumer mobility and its effects on small 
firm proliferation, and (iv) the implications of the changing dimensionality of the 
space and its effect on firms’ economic performance. 
1.2 Organisational ecology 
Organisational Ecology (OE) is a field within organisational sociology 
(Stinchcombe 1965) that focuses on the study of populations of organisations and 
the effects on organisational founding and mortality rates (Hannan and Freeman 
1989; van Witteloostuijn 2000). OE mainly uses a Darwinian approach of 
environmental selection features (Levins 1968). One central claim of OE states that, 
when facing environmental changes, the organisations of the population not able to 
fit the new conditions are replaced by new ones and a population-level adaptation 
occurs. This implies that a selection process takes place at the individual level 
(Hannan and Freeman 1977). 
According to Baum and Amburgey (2002), OE considers two types of effects on 
founding and mortality rates: (i) those due to organisational–level characteristics, 
and (ii) those due to ecological processes. The first one has been committed to the 
understanding of age-dependent processes (Freeman et al 1983; Fichman and 
Levinthal 1991; Barron et al. 1994; Hannan 1998), size-dependent processes 
(Ranger-Moore 1997; Carroll and Hannan 2000) and inertia theory (Hannan and 
Freeman 1984).  
4 
 
The processes that are of central interest in this thesis are the ecological 
processes, since they represent the arena where firm interactions may take place. In 
its attempt to understand the effect of such processes on founding and mortality 
rates of the participating organisational forms2, organisational ecologists have 
explored the relative performance between first-movers and efficient producers (r- 
and k-strategists) (Brittain and Freeman 1980; Péli and Masuch 1997; Péli and 
Bruggeman 2007), specialists and generalists under different degrees of 
environmental scope and conditions (niche-width theory) (Freeman and Hannan 
1983; Péli 1997; Bruggeman 1997a,b; Bruggeman and O’Nualláin 2000; Hannan et 
al. 2003, 2007), the non-monotonic relationship between founding and mortality 
rates and market population (density-dependence theory) (Carroll and Hannan 1992, 
1995a, 1989a, 1989b; Péli 1993; Kamps and Péli 1995; Lomi and Larsen 1996, 
1998) and the role of market concentration in firm viability (resource-partitioning 
theory) (Carroll 1985; Vermeulen and Bruggeman 2002; Carroll and Hannan 
1995a; Carroll et al. 2002; Dobrev 2000; Dobrev et al. 2001).3 In the following 
chapters we will see how our conceptual framework is based on modelling markets 
with explicit firm entry mechanisms (density-dependence theory), including the 
effects of firm scope (niche width) on cost functions, and the study of the generation 
of several features of market structures, including those with both high 
                                                     
2
 “An organisational form is a cultural object that has the capacity of spreading over system 
boundaries. A form diffuses with the proliferation of localised population of organisations 
that implement it” (Carroll and Hannan 2000:61). See also Ruef (2000), Pólos et al. (2002), 
and Hannan et al. (2007) for detailed theoretical frameworks on organisational forms. 
3
 The role of market concentration between OE and IO differs. For instance, van Cayseele 
(1998:392), in his review of the relationship between innovation and market structure, 
recognises the classical view in which antitrust authorities assume that increased 
concentration is associated with overall welfare loss and increased market power. 
According to this view, higher market concentration is associated with higher barriers to 
entry, contrary to the OE argument (Carroll and Hannan 1995a). However, these views 
might appear not to be completely contradictory if the barrier to entry is expected to affect 
generalists only, leaving specialists with the advantage of resource differentiation at the 
peripheries (Carroll and Hannan 1995a). Similar conclusions are reached in the study of the 
Dutch newspaper industry (see Boone et al. 2002). As mentioned by Carroll et al. (2003), a 
certain degree of resource heterogeneity is a needed condition for resource partitioning. For 
instance, in markets with homogeneous resources, only few generalists will likely dominate 
and concentration will effectively represent an entry barrier to all firms in the market. We 
explore these effects in detail in this thesis. 
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concentration and firm density (a known resource-partitioning characteristic).  
1.3 Industrial organisation 
As the economic branch that deals with market competition, IO has mainly 
analysed competition implications based on a variety of market structures or 
circumstances, largely assuming that market structure shapes firm conduct and 
subsequent performance (Schmalensee and Willig 1989; Scherer and Ross 1990; 
van Witteloostuijn 1992). The IO game-theoretical apparatus has served to model 
firms’ strategic interaction to basically understand equilibrium implications (Tirole 
1988). The assumptions of correct expectation matching and permanent market 
structures lead to the consideration of rational, profit-maximising agents that 
eventually reach a Nash equilibrium. The postulation of rational firm behaviour may 
not be very realistic, yet it allows for solving models and making predictions, as 
well as facilitating the explanation of economic systems properties under a set of 
specific assumptions, like the agreement of behaviour through pre-play 
communication, or perfect a priori knowledge of the rules of the game (Dawid 
1999). In our models, expectations are rules of thumb for decision criteria in the 
next time period, not assuming perfect rationality, since market conditions change 
over time and firms are considered to have limited information-processing 
capabilities (see next section).  
This does not rule out the case that firms (and consumers) behave consistent 
with certain basic microeconomic principles, which supports the IO competition 
framework (Mas-Colell et al. 1995). Although their adaptive behaviour leads firms 
to be largely profit-seeking, our models are characterised by: (i) consumer 
preference evaluation according to utility functions, (ii) long-run and short-run 
average cost curves defined in terms of a Minimal Efficient Scale (MES) and Cobb-
Douglas production function, (iii) spatial competition, (iv) profit-maximising 
decision-making under simple scenarios, and (v) firms behaving as mark-up price 
takers or quantity takers.4 However, due to the models’ construction, where few 
large firms might operate in the market (due to the relative amount of the total 
                                                     
4
 Some efforts have also been made in order to link, integrate or complement IO-related 
issues with computational models. Some recent examples are Barr and Saraceno (2005) and 
6 
 
demand and the MES), we will illustrate markets with firms able to set their prices 
proportionally to scale-driven average costs that eventually converge to oligopolies 
(Baumol et al. 1982) (Chapter 2 and 3). Other cases reflect that fragmentation –and 
horizontal differentiation– among small players may occur since large firms cannot 
cope with expansion costs (Hotelling 1929) (Chapter 3). It is noteworthy that, 
although the connection with IO is explicit in our modelling framework, it is weaker 
than with OE and largely restricted to single-product firms, with the exception of 
Chapter 5, where multi-product firms are able to take advantage of price 
discrimination per market segment. 
1.4 Agent-based computational modelling 
As we mentioned earlier, we adopt an ABM approach to implement our micro-
foundational framework. An ABM approach explores the “emergent” (i.e., bottom-
up) properties of a system (e.g., a market) from multiple individual-level (e.g., firm-
level) interactions (Schelling 1978; Epstein and Axtell 1995; Windrum et al. 
2007).5,6 We believe that ABM is a suitable methodological tool to integrate firm-
level interaction with ecological views, since ABM allows to deal with a complex 
models with a series of features that would make mathematical renderings fall short: 
(i) firm heterogeneity, (ii) limited firm processing capabilities, and (iii) operation in 
an explicit space (Chang and Harrington 2006).7 Representation of firm 
heterogeneity is a key aspect of our model because market participants differ in a 
number of aspects: size, scale advantage, spatial location, price levels, niche width 
(Chapter 2 to 4), and direction of expansion (horizontal or vertical, Chapter 5). The 
                                                                                                                                  
Dawid (2006). 
5
 An interesting discussion about emergence, bottom-up and top-down representations can 
be found in Conte et al. (2001). 
6
 First considerations of agent-based models to social science were not computational. The 
work of Thomas Schelling (who became the 2005 Nobel memorial prize winner in 
Economics) in explaining the emergence of segregated structures is the milestone example 
(Schelling 1969, 1971). 
7
 In fact, our preliminary ideas to model market-partitioning features were firstly conceived 
through a rather discrete-event simulation (García-Díaz 2004), but evolved into the ABM 
framework that is being presented in the next chapters. Those preliminary modelling ideas 
considered the market-partitioning process as an inflow of firms that took a fixed location in 
the space and expanded without considering rivals’ actions. 
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fact that we assume that firms have limited information-processing capabilities is 
related, as mentioned, to the degree of rationality that firms have. The fact that firms 
possess this limitation is central, as we consider that firms constantly face a market 
complexity characterised by a changing number of players over time, changing 
rivals’ prices, expected production updates based on last sales, assessments of 
expansion possibilities, and so on. In such an environment, it is more sensible to 
assume that firms are goal-directed (i.e., mostly profit-seeking), with actions that are 
driven by heuristic (adaptive) behaviour (Dawid 1999). Firms compete in a “space” 
across which consumers are distributed, using well-defined rules of adaptive 
behaviour. Also, consumer distributions may vary according to the degree of taste 
heterogeneity in the market. The whole rendering provides a vehicle that offers a 
steppingstone to explore the micro-foundations of market evolution processes. In 
the proceeding chapters we give a clear account of such consumer distributions, and 
concretely define what we mean with the concept of “resource space”. 
Our ABM framework is a novel contribution to those simulation models already 
developed in OE. Documented simulation models in OE roughly describe discrete-
event simulations with behaviour that is controlled by a “state variable”, such as the 
number of firms in a market, and with events relating to stochastic processes of 
entry and failure without explicitly modelling firm-level interactions (Barron 1999, 
2001; Carroll and Hannan 2000; Harrison 2004). In most of these models, 
competition has been considered only as a diffuse effect and as a function of the 
number of firms in the market (Carroll and Hannan 2000). In this thesis, we focus 
on the emergent effects of direct competition and its consequences on firm survival.  
1.5 Organisation of the book 
All the chapters are related to a rather common frame of modelling firm-level 
economic behaviour. In OE literature, it is common to find a focus on the survival 
chances of generalist and specialist organisations. The literature has also revealed 
that these concepts are liable to different interpretations (Boone and van 
Witteloostuijn 2004). Here, we use somewhat different terminology and consider 
two types of firms that differ in terms of their scale economies advantage: large-
scale and small-scale firms. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on settings with exogenously 
defined spaces. Chapter 2 explores the explanation of market-partitioning processes 
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from the consolidation of centre-located large-scale firms, coupled with the 
proliferation of small-scale firms at the market fringe in unimodal spaces. The 
chapter illustrates how this process can be generated from firm-level direct 
competition. We also observe in a market with identical firms how distance to the 
market centre increases the mortality rate. We reveal (a) how a pure selection 
process of firm types can effectively produce a partitioned market, but (b) that the 
results are more sensitive to parameter value changes in comparison with a process 
where firm type founding is simply guided by current market conditions.  
Chapter 3 presents the results of exploring market evolution in different resource 
space types as a means for a theoretical re-construction of van Witteloostuijn and 
Boone (2006)’s resource-based view of market structures. We show how resource 
heterogeneity (in terms of the spatial distribution of consumers and the number of 
discrete positions in the product space) generates specific market structures 
dependent of specific combinations of scale effects, consumer’s degree of fuzziness 
and niche expansion, also indicating that such volatility declines with decreasing 
heterogeneity.   
Chapters 4 and 5 deal with endogenously emerging spaces. Chapter 4 explores 
the proliferation of small firms under two phenomena that have been qualitatively 
addressed in OE parlance: (i) the contraction of the total generalists’ space as a 
mechanism for resource release, and (ii) the effect of space changes on small firm 
proliferation. The space is assumed to change according to different mechanisms of 
consumer mobility. We argue that scaled-based competition is not sufficient to 
generate the so-called resource release in resource partitioning, but that such 
processes of consumer mobility are needed, too. 
Chapter 5 deals with the so-called space dimensionality problem. The 
(exogenously) changing number of dimensions in the product space has been 
hypothesised to open up spots for small players (Péli and Nooteboom 1999). Our 
novel model deals with an alternative way to measure such (endogenous) 
dimensionality variations. Also, we alternatively measure firm viability in terms of 
profit/cost ratios and illustrate that, while increasing dimensionality slightly 
improves small-scale firm performance, it also registers a non-monotonic effect on 
the performance of large-scale firms. 
Chapter 2 to 4 are closely related since they share the same baseline model. 
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However, different emphases are given depending on the main objective of the 
chapter. Chapter 5 differs from the others in the sense that it does not explicitly 
model consumer behaviour, but strictly focuses on direct firm competition. Every 
chapter, however, can be read independently and can be considered as self-
contained. Figure 1.1 illustrates the thesis outline. 
 
 









2. Profit-seeking Behaviour and Market- 
Partitioning Evolution Processes 
2.1 Introduction 
According to a long tradition in economics’ Industrial Organisation (IO), the 
emergence of large firms in a market generates entry barriers to small firms, offering 
ample opportunities to exercise market power (Tirole 1988; Schmalensee and Willig 
1989; Barney and Ouchi 1991). An alternative perspective offered by 
Organisational Ecology (OE)’s resource-partitioning theory (Carroll 1985) in 
sociology suggests that, under certain conditions, the increasing dominance of large 
generalist firms at the market centre enhances the viability of small specialists at the 
periphery of such a market. Thus, market concentration is then not an indication of 
market dominance exercised by a few large firms, but rather reveals that the market 
is “partitioned” among the so-called generalist and specialist organisations, 
reflecting a dual market structure. Such a dual market structure is characterised by 
high market concentration and high firm “density” (van Witteloostuijn and Boone 
2006), the latter being defined as the number of firms in the market. From an IO 
perspective, sunk cost theory has also tried to explain dual market structures. Sutton 
(1991) argues that the sunk cost investment associated with advertising or R&D 
expenses enables heavily investing firms to reap the advantages of scope economies 
and product differentiation, while the small investors remain small but survive by 
focusing on consumers mainly interested in low prices (Boone and van 
Witteloostuijn 2004). 
The aim of the current chapter, in the spirit of previous efforts to integrate 
insights from IO and OE in the context of the study of the evolution of market 
structures (Boone and van Witteloostuijn 1995, 2004), is to develop a combined IO-
OE framework to explore cases where dual market structures emerge. Specifically, 
we seek to integrate IO’s firm-level decision-making rules (Tirole 1988) with the 
population-level approach of OE through an agent-based computational model. That 
is, we aim for understanding how a market structure with high market concentration 
and high firm density emerges from the micro behaviour of a set of profit-seeking 
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firms operating on the basis of well-defined rules of interaction. We show that the 
development of such a micro foundation (i.e., firm-level rules of behaviour and 
interaction) is indeed a productive cross-fertilising IO-OE effort, revealing how 
partitioned markets (i.e., with high concentration and high density) may emerge 
over time.   
The contribution of this chapter is fourfold. Firstly, we deploy an integration of 
IO concepts into OE’s perspective of market partitioning through the 
implementation of an agent-based computational model. Unlike OE, on the one 
hand, we adopt IO’s micro-level assumption of firms’ profit-seeking and 
consumers’ utility-maximising behaviour. Unlike IO, on the other hand, we focus 
on OE’s evolutionary processes of market evolution, rather than on equilibrium 
outcomes. In so doing, we demonstrate how an industry’s market structure (in terms 
of market concentration and firm density) evolves from a set of profit-seeking 
agents that interact in a decentralised way. Attempts to explain the micro 
mechanisms underlying market partitioning have been nonexistent to date (Carroll 
et al. 2002). By and large, the computational developments in OE are mainly macro-
level dynamical simulations, with only a few notable exceptions of micro-based 
models (Lomi and Larsen 1996, 1998).8 OE’s micro-based simulation models, 
however, lack a foundation in economics’ IO theory of the firm (or the consumer, 
for that matter). Although these earlier micro simulation exercises are extremely 
insightful, they cannot serve to reconcile OE with IO (Barron 2001; van 
Witteloostuijn et al. 2003).  
Secondly, although we introduce an IO-type of micro foundation into an OE 
setting of dual market structures, we deviate from traditional IO by focusing on 
evolutionary processes, rather than on (Nash) equilibria. As a side-product, this 
implies that our model offers a contribution to Evolutionary Economics (EE) as 
well. Like EE (and OE), but unlike IO, we deal with simulating evolutionary 
                                                     
8
 With the term “micro-based” we mean that the overall behaviour of the system depends on 
the interaction of the participating “units”. Indeed, OE’s computational models have 
focused more on the hazard effect on those units (e.g., firms) without specifying rules of 
interaction among them (for instance, the density-dependence model of Carroll and Hannan 
(2000)), or, as mentioned by Chang and Harrington (2006: 1277), on non agent-based 
settings that use a set of equations that describe system-level dynamic behaviour (Carroll 
and Harrison 1998).  
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processes, rather than calculating (game-theoretic) equilibria. From IO, but unlike 
EE (and OE), we adopt the assumption that a firm initially maximises expected 
profit. Although the firm in our model initially goes for maximum profit, the 
environment reaches a certain level of complexity such that this maximisation 
objective is actually reflected in a profit-seeking probing process. EE’s dominant 
conception of the firm is based on the behavioural theory of the firm (Nelson and 
Winter 1982), assuming satisficing rather than maximising decision-making 
behaviour (van Witteloostuijn 1988). In so doing, our way of modelling firm 
behaviour is similar to what is suggested in the neo-Austrian tradition (Kirzner 
1997), which views the firm as a profit-seeking entrepreneur, exploring the 
uncertain environment for profit opportunities.  
Thirdly, we explore how the shape of the environment’s resource distribution 
affects the outcomes of market evolution processes (van Witteloostuijn and Boone 
2006), departing from micro-level inter-firm interaction. Specifically, we aim to 
understand how unevenly distributed resource spaces (particularly, resource-
partitioning theory’s peaked demand distribution) affect the way market 
concentration and firm density evolve over time (Boone et al. 2002). Related to this, 
we explore how firm performance (i.e., organisational survival) depends on the 
focal firm’s resource space location.  
Fourthly, we produce outcomes that reconcile IO’s claim that selection favours 
efficiency and OE’s assumption that not-so-efficient firms may very well survive 
evolutionary processes. On the one hand, consistent with IO, we show how 
declining production costs drive inefficient firms out of the centre of market 
(Jovanovich 1982). On the other hand, as argued in OE (van Witteloostuijn 1998), 
we demonstrate that inefficiency (in terms of average unit costs) may well be 
compensated by strategic location in the periphery of the resource space, still 
keeping not-so-efficient firms viable in the market. This result reinforces the OE 
argument: “organisational ecologists do not assume that selection consistently 
favours the most economically efficient organisations” (Hannan 2005: 53). 
In particular, simulation outcomes illustrate that (i) unimodal resource spaces 
with scale economies and scope disadvantages provide appropriate conditions for 
dual market structures to emerge, (ii) in a market with identical firms (i.e., large-
scale firms only), those firms located further away from the market centre (i.e., away 
13 
  
from where the most abundant resources are) face a higher risk of mortality, and, 
(iii) dual market structures that emerge from pure firm-type selection process are 
more sensitive to scale economies than those that emerge from a somehow defined 
entrepreneurial process. This implies that entrepreneurial forces might also play a 
significant role in the evolution of market partitioning processes.   
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 briefly introduces the 
theoretical background on dual market structures and a number of relevant 
computer simulation studies. Next, Section 2.3 outlines the agent-based model 
while referring to detailed model fragments in appendices. Subsequently, Section 
2.4 provides the simulation’s experimental design and specifications of the 
statistical analysis. After that, Section 2.5 presents the analyses of results and 
interprets the main findings. Section 2.6 concludes with a summary and appraisal, 
listing avenues for future research. An additional Section 2.7 provides background 
information and presents a mathematical description of the equations used in the 
model. 
2.2 Theoretical background 
2.2.1 Resource-partitioning theory 
OE’s resource-partitioning theory explains the emergence of narrow-segment 
(specialist) organisations in a market dominated by broad-segment (generalist) 
organisations and characterised by increasing concentration (Carroll 1985; Carroll 
and Hannan 1995a; Carroll and Hannan 2000; Hannan et al. 2007). Resource-
partitioning theory is based on three critical assumptions: (a) consumer demand (or, 
more generally, resource) is unevenly distributed and characterised by a peaked 
distribution with a market centre; (b) taste heterogeneity among consumers is 
sufficiently well developed; and (c) the industry exhibits strong scale economies in 
the centre of the market (Carroll and Hannan 2000). Firms able to target a rather 
broad niche of consumer tastes (generalists) will mostly make use of scale 
economies and compete for the most abundant part of the resource space – the so-
called market centre. Increased competition in the market’s centre will force some 
of the firms located there to abandon the market, which releases peripheral 
resources that will be taken by narrow-segment targeting firms (specialists). 
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Increasing concentration will be coupled with a contraction of total space served by 
generalists, implying a competitive resource release that will favour specialists 
(Carroll 1985; Carroll et al. 2002). 
 Overall, the resource-partitioning process can be described in terms of two 
subsequent stages: 
 
(a) Initially, most firms are attracted to the market centre, which is, after all, the 
most abundant part of the resource space. Firms at the centre become large due to 
the advantages offered by scale economies. However, competition in that region 
also increases due to crowding. Some of the firms competing for resources at the 
market centre do not succeed and leave the market. The few winning generalist 
organisations take over the market centre and grow due to the departure of some of 
their competitors. Market concentration increases as the number of surviving 
generalists declines, and the amount of total resource space covered by all generalist 
organisations decreases (Carroll et al. 2002). In the end, “generalists tend to 
differentiate themselves by differentiating their product offers, positioning their 
niches apart from each other” (Péli and Nooteboom 1999: 1135), all this happening 
in and near to the market centre.  
 
(b) The forced exit of some generalists generates a competitive resource-release 
effect. Surviving generalists find it costly to reach for the peripheral areas of the 
resource space, in addition to their (close to) centre activities. Hence, such fringe 
regions become fertile soil for specialists. Peripheral specialist organisations 
proliferate as market concentration increases, avoiding direct competition with 
centre-located generalist firms. The downside of their peripheral location in the 
resource space’s low-resource tails is that they cannot benefit from scale 
advantages. The bottom line is that the consolidation of generalists at the centre 
creates the conditions for specialist proliferation at the market’s fringes (Boone et 
al. 2002, 2004).  
 
Ample empirical evidence across many different industries supports the 
resource-partitioning theory. Carroll, Dobrev and Swaminathan (2002) offer 
empirical support for the resource-partitioning theory’s assumptions (unimodal 
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resource space, scale economies and taste heterogeneity), as well as a review of 22 
different empirical studies in 15 different industries. From our model, we obtain 
analogue results with respect to recent empirical findings such as those found in the 
Dutch newspaper industry (Boone et al. 2004), in the sense that “in the dual market 
case … we expect that both size (in the market centre) and specialisation are 
important determinants of firm performance simultaneously” (van Witteloostuijn 
and Boone 2006: 424). Although our model does not involve generalists and 
specialists as such, comparable results are obtained for our model’s firm types. 
2.2.2 Sunk cost theory 
From an IO perspective, alternatively, Sutton (1991) explains how game-
theoretic equilibria might lead firms to incur short-run (so-called endogenous) sunk 
costs. This is the result of firms’ profit-maximising decisions whether or not to 
invest in advertising or innovation. The sunk costs can be recouped by focusing on 
brand recognition and increased consumers’ willingness to pay through product 
differentiation. The equilibrium outcome may be a dual market structure in which 
two types of firms (or strategies) peacefully and viably co-exist: 
 
(a) On the one hand, in order to recover the sunk cost investments, high-
investment firms target large resource areas with the intention of reaping scope 
economies (Boone and van Witteloostuijn 2004). Thus, large multi-product 
generalists take over the resource space’s central region by offering an investment-
intensive portfolio of products.  
 
(b) On the other hand, firms that cannot afford such huge investments in 
advertising or R&D play a different game, opting for a radically different strategy. 
Since product differentiation and brand recognition are not attainable for low-
investment firms, these firms at the market fringe focus on becoming single-product 
specialists that operate low-cost strategies (Boone and van Witteloostuijn 2004). 
 
The coexistence of large high-differentiation multi-product generalists along 
with small low-cost single-product specialists is the essential feature of Sutton’s 
dual market structure (1991). 
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2.2.3 Simulation models of industry evolution 
Agent-based computational models are uncommon, to date, in the study of 
industry evolution in both IO and OE. In IO, a good example of a non agent-based 
simulation model is McCloughan (1995), in which the development of industry 
concentration is analysed to explore several reported empirical regularities as to 
firm-level growth, basically considering entry and exit processes in a stochastic 
model. In OE, simulation models have been mainly developed in the form of (a) 
dynamic representations that reproduce the predicted density evolution, and its 
hypothesised effects on founding and mortality rates (Barron 1999; Carroll and 
Hannan 2000), (b) organisational growth models that reveal the effects on 
population dynamics (Harrison 2004), and (c) density evolution processes coupled 
with endogenously defined resource availability mechanisms (Lomi et al. 2005).  
In a very interesting micro-based simulation approach, Lomi and Larsen (1996, 
1998) use cellular automata models to study the contemporaneous density and 
density-at-founding effects on organisational survival (for related research on 
cellular automata models and strategic interaction, see also Lomi and Larsen 1997; 
Ginsberg et al. 1999). In so doing, they model the interplay between OE’s concepts 
of competition and legitimation. Legitimation is computationally represented, 
allowing sufficiently high-density levels in a neighbourhood to trigger the birth of a 
new cell. The effect of competition comes at play when density is too high in a 
cell’s neighbourhood, so that such a cell dies. While Lomi and Larsen demonstrate 
the effects of contemporaneous density and density-at-founding on mortality rates, 
the impact turns out to be highly sensitive to the way specific local rules are 
defined. 
Moreover, these models lack a micro foundation in the form of a set of 
assumptions of firm behaviour and inter-firm interaction. With our set of 
computational experiments, we are interested in exploring some specific questions. 
In particular, how does a firm’s location in the resource space affect its survival 
chances? Does size increase the survival chances of the firm at the market centre; or 
rather decrease their performance due to increased competition? Do small-scale 
firms find a way to survive, compensating their relative lack of scale advantage (and 
hence their relative cost inefficiency) with a strategic location in the resource space? 
And, can dual market structures arise from firms’ profit-seeking behaviour? It is 
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here where our agent-based computational model differs from the existing literature. 
2.3 The model 
We next present a conceptual framework for an agent-based computational 
model (a set of files written in MATLAB) to study market partitioning. The model 
basically features an inflow of firms that compete in a resource space where 
consumers are distributed. The model uses prices and relative distances in the 
resource space as input to the consumers’ decision-making problem.9 We study how 
the population of firms, market concentration and niche distribution evolve in such 
a setting. This section provides a detailed account of the model features. Chapters 3 
and 4 give the reader shorter and more qualitative descriptions of the baseline 
simulation model.  
2.3.1 Resource space and firm entry 
The term “resource space”, coined by organisational ecologists, is used to 
represent the external environment in which the organisations exist, compete and 
survive. The resource space mainly accounts for the distribution of consumers along 
the pool of consumer preferences (or tastes). More generally speaking, the resource 
space characterises the purchasing power of consumers across the set of n taste 
positions that characterise this space (Carroll et al. 2002).  
Multidimensional spatial representations are well known schemes in social 
science. The different representations have included, for instance, spaces of product 
attributes (Lancaster 1966) or arrangements of socio-demographic descriptors 
(Bonne et al. 2002). Following the spirit of OE, we adopt the term “resource space” 
to represent a population of consumers distributed over an ordinal representation of 
tastes. Having an ordered set of tastes is based on the assumption that such a set of 
tastes can be mapped to a pool of potential product characteristics. We first build a 
                                                     
9
 In general, the resource-partitioning model does not make any use of prices (Carroll et al. 
2002), but rather argues that the cost-related scale advantage is translated into aspects other 
than price reductions (e.g., product quality, product bundling, service, etc.). Without loss of 
generality, we use prices in our models in a way that (i) the model equations let prices 
reflect scale advantages in a straightforward way and (ii) the equation structure leaves open 
the translation of any scale-advantage into other variables that can just be re-adjusted in 
future variations of our model. 
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space of product characteristics but, since such a set is susceptible to be ordered 
(e.g., the degree of sweetness of wine or the amount of memory capacity of a digital 
camera), we assume that every point in the product characteristics space 
corresponds to a given preference in the taste space. Following OE’s resource-
partitioning theory, the resource space is also modelled as a unimodal resource 
space with a market centre. In summary, our resource space is defined as the 
unimodal distribution of consumers along a one-dimensional space of product 
characteristics, where every product characteristic identifies one consumer taste.  
Total demand is approximately 5500 consumer units distributed across n = 100 
taste positions.10 Each consumer buys only one product each time period. We derive 
the resource space from a Beta probability density function f(X;η), where η is the 
distribution parameter (η = 3). Each generated taste k, k = 1,…,n, has an associated 
demand bk, k = 1,…,n, which represents the amount of resources (consumer units) 
located at each taste position. Figure 2.1 visualises the resource space. Firm entry to 
the market follows two mechanisms: (a) stochastic entry with a density-dependent 
rate; and (b) an allocation mechanism of entrants along the resource space, which 
gives a starting spatial location to the firm (later we will see that firms can move 
across the space). 
The first mechanism is consistent with empirical findings regarding 
organisational founding (Hannan and Carroll 1992; Barron 1999), revealing that the 
founding rate is increasing at low density, but decreasing at high density (Carroll 
and Hannan 1995b; Carroll and Hannan 2000). We consider a process with an 
arrival rate represented by λ(t) = exp[δ0 + δ1N(t) + δ2N(t)2], where N(t) is density at 
time t, with t = 1,…,T. The number of entrants is drawn from a negative binomial 
distribution with a success probability of O/(O + λ(t)), where O (O = 2) is the 
inverse of the “overdispersion” parameter (Harrison 2004). Parameter values for δo, 
δ1 and δ2 are derived from Lee and Harrison (2001) and adjusted to the time 
dimension we use in the simulation. The simulation horizon is set at 100 years, 
                                                     
10
 Both the total number of consumers and the number of positions are arbitrary figures, but 
were selected after experimentation with the remaining model settings in order to reflect a 
growth potential at the centre and the possibility of survival of small firms at the periphery. 
At the most abundant position of the defined resource space, it is possible to observe 
approximately 100 consumers.  
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divided in quarters (1 simulation time period = 0.25 years).11 Parameters of the 
simulation model are calibrated taking into account such a time dimension. We 
simulate the evolution of an industry since the inception of the first firm (that is, we 
assume that N(0) = 1). 
 
Figure 2.1: The resource space. 
 
The second mechanism assigns a location to entrants across the resource space. 
We assume that, when the market is not yet crowded, entrepreneurs are more prone 
to locate their firms in the most abundant region of the resource space in and near 
the centre, but as the market centre gets crowded, they start to look for empty spots 
in the periphery, away from competition (Boone et al. 2006). For this location-
assignment mechanism, we built a probability distribution considering the following 
three factors: (i) the population of unserved consumers, (ii) the entrant’s perception 
of competition, and, (iii) the overall sensitivity or sharpness to distinguish among 
different alternative locations.  
                                                     
11
 We were careful in selecting a convenient rendering for the time period construct. 
Calibrations based on monthly movements were also explored, but adopting year quarters 
revealed a more convenient representation that kept the short-run perspective for agent 
interaction while minimising the number of computations. 
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We assume that CBPk(t) is a state variable that indicates the active consumer 
base percentage at position k, at time t. We assume that a consumer only buys once 
in every time period, so with the term “inactive” we mean that a consumer did not 
buy (e.g., due to reasons like the price was too high and the product was too distant 
from his or her preference). As we will see later, we define a utility participation 
constraint Uo that consumers use to decide if they buy (i.e., become active) or not 
(i.e., become inactive). Those unserved consumers constitute a population of 
interest to entrants, interest that grows as the value of CBPk(t) decreases. For 
example, if CBPk(t) = 0.60, it means that 60 per cent of consumers at that slot have 
bought a product and 40 per cent are still inactive. Thus, the observed number of 
inactive customers in taste position k is equal to (1 – CBPk(t))bk.  
We also assume that potential sales are more attractive when and where 
competition is lower. Therefore, we add a competition effect that depends on the 
number of firms located at k at time period t. For instance, suppose an entrant at 
time t + 1 perceives that there are two positions, k1 and k2, that are the most 
attractive spots to enter. They can be the most appealing entry points because they 
had the largest amount of unserved consumers at time t, If, at time t, k1 contains ten 
incumbent firms, while k2 has twenty, the entrant is more likely to initially locate at 
position k1. 
As mentioned above, we also consider a “sharpness” measurement: a coefficient 
that is included in the location mechanism. The rationale behind this coefficient is 
the following: intuitively speaking, as the sharpness coefficient increases, the more 
likely entrants are able to distinguish among the best entry spots, like the market 
centre at the beginning.12 Sharpness is incarnated by a power coefficient that, after 
experimentation, we decided to set to 2. 13 In sum, the probability that a firm is 
                                                     
12
 Scholars have noted that founders (or individuals, in general) might have different levels 
of perceptual abilities to identify market opportunities (Kirzner 1979, Gaglio and Katz 
2001).  
13
 There is also a computational justification regarding the use of the “sharpness” 
coefficient. The use of higher values of this coefficient contributes to give a less volatile 
account of the way firms enter the market, since entrants clearly identify the larger empty 
spots. Its use was important in the model-checking phase. We decided to adopt the value 
mostly used in the experimental phase. We also run further experiments with values equal to 
1 that did not reveal any substantial change in the qualitative behaviour of the simulation. 
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tρ ,  (2.1) 
where Nk(t) is the number of firms that at time t are already present at slot k, so 
N(t) = ΣNk(t). Thus, the spatial location mechanism is used to select the best entry 
location and is implemented by drawing a random number from the probability 
distribution defined above by ρ1(t), ρ2(t), ρ3(t), …, ρn(t).  
2.3.2 Firms’ cost function 
Firm i’s cost function has two components, one related to production costs, 
CiPROD(Qi, t), and the other related to niche-width expansion costs, CiNW(t). For firm 
i, total costs at time t are: 
)(),(),( tCtQCtQC iNWiiPRODii += .   (2.2) 
We consider a production cost function with two production factors, F and V. 
The cost of each unit F is WF and the cost of each unit V is WV. Total production 
costs are: 
)(),( tVWFWtQC iViFiiPROD += .    (2.3) 
Following standard microeconomic theory (Mas-Colell et al. 1995), production 
volume is calculated according to a classic Cobb-Douglas function: 
βα )()( tVAFtQ iii = .     (2.4) 
It is straightforward to see that α = (∂Q/∂F)(F/Q) and β = (∂Q/∂V)/(V/Q), which 
means that α and β are production volume elasticities with respect to production 
factors. A corresponds to a scale parameter and α + β > 1, which is needed to 
produce a downward-sloping long-run average cost curve (LRAC), and, 
consequently, positive scale economies (Mas-Colell et al. 1995). Parameters of the 
LRAC curve (α,β, WF, WV and A) are calibrated to produce minimum average costs 
for the whole industry equal to 1 when Q = ∑bk, implying that cost values in the 
model are normalised. We assume that the firm uses a fixed F, independent of the 
production level. The variable number of units of V is computed according to the 
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.    (2.5) 
With fixed cost F and variable cost V, the firm can arrive at a lower average 
production cost as output increases. Figure 2.2 shows two different production cost 
curve examples derived from the same LRAC curve, for a large-scale and small-
scale firm, respectively. 
The next cost component relates to niche width. As a firm expands, we may 
assume that serving a wider set of taste positions may lead to higher coverage costs. 
Such costs may be due to increasing logistic, overhead or advertisement costs that 
are the consequence of targeting a more heterogeneous consumer taste set. 
Moreover, expansion costs constitute the basis of the OE’s trade-off between niche 




Figure 2.2: Two production cost curves samples (dashed lines) from the 




We define wil(t) and wiu(t) as the upper and lower niche limits of firm i, 
respectively. We define the constant NWC as the niche width cost coefficient, and 
the niche-width related costs as: 
)()()( twtwNWCtC liuiiNW −= .   (2.6) 
Note that an increase of the firm’s niche will produce an increase of the niche-
related costs, in a similar fashion that scope diseconomies materialise when multiple 
product portfolios do not appear to generate any revenue attractiveness  to a single 
firm (Panzar and Willig 1981; Boone and van Witteloostuijn 2006). The procedure 
by which we chose a value for NWC is presented in the next section. 
2.3.3 Consumer behaviour 
Our understanding of how consumers make decisions is presented in Figure 2.3. 
In a simplified example, let us assume that firms i and j attempt to attract consumers 
by translating their cost reductions into prices, Pi and Pj, while consumers jointly 
evaluate prices plus the firm’s offering similarity vis-à-vis their taste. The firms’ 
offered utility (linearly) decreases with distance to the consumer’s taste. Essentially, 
the consumer evaluates the perceived utility of the pool of firm offerings and 
chooses the one that brings higher utility (the white dots in Figure 2.3). 
Formally speaking, consumer j at taste position k has a utility function defined 
by 
nkbjtPtiBtiU kikjkj ,...,2,1 and ,...,2,1 with )(),(),( ,, ==−= , (2.7) 
where Bj,k(i,t) is the “benefit” she or he receives (e.g., product functionality) at 
time t, and Pi is the price to be paid to firm i. We assume that the benefit for 

















,   (2.8) 
where Bo and γ are constants, pi(t) is firm i’s niche centre, ||pi(t) – k|| denotes the 
distance between the firm’s niche centre and the taste position, and εijk is an error 
term that represents the inability of consumer j to exactly evaluate “product 
dissimilarity” of firm i’s offering with respect to her own taste k. 
As explained below, our simulation is independent of whatever value Bo takes, 
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since it will not affect the decision-making process. Parameter γ is calibrated along 
with NWC in such way that the largest firm in the market is able to catch 
approximately two thirds of the whole space (with expansion probability equal to 
1). 
 
Figure 2.3: Conceptual framework for consumer behaviour. 
 
These calibrated values allow for the existence of the centre-periphery scope 
effects (as the resource-partitioning model argues). It is also noticeable that, in 
principle, at least two large-scale firms are enough to serve the whole market. The 
term εijk is assumed to be distributed as N(0,σ2), which allows for the existence of 
what is called “niche overlap” in OE (see Figure 2.3), since two or more firms 
might share one or more positions.14 If Sk(t) is the set of firms that offer a product to 
                                                     
14
 Niche overlap is a key concept in the dynamics of resource partitioning and represents 
the possibility of having two or more firms sharing one or more positions. It also implies 
that, in any position, there is the possibility of having no absolute winner. In other words, if 
firms have close utility offerings at some position, they should share consumers in some 
way. Niche overlap might be modelled in different manners. An alternative argument might 
run as follows. Consider firm A offering a utility value of 30 to consumers at slot k, and firm 
B offering a utility value of 70 to the same consumers. It seems appealing to argue that 
market shares are assigned according to proportional utility values (e.g., firm A would get 
30% and firm B 70%). However, this assumes that the extent of perception imperfection is 
the same in the range of all possible differences between A’s utility and B’s utility. It might 
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.     (2.9) 
Consumers have a participation threshold defined as Uo = Bo – Po. Po is a price 
defined according to a mark-up (we later explain that it is set to 20%) over the 
highest value of the LRAC curve.15 
2.3.4 Price setting 
Prices are set by estimating the additional quantity firms expect to sell in the next 
time period. Based on that, firms are able to estimate costs and determine prices. 
Price discrimination is prohibited and every firm offers a unique price at every time 
step. A new entrant starts with a niche width of one single taste position, so that 
wi
u(t) = wil(t). If a firm enters the market, it will initially seek to maximise profits 
(subject to entry constraints like entering only one single position or carrying out a 
finite search on the price range). Qi(t) is defined as the quantity firm i expects to get 
at entry at time t, and Uoi(t) as the utility that firm i is “offering” to position k at the 
beginning of time t. Successful entry requires a computation of an expected quantity 
to sell according to: 
))(Pr()( oioki UtUbtQ >= .   (2.10) 
Accordingly, if the firm i attempts entry into an occupied slot, the calculation of 
Qi will include information from competing firms already offering products at that 
position. To simplify notation, since everything happens at taste k, we define Uj(t) 
as the utility that j-th firm offers at the position of interest. Let us assume that, in 
position k, there are Nk(t) firms at time t (that is, Nk(t) = |Sk(t)|, the number of 
elements in the set Sk(t)). Taking the advantage that all the εijk’s are independent and 
identically distributed, we compute the expected quantity according to a joint 
                                                                                                                                  
work relatively well if utility values are very close –where perception is fuzzy– but when 
they are very distant, as it might be in the example, there is no reason to think that firm A 
would get any sales. In our framework, it can indeed be shown that the proportional 
distribution according to utility values does not behave well for all the possible differences 
between A’s and B’s utilities.  
15
 Firms set a production level at the beginning of every time period, and at the end (after 
all transactions have taken place) they see their realised sold volume. We therefore use a 



















tUtUUtUbtQ .  (2.11) 
Specifically, entrant i randomly selects m prices from a range denoted by the 
proportional values (with a mark-up factor) of the extremes of the estimated LRAC 
curve, and performs expected profit calculations. The resulting price set is denoted 
by Pi,1, Pi,2,…, Pi,m. Entrant i will select the initial entry price, Pi, according to the 








.  (2.12) 
The value of m (which is set to 5) does not have any effect on the simulation 
outcomes, and it is used only to produce a starting (entry) price.16 Given the 
complexity of these calculations, we present further details in section 2.7. 
Subsequently, we suggest an adaptive approach to update prices, similar to 
profit-seeking behaviour as assumed in neo-Austrian economics (Kirzner 1997). 
The argument is that firms, once in the market and in search of expansion 
opportunities, face a higher level of complexity in an environment characterised by 
multiple competitors with presence in multiple positions that offer different prices. 
Firms take into consideration price information observed in last-period transactions. 
After entry, and in the face of competition, incumbent i’s niche limits wil(t) and 
wi
u(t) are adjusted accordingly. In so doing, firms might keep, lose or gain taste 
positions. Consequently, firms update their niche centre pi(t) after all transactions 
have occurred and take the last sold amount as a reference point for the next 
production level. The possibility that firms update their niche centre and that they 
expand in the direction of higher expected sales implies than firms are able to move 
in the direction of higher scale expectations. The niche expansion (or reduction) 
decision-making process is discussed next.  
                                                                                                                                  
buyer population at every time period. 
16
 In order to force firms to start rather small and allow them to consider quantities within 
the region of downward average costs, we also constrain entrants to have an upper bound 
production capacity, which is the intersection point of their average cost function with the 
LRAC curve. This value corresponds to the highest expected quantity in absence of 
competition. To avoid an excess of information in this chapter, the maximisation algorithm 
is presented in Chapter 3. 
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2.3.5 Firm expansion 
After transactions have taken place, firm i computes the expected benefit of 
expansion and takes the decision whether or not to expand. The direction of 
expansion may affect niche limits and niche centre when firms effectively gain 
newly targeted positions. Firms might be engaged in both vertical and horizontal 
expansion. First, with respect to vertical expansion (niche penetration), firms try to 
fill positions that they have already occupied. Firms gradually try to “fill up” the 
positions in which they already have a product offering if such a strategy leads to 
scale advantages (diminished average costs). Firms set their new consumer base 
within the current niche, taking into account (a) the set of unserved consumers, and 
(b) the current probability of catching an additional consumer (given his or her 
utility constraint). Again, Section 2.7 gives details of the vertical expansion 
equation. 
With respect to horizontal expansion (niche broadening), a firm that tries to 
expand into other niches evaluates expected sales in adjacent positions to the 
current niche. Firm i considers expansion to the upper and lower adjacent slots of 
the current niche. For example, considering that expansion is attempted to the upper 
slot, firm i first estimates the expected additional quantity to be sold next time 
period , ∆Qiu. If firm i supposes that utility Uiu is offered at such an upper position, 

















tUtUUtUbtQ .  (2.13) 
In the same fashion, firm i estimates the expected additional quantity sold at the 
adjacent lower slot of current niche, ∆Qil. In the end, the firm may decide to expand 
to the position that offers larger scale advantages.17 Based on the expected total 
quantity after expansion, the associated new production and cost levels are 
computed. The reader can refer to Section 2.7 for a detailed presentation of these 
expansion-related computations. 
Based on arguments of consumer retention (cf. Harrington and Chang 2005), we 
                                                     
17
 Firms prefer higher to lower profits. Since total costs increase with quantity and prices 
are gradually updated to mark-up over costs, profits are proportional to total costs, 
increasing with quantity. If average costs decrease with quantity, it is sensible to assume 
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assume that a firm prefers to attract more consumers in positions where the firm has 
already gained a presence. Hence, firms first attempt to expand vertically before 
considering a horizontal move. To reflect this, we use a niche expansion coefficient. 
Costs and niche positions are updated vis-à-vis outcomes in the previous time 
period. For instance, if firm i decides to expand towards the upper taste position, 







=+ ,   (2.14) 
where 
))1,()(1()1( ++=+ tQCMarkUptP iiei .  (2.15) 
Expression 2.14 is used to avoid unrealistic jumps in prices and to keep a certain 
degree of “inertia” with respect to the previous price the firm has used, so that we 
take the average value between the expected price and the previous price. As 
mentioned earlier, the mark-up over costs (MarkUp) is set equal to 0.20.18,19 Firms 
lose a position k if their local offers are not accepted by any customers. Firms leave 
the market if they incur cumulative negative profits, which are calculated simply as 
                                                                                                                                  
that a firm will move in the direction of larger scale advantages.  
18
 The mark-up figure is a value between 0 and 1, and is set just to represent the fraction of 
return (over costs) that a firm gets for every unit sold. Neither the expansion procedures nor 
the consumer decision-making process are affected by the choosing of a particular mark-up 
value. 
19
 Strictly speaking, our micro assumptions as to firm behaviour are a mixture of neo-
classical and neo-Austrian economics suppositions. Initially, a firm follows profit-
maximising behaviour at entry. Subsequently, as an incumbent, the firm adopts a mark-up 
strategy to update prices when facing multiple competitors at every position of its niche. 
There are two reasons to shift to this adaptive mark-up strategy. First, we know from 
behavioural theories of individuals and firms (Simon 1957; Cyert and March 1963) that 
maximising behaviour is more likely to arise in cases where computation is simple (here, a 
firm facing competition at a single taste position), but it is replaced with heuristic behaviour 
when computation becomes more complex (here, after entry, firms face multiple 
competitors with different prices at different taste positions). Although in any case, even at 
entry, the profit-maximisation problem is mathematically intractable (in terms of deriving a 
closed-form solution) but computationally treatable (as in numerical optimisation methods); 
after entry the computations would become too intensive. Second, in other computational 
models, mark-up pricing is introduced with reference to the claim that this is the most 
common rule to fix prices by real firms that adaptively probe their way in uncertain 
environments (Adner and Levinthal 2001: 619). 
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sales revenues minus total costs. Table 2.1 summarises the model’s main features.  
2.4 Simulation’s experimental design 
We now turn to explaining how we obtain the simulated data and the statistical 
processes we run to analyse it. We consider three different experiments: (a) 
Experiment 1 was run with large-scale firms only, in order to explore basic model 
features, like the effect of distance to market centre and firm size on mortality rates, 
(b) Experiment 2 was run with two different firm types (large-scale and small-scale 
firms), but with a constant probability of founding per type, independent from any 
market conditions; and (c) Experiment 3 with the two different firm types, and a 
probability of founding a specific type that depends on market conditions. Recall 
that large-scale firms are those that have large capacity and are able to reap 
substantial scale economies in the long run. In contrast, small-scale firms can be 
very competitive at the beginning, but have limited scale advantages, implying that 
they may be out competed by the large-scale firms in the long-run (see Figure 2.2). 
As explained below, the extent to which the small-scale firm scale advantage is 
limited, is left to parameter values explorations. 
So far we have given justifications to parameter values based on desired 
theoretical calibrations or known empirical facts (see section 2.7 for a summary 
table about model parameters). However, there are three variables in our model that 
are not related to any a priori theoretical calibration benchmark, nor do they have 
any connection with known empirical studies in market partitioning: (i) the niche 
expansion coefficient; (ii) the extent of small-scale firm scale advantages; and (iii) 
the degree of consumer’s fuzziness. In absence of any empirical grounds for them 
we follow an “indirect calibration” procedure, by which the researcher “indirectly 
calibrates the model by focusing on the parameters that are consistent with output 
validation” (Windrum et al. 2007: 4.4). For instance, although the assumption that 
firms may decide to expand, horizontally or vertically, is reasonable, there is no 
reason to expect them to do so in each and every time period. Empirical studies in 
resource partitioning (Carroll and Hannan 2000) exemplify the gradual niche 
expansion due to the steady increase in market concentration over many years 
(Swaminathan 1995; Carroll and Swaminathan 2000). Exploration with the model 
reveals that the range of [0.05, 0.125] contains two rather extreme expansion 
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profiles: very rapid and very slow expansion behaviour. 
 
Resource space • One-dimensional unimodal taste space of n = 100 taste 
positions 
• Each taste position reflects demand, which represents 
the number of product units that customers in such a 
position would be willing to buy each time  
Organisational 
founding 
• Follows two mechanisms: (a) a negative binomial 
distribution with density-dependent entry rate, λ(t) = 
f(N(t)), N(0) = 1; and (b) an allocation mechanism of 
entrants across resource space 
Niche centre and 
niche width 
selection 
• Niche centres are the middle points of each firm’s niche  
• All entrants start with the same niche breadth (one 
position) 
Cost structure • Cost functions are generated according to a long-run 
average cost curve 
• Firms’ total costs include production and niche-width 
related costs  
Price setting • Firms start with the expected profit-maximising price, 
resulting from sampling and evaluating m scenarios, 
taking into account competitors’ price at the entry 
position  
• Subsequent price updates follow a mark-up based 
strategy and calculations of expected quantities 
according to current market conditions 
Firm expansion • Firms expand vertically (filling already occupied taste 
positions) and horizontally (targeting new adjacent taste 
niches), deciding to expand if they can take advantage 
of scale economies 
Table 2.1: The model’s set up. 
  
We take similar considerations on board to evaluate the value ranges of the other 
two variables: the degree of scale advantage for small-scale firms (defined as the 
quantity where the firm’s cost function and the LRAC curve intersect, Qo), and the 
degree of consumer’s fuzziness (that is, the standard deviation of the error term εijk). 
For instance, we have calibrated the small-scale range in order to keep a reasonable 
scale difference between the two firm types. Moreover, the degree of consumers’ 
fuzziness is calibrated in order to allow for the presence of two or more firms in a 
given position, but without allowing these degrees to distort the transaction process. 
That is, we explore combinations of different values for this set of three variables 
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such that sufficient variety is included. 
For the simulation trials, we consider three different values of the small-scale 
firm advantage, two values of the expansion coefficient and two values for niche 
overlap intensity. This gives a total of 3 x 2 x 2 = 12 combinations. For each 
combination, we run five simulations and take average results. The total number of 
runs is 12 x 5 = 60 per experiment with two firm types. We also keep the same 
number of runs for the first experiment with large-scale firms only. The result is a 
total of 3 x 60 = 180 simulation runs.20 Tested values are summarised in Table 2.2.  
 
Variable Range Tested values 
Expansion coefficient 
(ExpCoef) 
[0.05, 0.125] Low = 0.05; high = 0.125 
Small-scale advantage (Qo) [5,20] Low = 5; medium = 10; high 
= 20 
Degree of consumers’ 
fuzziness (σ) 
[0.05,0.1] Low = 0.05; high = 0.1 
Table 2.2: Parameter setting. 
 
We analyse the hazard rate of firms in the market using statistical event-history 
models, as standard in empirical OE, in which the dependent variable is the 
instantaneous rate of exit from the market at time t. Such an instantaneous rate takes 
into account the probability of failure (leaving the market) between t and t + dt, 











.   (2.16) 
Following the standard practice in OE, we use piecewise constant-rate 
exponential models to compute such hazard rates. Piecewise constant-rate 
                                                     
20
 A single simulation run could take many hours to complete, depending on the experiment 
type and the parameter value combinations.  We used two PCs with processing speed 2.6 
GHz and 2.9 GHz, respectively. We decided to combine simulation results from different 
parameter values in a single experiment, taking into account that (a) variance results per 
experiment could be high as a consequence of the aggregated data coming from different 
parameter value combinations, and, (b) there is no a real baseline parameter value 
combination, since (as mentioned) some of the parameters are used for control of the 
qualitative behaviour of the simulation output only, and do not have a direct empirical basis 
(e.g. the expansion coefficient).  
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exponential models permit to estimate hazard rates without strong assumptions 
about the form of the baseline hazard rate (Carroll and Hannan 2000; Cleves et al. 
2004). To do so, we divide the whole time horizon in intervals every 50 time 
periods, and calculate the hazard rate according to 
)''exp()( ΥΗzΕth += ,                   (2.17) 
where E corresponds to a vector of estimated baseline effects (a set of eight 
constants, each related to each time interval), z is the vector of age pieces, Y is the 
vector of independent covariates, and is H the vector of estimated coefficients 
(Boone et al. 2000; Carroll and Hannan 2000; Cleves et al. 2004). The vector Y 
contains the variables than measure firm size, distance to the market centre, market 
concentration, firm type (small or large scale), total sold quantity and density. Since 
covariates are time-dependent, and the hazard rate is calculated in duration time, we 
apply a “spell-splitting” technique to our data (Carroll and Hannan 2000), which is 
generated directly from the simulation program. Statistics are run in the STATA 
software program. Next, we present our simulation outcomes, interpreting the 
results from the perspective of the extant IO and OE literature. 
2.5 Simulation outcomes 
2.5.1 Preliminaries 
As resource-partitioning theory argues, as firms grow, they move towards the 
market centre. Using one-firm simulation trials, we explored how firms move across 
the resource space. One interesting behavioural feature of the model is the fact that 
firms are effectively able to move in the direction where scale economies 
advantages can be increased. Simulation runs with one single firm reveal this 
desired behaviour of the model. We ran simulations for 400 time periods with one 
single large-scale firm in the market. We used ExpCoef = 0.05 and σ = 0.05. 
Sample trajectories are presented in Figure 2.4. For every one-firm simulation 
trial, each trajectory illustrates starting (at t = 1) and final (at t = 400) niche-centre-
to-market-centre absolute distance (in terms of number of positions). It is plain to 
see from the figure how firms move towards the direction of higher scale 
advantages (i.e., the market centre in absence of any competition). This behaviour 
also suggests that the fiercest scale-based competition is expected near the market 
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centre and increases as large-scale firms grow and move towards such a point. 
2.5.2 Experiment 1: large-scale firms competition 
As said before, we stick to the same number of runs (60 runs), despite the fact 
that variations of Qo do not apply in our benchmark Experiment 1 with large firms 
only. Of course, we use the other relevant parameter combinations. In this 
experiment, our interest is to see the effects of location and size advantage on 
mortality rates. Therefore, we remove the consumer’s utility constraint (Uo) to 
enable consumers to buy at any price. This means that survival in the market is only 
due to scale advantages and resource space location, and not to consumers’ 
participation constraints.  
 
Figure 2.4: Firm movement towards the market centre. 
 
Guided by OE’s empirical studies (Swaminathan 1995, 1998, 2001; Boone et al. 
2000, 2004), we selected three independent variables: Firm size, Size, distance of 
the firm’s niche centre from the market centre, Distance, and market concentration, 
measured as the market share of the four largest firms, C4. We dropped the niche-
width variable (the number of each firm’s occupied taste positions) in all 
experiments, because it was highly correlated, at significance level p = 0.05, with 
size (this is as expected: the larger the firm’s niche width, the larger its consumer 
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base). We considered three standard control variables commonly used in empirical 
OE studies: organisational Mass (the total volume sold), Density and Density 
squared, but the latter two also appeared to be highly correlated (at significance 
level p = 0.05) with C4, and were consequently dropped for this experiment. The 
average evolutionary pattern of market concentration (C4) and density is shown in 
Figure 2.5. As suggested before, we used the following age pieces or intervals: 0≤ t 
< 50; 50 ≤ t < 100; 100 ≤ t < 150; 150 ≤ t < 200; 200 ≤ t < 250; 250 ≤ t < 300; 300 
≤ t < 350; 350 ≤ t. Statistical information is presented in Table 2.3.21 
On average, for all the simulation conditions, 642 firms entered the market 
(Standard Deviation = 150.9), while 632 firms exited (Standard Deviation = 
126.96). The statistical analyses reveal that firm Size and Distance to the market 
centre are significant in all 60 event-history regressions. The remaining variables are 
largely non-significant. Size decreases the risk of mortality (with a coefficient of –
0.1320). This result is in line with OE theory and evidence (Carroll and Hannan 
2000). 
The negative effect of organisational size on mortality rates has, for instance, 
been found in the population of credit unions in New York (Barron 1999). More 
generally, its positive effect on other measures of firm performance, such as growth 
and profitability, has been also revealed for large daily newspapers in the 
Netherlands (Boone et al. 2004).  
We also find that the mortality rate increases as the firm moves away from the 
market centre (0.0828). Increased concentration is a by-product of scale effects and 
related to increased mortality (0.7394), although this measure appears to be 
significant in only 53.33% of the total number of simulation runs. The evolution of 
market concentration reveals a U-shape curve (see Figure 2.5, where dashed lines 
correspond to simulation runs and the thick solid line to average behaviour). The 
curves start at the value of 1 due to the fact that by design, the simulation begins 
with only one firm. As the market gets crowded, concentration declines, but this is 
later offset by the fact that firms located at the centre exercise their scale power and 
out compete the small firms. Hence, after a massive entry, only a few firms are able 
                                                     
21
 A more rigorous procedure would be to assess the average statistical behaviour of the 
model per simulation initial conditions. We also decided to pool all the results because their 
disaggregation had not offer any additional insight. 
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to quickly move to the centre and take advantage of the centre’s resource 
abundance. That is, after a while, expansion triggers increased niche overlap and 
scale competition. Scale disadvantages drive many firms out of the market. The 
survivors take over the market. Market concentration increases sharply, and density 







Avg. coefficient** Std. Dev. Min** Max** 
0 ≤ t < 50 61.67% -4.1046 1.4809 -8.865628 -1.547164 
50 ≤ t < 100 85% -4.9539 1.6806 -10.93482 -2.045272 
100 ≤ t < 150 91.67% -5.7823 1.6702 -12.12515 -2.658069 
150 ≤ t < 200 83.33% -6.0441 1.6921 -10.87382 -3.563209 
200 ≤ t < 250 66.67% -6.3742 1.8863 -12.29788 -2.933526 
250 ≤ t < 300 53.33% -6.7320 1.7767 -12.60825 -3.934704 
300 ≤ t < 350 40% -6.7412 2.0186 -12.77187 -4.131844 
350 ≤ t  13.33% -6.3875 1.7605 -9.342791 -4.4718 
Size 100% -0.1320 0.0700 -0.2946194 -0.051574 
Distance 100% 0.0828 0.0116 0.0617111 0.1095646 
C4 53.33% 0.7394 0.5736 -0.820906 2.192983 
Mass 23.33% -0.0005 0.0005 -0.0011382 0.0010978 
*p  ≤ 0.05  
**Figures obtained from significant values (total: 60 simulation runs)  
 






Figure 2.5: Concentration and density behaviour with large-scale firm 
competition. 
 
After an increase in entry, only those able to reap cost advantages survive, 
imposing scale-based barriers to new entrants. After some time, entry is no longer 
attractive, as incumbent firms must fight for resources. This leads to a market 
collapse in terms of density (Figure 2.5).22 This implies that, coupled with the scale 
effect, there is an efficiency effect since the fall in average price forces the most 
inefficient firms to leave the market. Such an effect is sustained by the incumbents’ 
increased competitive power, which is reflected in the market’s average total 
delivered cost (production plus niche-width costs). All this can be seen in Figure 
2.6.  
                                                     
22
 Original versions of density-dependence theory fail to explain industry shakeouts (Barron 
2001), but subsequent variations have been proposed to explain density decline (Lomi et al. 
2005). Additionally, IO economists have tried to explain shakeouts with reference to 
technological innovation (Klepper and Graddy 1990; Klepper and Simons 2005). In 
absence of any innovation, Experiment 1 also reflects a shakeout, based only on scale 
advantages and increased market efficiency in a market with heterogeneous preferences. 
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These results match two pieces of theory. First, the evolutionary outcome 
resembles a Bertrand oligopoly, although it is clear that in our model incumbent 
firms do not choose prices but rather choose quantities and compute costs that 
translate (proportionally) into mark-up prices. However, a firm’s profitability 
depends on the relative evaluation of prices in the consumers’ utility functions, so 
that a firm with the lowest price conquers the highest market share.  
Second, the outcome provides a complementary view to the market resource-
based hypothesis, which states that tailed resource spaces with both scale and scope 
economies generate a highly concentrated market structure with a few large multi-
product firms (van Witteloostuijn and Boone 2006: 421). Our model does not 
exhibit any multi-product context (and consequently no scope economies in the 
economic sense). However, it does present a scale-driven process which, in the long 
run, generates a few survivors only after competition.  
In this model with identical firms, we could also demonstrate that the density 
decline is not due to the shape of the resource space but to the dominance of scale 
economies (revealing a highly concentrated market with average concentration 
equal to 0.9061 and average density equal to 10 firms at t = 400). In a tailed 
resource space with identical large-scale firms: (i) the mortality rate increases with 
distance to the market centre; and (ii) the shape of the resource space generates 
scale differentials, since price also increases with distance to the marker centre (this 
result becomes clearer when we illustrate snapshots of average costs in the next 
experiments). This supports the idea that the shape of the resource space is a key 
determinant of market structures. 
The next experiments include two types of firms and differ in the way the firms 
choose their type at entry. Experiment 2 maintains an equal probability for an 
entrant of being either large or small scale. On the other hand, Experiment 3 
assumes that a higher potential consumer base leads to a higher large-scale firm 
entry, but tight and crowded markets encourage exploiting small resource space 
spots through small-scale firm entry. We give a more detailed rationale for these in 




Figure 2.6: Behaviour of market’s average scale advantage over time. 
 
2.5.3 Experiment 2: two firm types and a pure selection model 
We ran a second experiment that includes the two types of firms defined earlier: 
large-scale and small-scale. Becoming a large-scale or small-scale firm upon entry 
depends on a constant and equal probability (0.5) of adopting either type. The 
intention of keeping a constant probability of adopting either firm type, independent 
of market conditions, is to observe to what extent a pure firm-type selection process 
is able to generate a partitioned market. What we would expect is that, at the near 
centre where most of the firms attempt to enter at the beginning, the small-scale 
ones would be swept away in the long run. As the market gets populated (recall that 
new firms only enter spots where there are unserved consumers) new firms 
gradually try to enter peripheral spots in the space. After some time, in the market 
fringe, the large-scale firms might never find a suitable operation point and their 
small-scale competitors might become more adaptive, so the large-scale firms would 
be swept away from the market periphery. This process should produce a market 
with high concentration (large-scale firms at the centre) coupled with a high firm 
population (small-scale firms at the periphery).  
Given that firms now face a utility constraint Uo at the demand side, they most 
likely incur negative profits after entry until they expand beyond their break-even 
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point of production. In order to pass this hurdle, all firms are given an “endowment” 
(Hannan 1998), which is defined as a proportion to fixed costs and assures that a 
firm is able to survive in the market for the first two years of operations. The exact 
value of the endowment depends on the scale advantage assigned to each firm, as 
presented in Table 2.2. According to the values we adopt in our simulation, the 
large-scale/small-scale endowment ratios are 91.40, 55.71 and 33.95. We run 60 
simulations, including the scenarios sketched in Table 2.2. Simulated data produced 
an average of 2,270 firms entering the market (SD = 439.32), whereas 2,106 exited 
(SD = 409.10). Figure 2.7 and 2.8 depict the evolutionary trajectories of market 
concentration and density, respectively, and Table 2.4 reports the statistical results 
of the hazard rate model. 
Our findings show, again, a positive effect of concentration (0.4839) with still a 
large percentage of significant coefficients (77 per cent). Figure 2.7 also reveals an 
average declining pattern up to approximately time period 50, followed by a further 
increasing trend. For the statistical part, we added a variable named Type to the 
statistical model, which takes the value of 0 if the firm is a large-scale and 1 if it is a 
small-scale firm. We also observe that firm Size and Type are related to lower 
mortality, since they account for negative coefficients. This means that both large 
firms and small-scale firms present advantages in the competitive scenario, which is 
consistent with a rather high density, coupled with the above-mentioned high 
concentration. As observed in Experiment 1, the effect of Distance gets blurred due 
to the introduction of the two firm types. This is because its effect is non-significant 




Figure 2.7: Average behaviour of market concentration with two firm types 
and a pure selection model. 
 
 






Despite of the fact that the probability of founding a large-scale firm remains 
constant, Figure 2.8 indicates differences of the density evolution outcomes per type 
at t = 400. On average, large-scale firm density declines from a peak of 39 to a 
stabilising value of 26, whereas 138 small-scale firms are still alive at t = 400. 
Although in general terms we can say that this experiment generated a 
convincing firm-type selection process, it was not successful in reproducing highly 
concentrated markets with high density for all the parameter value ranges. Separate 
data analyses revealed a tendency to market fragmentation when the growth 
capacity of small-scale firms was introduced, coupled especially with low niche 
expansion capabilities. That is, when the expansion capability of the firm is low, the 
higher the “scale advantage” of the small-scale firm becomes (i.e., Qo = 20), the 
more likely a decline in market concentration.  
The intuitive explanation is that small-scale firms would need larger sales in 
order to find their operation point that will make them bigger. Since the resource 
space is constant, this implies that there would be fewer small-scale firms in the 
space. In addition, if the expansion coefficient is low, all the firms in the market will 
face a higher “inertia” in the expansion process. We observed from the entry 
mechanism that all firms initially try to put a foothold near the market centre, but 
crowding will probably force new entrants (both large and small-scale firms) 
towards the periphery at later stages. Figure 2.9 illustrates that, for some parameter 
value combinations, such a process is not enough to make the market centre an area 
of grown large-scale firms. In such cases, market concentration, instead of having 
an increasing trend at a later stage, completely declines. In other words, large-scale 
firms, which are potentially more efficient (in terms of average unit cost), are not 
always able to out compete their small-scale rivals in the market centre. 
However, market segregation clearly emerged in those cases where expansion 
capabilities were higher. That is, large-scale firms took over the market centre while 
surviving small-scale firms were relegated to the resource space periphery. The 
market is “partitioned”: the abundant region is populated by the few large-scale 
firms, while the scarce resource region is populated by the small-scale firms. A plot 
illustrating the aggregate niche width distribution can be seen in Figure 2.10. Dots 
represent the locations of large-scale firms’ niche centres and circles the locations 
for the small-scale firms’ niche centres. For the given parameter configuration, 
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Figure 2.10 clearly illustrates the effect of the pure selection process: small-scale 
firms are excluded from the near-centre region, and large-scale firms are excluded 
from the peripheral region. 
In any case, despite their higher cost inefficiency, small-scale firms are able to 
find a spot in the space to proliferate. This finding supports OE’s argument that 
selection does not always favour the most efficient firms (Hannan and Freeman 






Avg. coefficient** Std. Dev. Min** Max** 
0≤ t < 50 88% -3.4405 2.0867 -6.934497 9.561507 
50 ≤ t < 100 97% -6.0683 1.3117 -9.37481 -2.753323 
100 ≤ t < 150 98% -6.3445 2.1970 -9.796994 6.310733 
150 ≤ t < 200 95% -6.6848 1.3755 -10.57099 -3.284243 
200 ≤ t < 250 85% -6.9704 1.3593 -10.54533 -4.1524 
250 ≤ t < 300 83% -7.3141 1.3406 -11.57596 -5.038282 
300 ≤ t < 350 80% -7.3752 1.4892 -11.78573 -3.731257 
350 ≤ t 38% -6.4329 1.2579 -8.843504 -3.848529 
Size 100% -0.0919 0.0238 -0.1420294 -0.0311029 
Distance 8% 0.0028 0.0055 -0.0063139 0.0074056 
C4 78% 0.4839 5.2230 -30.59252 3.691417 
Type 100% -0.3914 0.1807 -1.07301 -0.1785266 
Mass 10% -0.0001 0.0007 -0.0010216 0.0006881 
Density 23% -0.0010 0.0254 -0.0379064 0.0490001 
Density2 22% 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001236 0.0000992 
*p  ≤ 0.05 
**Figures obtained from significant values (total: 60 simulation runs) 
 
Table 2.4: Hazard rate results of the pure selection model. 
 
In conclusion, Experiment 2 (firm-type selection process) illustrates that market 
partitioning is possible. However, it is dependent on the specific parameter values, 
as observed in Figure 2.9, where market concentration may decline. It is important 




Figure 2.9: Concentration behaviour in Experiment 2; ExpCoef = 0.05, σ = 
0.1. 
 






Consequently, arguing that real firm-type selection processes are weak because 
the firm-type selection model is sensitive to parameter value changes might be 
wrong. Instead, we can examine whether variations of the firm-type probability have 
an effect on the results. We will see in the next section that some degree of 
“entrepreneurial intervention” can enhance the partitioning process. With 
“entrepreneurial intervention” we mean an activity that helps to decide, in light of 
perceived market conditions, which is the most convenient firm type to be founded. 
Entrepreneurial intervention is modelled with an entry probability per firm-type that 
depends on market occupation. With the inclusion of an entry probability per firm 
type, we show next that the model becomes less sensitive to parameter variation 
than the pure firm-type selection model.  
2.5.4 Experiment 3: varying entry probability per firm type 
In Experiment 3, we ran the model with both large-scale and small-scale firms 
while changing their probabilities of founding according to market conditions. The 
proportion of large-scale and small-scale entrants over time is based on the 
theoretical framework of Carroll and Hannan (1995). They mention that, early in the 
market, “[c]ompetition forces each [firm] to specialise to some extent to 
differentiate itself, although the overall strategy adopted by most firms is generalists 
in nature” (Carroll and Hannan 1995: 216).  
Additionally, the incentives to found a new firm with large sunk costs decline as 
the market approaches its “carrying capacity” (maximum organisational mass for the 
industry). Accordingly, we implemented a very simple mechanism in which the 
probability of founding a large-scale firm at the first time period is 1 but declines 
with market saturation over time. That is, if the total sold amount at time t is 
represented by Mass(t), the probability of founding a large-scale firm at time t, t > 1, 
















After 60 simulation runs, the registered average number of entrants over the 
hundred-year evolution was 2,070 firms (SD = 405.66), while the average number 
                                                     
23
 With such a mechanism, simulation results reveal that the average probability that a 
large-scale firm is founded at t = 400 is 0.0786. The market always reached its carrying 
capacity at t = 400. 
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of failures was 1,924 (SD = 377.99).24 The evolution of key variables (market 
concentration and density) is visualised in Figure 2.11 and 2.12. The statistical 
results are reported in Table 2.5. 
 
Figure 2.11: Average concentration behaviour with varying entry 
probability per firm type. 
 
As is clear from Figure 2.11 and 2.12, the qualitative pattern of outcomes 
resembles, again, indications of resource-partitioning theory. Market concentration 
sharply declines from 1 (recall that simulation starts with a single firm, by design), 
but later increases steadily as scale effects become dominant. Some firms are able to 
find their way to the market centre and become large. The simulation also reveals 
that, although a few large-scale firms might be enough to cover the whole market 
(as explained in Section 2.3), the fact that large-scale firms move towards the centre 
to compete for a large market share leaves the market fringe uncovered. On the one 
hand, the number of large-scale firms declines from a peak of 29 to 7 at t = 400, on 
average. On the other hand, the registered average number of small-scale firms is 
                                                     
24
 For instance, the American automobile industry, which has exhibited resource-
partitioning characteristics (Carroll et al. 2002) over its first hundred years, had 2,197 
automobile producers and 3,845 firms that attempted but failed to enter the market (Hannan 
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139 at t = 400, implying that fringe specialists survive in the market’s periphery. 
However, contrary to similarities to the resource-partitioning process, small-scale 
firm’s density slightly declines after reaching a peak, and then stabilises.25 In 
“equilibrium”, after a 400-period evolutionary process, we observe a fringed 
oligopoly with a high number of small-scale firms that are mainly located at the 
periphery (cf. van Witteloostuijn and Boone 2006). 
 
Figure 2.12: Average behaviour of density with varying entry probability 
per firm type. 
 
The statistical analyses reveal a dual market structure outcome: as market 
concentration, reflected by C4 increases, the mortality risk for all the firms in the 
market (2.3438) declines not only with Size (–0.0934) but also with firm Type (–
0.4936). That is, both large and small-scale firms find viable ways to survive in the 
market with increasing concentration. Additionally, the variable Distance tends to 
drop below the assumed threshold level of significance. This is in contrast with the 
result in Experiment 1. The effect of Distance is also stronger than that in 
                                                                                                                                  
2005: 52-53). 
25
 Although the simulations were run up to 400 time periods, sample plots not reported here 
with 1000 time periods indicate that small-scale firm’ density certainly stabilises in the long 
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Experiment 2. That is, the Distance coefficient appears to be positively related to 
mortality rates and is  significant in 25 per cent of the runs. Again, the market’s dual 
structure indicates that distance to the market centre is not very important in 
explaining overall mortality rates.  
The set of results are not completely in line with standard resource-partitioning 
theory for a number of reasons we give in Section 2.6. After all, the “pure” form of 
resource-partitioning theory claims that, as concentration increases, specialists’ 
mortality rates decrease while generalists’ mortality rates increase (Boone et al. 
2000). Partial tests (not reported here) of our model using an alternative, monotonic, 
measure for market concentration (the Gini coefficient) indicate that the effect of 
size becomes stronger with concentration, whereas small-type benefits decline. 
These results reinforce the classical IO view on the impact of increasing 





Avg. coefficient** Std. Dev. Min** Max** 
0≤ t < 50 70% -2.7579 1.6333 -6.193952 3.28621 
50 ≤ t < 100 95% -4.9217 1.8563 -10.44804 -1.553963 
100 ≤ t < 150 93% -5.4132 1.7112 -10.35151 -2.058892 
150 ≤ t < 200 92% -5.7060 1.8342 -9.843166 -2.458982 
200 ≤ t < 250 83% -5.7894 1.9376 -10.77222 -2.634414 
250 ≤ t < 300 78% -5.9781 1.8626 -10.12993 -3.353002 
300 ≤ t < 350 65% -5.6709 2.0223 -9.731611 -2.700977 
350 ≤ t 20% -4.6387 1.5752 -6.855718 -1.94698 
Size 100% -0.0934 0.0263 -0.1674967 -0.0404862 
Distance 25% 0.0069 0.0037 0.003457 0.0166006 
C4 92% 2.3438 2.2192 -8.612538 7.374847 
Type 100% -0.4936 0.1621 -0.9071154 -0.285792 
Mass 33% -0.0004 0.0006 -0.0010271 0.0013273 
Density 38% -0.0214 0.0184 -0.0513715 0.0315866 
Density2 42% 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0000912 0.0001841 
*p ≤ 0.05 
**Figures obtained from significant values 
Table 2.5: Hazard rate results of the varying entry probability model. 
                                                                                                                                  
run at a point very near the figure indicated at the 400th time period. 
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As illustrated before, the simulation models reveal a downward average cost 
change over time (increasing cost efficiency). Similar to what we observed in 
Experiment 1, Figure 2.13 illustrates that average production costs decline over 
time. This is an indication of a positive social welfare effect that follows from two 
main underlying mechanisms. First, there is a “scale effect”. The dashed line reveals 
the declining trend of the industry’s minimum average production costs; the average 
sale price falls in the slipstream of increasing size and scale advantages. Second, 
there is an “efficiency effect” in the market centre. At a late stage of industry 
evolution, both large and small-scale firm densities decrease. This is coupled with 
declining average production costs. As a consequence, the most inefficient firms 
leave the market. However, some degree of cost inefficiency is compensated by 
strategic location. To check the validity of this interpretation, we calculated the 
average production costs of the “healthy” firms in the market (those with both 
positive cumulative profits and positive profits in the last time period) for all the 
surviving firms at t = 400, and for all simulation runs. The aggregated results are 
plotted in Figure 2.14.  
 
Figure 2.13: Behaviour of market’s average scale advantage over time. 
 
Average production costs are much lower in the market centre than in the 
periphery. The stabilising high number of small-scale survivors indicates that not-
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so-efficient firms can survive in the periphery, at a safe distance from their efficient 
large-scale counterparts in the centre. The selection of efficient large-scale firms in 
the industry’s centre is in line with standard thinking in IO regarding the survival of 
the most efficient (Jovanovic 1982). However, arguments from OE emphasise that 
inefficient firms might also survive. This is reflected in the sustainability of not-so-
efficient small-scale firms at the market’s periphery. Van Witteloostuijn (1998) cites 
two empirical examples that support this outcome. The first is the European 
ethylene market, in which firms, inefficient in terms of their average production 
costs, might stay in the market. The second example is a study by Baden-Fuller 
(1989) of the British steel castings industry; there, not all the firms with negative 
profits have left the market. 
 
Figure 2.14: Average unit cost vs. niche centre positioning (all runs) at t = 
400 (circles ≡ small-scale; dots ≡ large-scale). 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, there is an entrepreneurial ability to 
anticipate which firm type (large or small scale) is more appropriate to be founded. 
This entrepreneurial ability brings the results closer to the spirit of resource-
partitioning theory and less sensitive to parameter value choice. The aggregated data 
of Figure 2.14 reveals a common pattern for all the simulation runs of this 
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experiment: niche centres of the few large-scale firm survivors are located near the 
market centre, while a dense small-scale firm population is located at the periphery. 
Contrary to what we observed in Experiment 2 (with low expansion capabilities and 
increased small scale), the average pattern of market concentration was always 
increasing. In fact, 91.67% of all runs revealed high concentration values at the end 
of the simulation (i.e., C4 ratio larger than 50%). In Experiment 2, 76.67% of the 
runs registered high concentration values. But signs of market fragmentation 
appeared in the remaining 23.33%, as revealed in Figure 2.16. This figure compares 
(with the same parameter values) Experiment 2 and 3, in terms of unit delivered 
cost and niche centre location. Experiment 3 is more robust to the parameter change 
since it still reproduces centre-periphery scale differences.  
 
Figure 2.15: Concentration behaviour in Experiment 3; ExpCoef = 0.05, σ 
= 0.1. 
2.6 Concluding remarks 
We have presented a bottom-up approach to the emergence of dual market 
structures, by modelling and simulating the behaviour of and interaction among 
profit-seeking firms. In particular, first, we illustrated how in a model of identical 
firms, those located further away from the market centre experience a higher risk of 
mortality. Second, we also observed that in a market where concentration increases 
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the overall risk of mortality, large-sized firms at the market centre and small-scale 
firms at the periphery register lower mortality rates. Third, we have also illustrated 
that although the most inefficient firms are driven out of the market centre, the not-
so efficient firms survive at the periphery, out of the competitive reach of the 
efficient firms at and near the centre. The survival-of-the-efficient outcome at the 
centre is in line with traditional IO theory, but the location effect gives support to 
the OE argument as to the survival of not-so-efficient firms at the fringe. Finally, 
fourth, in the case where both firm types have a probability of being founded that 
depends on market conditions, results revealed that the market-partitioning model is 
reinforced within the explored parameter value ranges vis-à-vis the case where such 
a probability is constant. This might suggest that some degree of entrepreneurial 
intervention as to which firm type to be founded may be needed to effectively 
produce partitioned markets. 
 
 
Figure 2.16: Aggregate results for Experiment 2 and 3 with Qo= 20, 
ExpCoef = 5%, σ = 0.1, (circles ≡ small-scale; dots ≡ large-scale). 
 
We are aware of what these results do not mean. First, the results of our model 
do not imply that pure selection processes do not take effect. However, they do 
constitute an example of how, in a model that is built with a general representation 
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of firms’ market expectations, there might exist conditions where reinforcement by 
other factors to effectively reproduce small-scale firm proliferation may be needed. 
We have used a way of representing an entrepreneur’s effect through a varying 
founding firm-type probability. Yet it is also possible to show that other factors 
might contribute to small-scale firm proliferation in a concentrated market. For 
instance, it is possible to show that some degree of consumer mobility might 
generate a loss of the space occupied by the large-scale firms, enhancing the 
proliferation of small-scale firms. In Chapter 4, we depart from the assumption that 
every possible point in the space matches exactly one taste, but rather assume local 
variations in order to allow for some consumer mobility. We offer two empirically 
based connections to the above arguments. First, Swaminathan (1995, 1998) points 
out that other factors such as “niche formation” are needed jointly with resource-
partitioning theory in order to account for a full explanation of specialist 
proliferation. Second, entrepreneurial forces have proven to play an important role 
in driving the evolution of a market configuration (Boone et al. 2006).  
Another interesting point is that resource-partitioning processes are only partially 
replicated in our model. As we explain in Chapter 4, even considering that firms 
move to the centre as they grow, we did not get clear evidence of resource release 
due to the large-scale firms’ competition. It is important to recall that we model only 
a scale-based competition process in a space with an unequal distribution of 
consumers, while the resource-partitioning process deals with an involvement of 
realistic baseline hazard functions, in which demographic firm factors are also 
crucial. Small-scale firms might have higher mortality rates than generalists at every 
point in time because they usually are small firms with low resistance to changing 
market conditions. This is consistent with Carroll and Hannan (2000). Large-scale 
firms might be more likely to take advantage of strong ties with suppliers and 
retailers, which make them more resistant to changing market conditions. These 
arguments are out of the scope of our “scale-based competition” experiments. An 
alternative way to get closer to a resource-partitioning outcome in our model is 
having large-scale firms reducing their aggregated space at a rate higher than 
small-scale firm entrants. However, in contrast to resource-partitioning theory, our 
model reflects crowding effects among the small-scale firms that compete among 
themselves at later stages of the simulation, since the interaction rules for 
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competition are the same for every agent in the model. 
Additionally, we have assumed a fixed resource space, knowing that changing 
consumer preferences over time might dramatically change the model’s outcomes 
(Epstein 2007:20). It is noticeable that in the long history of research into resource-
partitioning this point has rarely been touched upon, although OE recognises that 
such changes might occur through the opening up new niches, generating a 
flattening of the resource space (Carroll and Hannan 1995a; Swaminathan 1995). 
Again, this reinforces the need to further study the impact of consumer mobility 
across space positions (see Chapter 4).  
We believe that a full formal development of resource space types and location 
effects on organisational survival (from an OE point of view), and organisational 
profitability and performance (from an IO perspective), will generate an interesting 
cross-fertilising effort. We saw that a unimodal resource space created scale 
differentials depending on firm location. However, we would expect different 
results in a model of two firm types, if the space does not generate any scale 
differentials due to strategic location, like in a flat space. These kinds of issues are 
worth investigating if we want to build a complete picture of resource-space effects 
in shaping market structures. Such an exploration is attempted in Chapter 3. More 
generally, our model’s set-up offers ample opportunities for future research that 
focuses on links between firm-level strategies and population-level features in a 
more co-evolutionary way (Dobrev et al. 2006), as we suggest in Chapter 4.  
2.7 Background information: additional model 
calculations 
In this section, we present a more detailed account of the equations that describe 
the computational model. The basic model information is presented in Section 2.3. 
The reader may want to go through this section when looking for further details. 
However, this exercise is not necessary, so this section may be skipped without 
losing fundamental information about the model’s logic.  
2.7.1 Entrant’s expected demand in absence of competition 
(entry at empty taste position) 
Using the model definitions stated in Section 2.3, firm i at the beginning of time 
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t calculates the initial expected demand (that is, at entry), Qi(t). Since all the 
variables εijk are i.i.d. and N(0,σ2), the probability of getting a consumer with a 
given price is constant for firm i at time t. Hence, Qi(t) is the expected value of a 
binomial distribution:  
))(Pr()( oioki UtUbtQ >= .   (2.18) 
The term Uoi(t) represents the utility amount that firm i is offering to consumers 
at time t. To simplify notation, we designate εi (εi ∼ N(0,σ2)) as the error term 
associated with firm i’s offering. Deriving accordingly from Equation 2.7 and 2.8, 












−= εγ .  (2.19) 
Since pi(t) = k for an entrant, we get 
))(Pr()( tPPbtQ ioiki −<= ε .    (2.20) 
2.7.2 Entrant’s expected demand in the presence of competition 
Using the model definitions introduced in Section 2.3, firm i at the beginning of 
time t calculates expected demand at entry, Qi(t), taking into account both the utility 
level associated with its offer at taste position k and the observed utility offerings (at 
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where εi – εj ∼ N(0, 2σ2). 
2.7.3 Vertical expansion (niche penetration) 
The additional quantity that firm i targets within its current niche in the next time 
period t+1, ∆Qi(t+1), is set considering the current proportion of unserved 
consumers and the probability of serving them in combination with the consumer’s 
utility participation constraint Uo. The set of niche positions covered by firm i at 
time t is defined as Ti(t), where 
)]}(),([:{)( twtwkktT uilii ∈= .   (2.24) 
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2.7.4 Horizontal expansion (niche expansion) 
Firms evaluate whether they will move towards or away from the centre, 
assessing the expected quantities they will be able to sell at positions adjacent to 
their current niche. Given information at time t, firms assess where the niche centre 
would be if, say, the upper position is added, piu(t). Firms will move into the 
direction of larger projected scale advantages. Next, how firm i calculates the 
























































































































































































           
 (2.28) 
The calculation for the expected quantity at the lower positions, ∆Qli(t+1), is 
identical. 
2.7.5 Constants and variables used in the model 
 
 
Symbol Definition Type Value/units 
n Number of taste positions 
in the resource space 
Constant 100 
η Parameter resource (Beta) 
distribution 
Constant 3 
bk, k = 
1,2,…,n 




δ1 Parameter density- Constant 0.02 
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Nk(t) Density at position k at time 
t 
Variable Number of firms 
O Inverse of “overdispersion” 
parameter 
Constant 2 
CBPk(t) Active consumer base of 
taste k at time t 
Variable Percentage (%) 
WF LRAC curve parameter Constant 8.3039 
WV LRAC curve parameter Constant 4.1520 
α LRAC curve parameter Constant 0.7 
β LRAC curve parameter Constant 0.7 
A LRAC curve parameter Constant 1 
Fi Cobb-Douglas function 
variable 
Constant Number of fixed 
resource units for 
production 
Vi(t) Cobb-Douglas function 
variable 
Variable Number of variable 
resource units for 
production at time t 
wi
l(t), wiu(t) Firm i’s organisational 
niche limits at time t 
Variable Positions that 
represent lower and 
upper niche limits, 
respectively, for firm i 
at time t 
NWC Firm’s niche-width cost 
coefficient 
Constant 200 
γ Consumer’s product 
dissimilarity effect 
Constant 10 
pi(t) Firm i’s niche centre Variable Taste position where 
firm i has its niche 
centre, at time t 
εijk Consumers’ fuzziness 
parameter 
Constant Normally distributed 
variable, mean = 0, SD 
= σ 
σ Degree of consumers’ 
fuzziness 
Constant [0.05, 0.1] 
Pi(t) Firm i’s price at time t Variable Price in model’s unit 
cost 
Po Mark-up over the highest 
LRAC value 
Constant 14.0922 
 ExpCoef Expansion coefficient Constant [0.05, 0.125] 
Qo Small-scale advantage Constant [5, 20] 
QLS Large-scale advantage Constant 2750 
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Symbol Definition Type Value/units 
m Number of scenarios firms 
run to set initial price 
Constant 5 





3. A Computational Approach of the 
Resource-based Market Structure Theory 
3.1  Introduction 
Market-partitioning processes constitute an appropriate steppingstone for 
connecting Industrial Organisation (IO) and Organisation Ecology (OE) theory 
fragments (Chapter 2). In this Chapter we enrich this link by exploring properties of 
the model in different resource spaces. This exercise leads to a computational 
approach to the study of market structures under a resource-based view. The study 
of market structure and its determinants is associated with a long tradition in the 
context of both economic theories (IO) and sociological approaches (OE) and in 
both theoretical and empirical domains. Both IO and OE have developed a large 
number of theoretical frameworks and a huge collection of empirical evidence 
relating to the competitive effects under different market structure conditions, albeit 
often using different lenses. For instance, IO has traditionally focussed on welfare 
implications of specific structures (e.g., oligopolies) (Tirole 1988; Schmalensee and 
Willig 1989), while OE has focused on how population-level characteristics are 
shaped throughout entry and exit processes (Carroll and Hannan 2000; Carroll et al. 
2002). 
 It has been argued elsewhere that a more complete picture of market structure 
and its evolution would greatly benefit from integrating perspectives from these two 
branches (Boone and van Witteloostuijn 1995, 2004). However, bringing together 
important insights from both perspectives, thought to be relevant in order to 
understand how market structures are shaped, has only attracted interest in recent 
years. Some of these insights involve the diversity and spatial distribution of 
consumer tastes (Boone et al. 2002; van Witteloostuijn and Boone 2006) through 
the consideration of different shapes of the so-called resources spaces. This chapter 
further explores this issue. 
This so-called resource-based approach to market structures adds to 
organisational science a logic that takes into account the resource space shape as 
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one of the determinants of firm performance and market evolution. A number of 
resource-based approaches have been developed to understand the determinants of 
firm profitability and survival: the resource-dependency theory (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978), the resource-based view of the firm (Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 
1986), niche-width theory (Freeman and Hannan 1983; Hannan et al. 2003, 2007), 
resource-partitioning theory (Carroll 1985, Carroll and Hannan 2000; Hannan et al. 
2007) and the resource-based theory of market structure (van Witteloostuijn and 
Boone 2006).  
Resources affecting firm performance might be considered from several angles: 
e.g., internal and external (Barney 1991), heterogeneous and homogeneous (Hannan 
and Freeman 1977; Carroll 1985; Boone et al. 2002, 2004), temporally changing 
according to either a fine-grained or a coarse-grained frequency (Freeman and 
Hannan 1983; Péli 1997; Usher 1999), and with respect to their degree of 
accessibility, deployment and implementation (Barney 1986; van Witteloostuijn and 
Boone 2006). Barney (1991), for instance, argues that firms need internal, immobile 
and heterogeneous resources to generate sustained competitive advantage. 
Moreover, Barney (1986) mentions that, under market imperfections, the firm’s 
accuracy in determining the expected value of needed resources in strategic factor 
markets increases the likelihood of getting above normal returns, although such 
returns might sometimes be a matter of sheer luck. In fact, Denrell (2004) illustrates 
how, in a situation where two firms share the same resource-related possibilities, 
and even in the absence of path-dependence effects, sustained competitive 
advantage can be obtained. However, firm resource differentials are most likely to 
exist in the real world due to market imperfections (Barney 1986).  
In this chapter, we focus on a resource-based view of market structures and 
address the specific question of how different types of resource space distributions 
might affect the market composition of a set of firms that face opposing forces of 
scale advantages and scope disadvantages, which are reinforced or weakened by the 
shape of the resource space. A vehicle of integration of the resource-based view of 
market structures, the evolutionary and population-level approach of OE and the 
firm-based rules of competitive behaviour assumed by IO, is the agent-based 
computational model introduced in Chapter 2. We use the model to explore the 
implications of spatial taste distribution and its degree of taste heterogeneity on the 
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emergence of specific market structures. We also study the survival effects as to 
different types of firms, and explore how a specific resource space is able to 
facilitate or deter their route to successful performance. In this way, we show not 
only how organisational characteristics (e.g., scale advantage) but also external 
resources (i.e., the shape of the demand side) and its associated diversity are 
important determinants of market structure.  
Our approach consists of exploring the relative importance of scale and scope 
effects of two different types of firms and the subsequent market configuration in 
the presence of resource spaces of different shapes (namely flat, unimodal and 
condensed resource space distributions), as suggested by van Witteloostuijn and 
Boone (2006). However, the approach presented here is different from their work in 
several instances. First, we do not need to rule out scale economies or “scope 
diseconomies”26 depending on the specific types of resource spaces (flat or 
condensed). Instead, second, we focus on studying the fate of single-product firms 
under the simultaneous interplay of scale and scope effects. Specifically, third, we 
study the viability of large-scale and small-scale firms in an entry-and-exit scenario 
under different market conditions characterised by different degrees of resources 
space heterogeneity.  
For the single-product case, our findings show that the computational outcomes 
reflect similar patterns to those theorised by van Witteloostuijn and Boone (2006) 
theorised. The relevant contribution is the bottom-up replication of similar stable 
patterns from an evolutionary point of view. So, as in Chapter 2, we produce a 
micro-foundation, explicitly modelling the interaction among the decision-making 
firms, of an established theory fragment. More interestingly, and apart form such a 
computational reconstruction, we also found that: (i) flat spaces provided more 
volatile results and higher dependence on specific combinations of firm expansion, 
consumer fuzziness and scale advantages; (ii) high market concentration does not 
always imply overall higher cost efficiency, even if such cost efficiency is fully 
transferred to consumers via the price mechanism; and (iii) the strength of the firm 
                                                     
26
 As noted in Chapter 2, the strict definition of the term “scope diseconomies” is confined 
to multi-product contexts (Panzar and Willig 1981). Here, we adhere to the broader 
characterisation given by organisational ecologists (see Boone et al. 2002: 412; Boone et al. 
2004: 119) who use it to refer to the negative consequences of having a highly 
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size and firm type effects on mortality depend critically on the shape of the resource 
space.  
3.2 Resource spaces, market structure and firm 
viability 
Recent research in the OE domain has illustrated the importance of studying the 
effects of resource space features on industry structure. More detail is provided in 
our brief review, below. The earliest developments in OE emphasised the effects of 
firms’ environmental resources on their survival chances, like niche-width theory, 
which deals with survival consequences of broad (generalism) and narrow 
(specialism) niche breadth in intertemporal environments (Freeman and Hannan 
1983; Péli 1997). The influence of the consumer distribution along the n-
dimensional space of socio-economic characteristics was made explicit in resource-
partitioning theory.27 These partitioned markets are characterised by high 
concentration and high market density (van Witteloostuijn and Boone 2006).  
We attempt to provide a common ground from an agent-based modelling 
perspective, which serves not only to formally connect this resource-based view of 
markets with traditional IO, but also as a basic framework of several recent 
empirical OE fragments that we briefly discuss below: (a) the effect of resource 
space heterogeneity on market structure (Boone et al. 2002), (b) the effect of 
resource space heterogeneity on firm performance (Boone et al. 2004), (c) the 
resource-based view of markets (van Witeloostuijn and Boone 2006) and (d) the 
effect of scale /scope economies (Wezel and van Witteloostuijn 2006) on mortality 
rates under different degrees of industry-level product heterogeneity (Boone, Wezel 
and van Witteloostuijn, 2006).  
Boone, van Witteloostuijn and Carroll (2002) provide an account of the effects 
of different unimodal resource distributions in terms of socio-demographic 
characteristics in the Dutch newspaper industry. Key findings show that those 
                                                                                                                                  
heterogeneous niche, in which reaching the far ends is economically unattractive. 
27
 The reader may recall from Chapter 2 that it is common to assume that the n-dimensional 
space of social features (McPherson 1983, 2004) maps the space of tastes, or that every 




spaces that exhibit a more concentrated set of resources provide a fertile area for 
generalists, generating a higher generalist market concentration. Such high 
generalist concentration not only constitutes a sign of increased mortality risk 
among them, but also triggers a simultaneous and enhanced viability for specialist 
organisations. In their work, the different environmental distributions are defined as 
eleven multidimensional arrangements (i.e., provinces in the Netherlands) along 
four socio-demographic dimensions: age, religious background, political preference 
and education level.  
Boone, Carroll and van Witteloostuijn (Boone et al. 2004) extend these results in 
the Dutch newspaper industry and explore performance effects on both pure 
generalist and specialist organisational forms. They demonstrate that these 
organisational forms located near the resource space centre and periphery, 
respectively, are better performers than those located “midway” (between the centre 
and the periphery). Performance is measured in terms of circulation growth and 
financial profitability. A third key variable, named “reader profile distance”, is also 
used. The reader profile distance is obtained by considering four defined welfare 
categories (“relatively poor, lower middle class, higher middle class and relatively 
wealthy”; Boone et al. 2004: 127). For each category, the absolute difference 
between the proportion of readers of a given specialist newspaper and the 
proportion of readers of the generalist newspapers is obtained. Then, a compound 
number that results from summing up all the category-based differences is 
calculated. This number is what they call the profile distance. In this study, it is also 
confirmed that the reader profile from national newspapers (the generalists) deviates 
significantly from the regional ones (the specialists) as concentration increases. It is 
also shown that this increase in distance has a positive and significant impact on the 
profitability of regional newspapers in the Randstad, the more important economic 
region of the Netherlands (that is, the “midway” specialists). This constitutes 
evidence for the need for differentiation of those midway specialists in scale-
dominated areas, while regional papers (the pure specialists) outside the Randstad 
area prove to be differentiated enough to survive, away from the scale dominant 
pressure of national newspapers.  
Van Witeloostuijn and Boone (2006) have also developed a resource-based 
theory of market structure in which scale and scope economies, coupled with 
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different resource space types, produce a set of identifiable patterns of market 
structures. These patterns (i.e., concentrated, fragmented, uniform and dual) include 
different combinations of product scope (single-product and multi-product firms) 
and organisational forms (generalist and specialists). They present a typology of 
eight cases. An important feature of this work is the fact that a firm that is able to 
reap scale or scope economies is not entirely due to the internal (e.g., technological) 
characteristics of the firm, but also because of the external resource heterogeneity 
that enables such an advantage to materialise (e.g., the absence of scope economies 
in condensed spaces, or the presence of centre-periphery scale economies in peaked 
spaces).  
In a different vein, the endogenous course of the degree of heterogeneity in the 
product space is argued to affect firm hazard rates (Boone et al. 2006), as well as to 
reduce or reinforce the scale and scope effects on survival rates (Wezel and van 
Witteloostuijn 2006). Industry-level product heterogeneity adds an additional level 
of complexity to the picture of survival consequences in market evolution: it is 
hypothesised that the hazard rate is a U-shaped function of industry-level product 
heterogeneity (Boone et al. 2006). Moreover, and apart from the beneficial effects 
of scale (aggregate production) and scope (niche covering) economies, it is shown 
how the size of their impact on hazard rates change as industry product 
heterogeneity changes (Wezel and van Witteloostuijn 2006): in an industry that 
exhibits low product heterogeneity, the beneficial effect of positioning at the market 
centre is undermined because finding homogeneous spots to reap scale advantages 
(near the centre) becomes less relevant. On the other hand, the effect of scope is 
strengthened under such low product heterogeneity.  
3.3 The model 
In the following modelling framework, our aim is to study the effects of resource 
heterogeneity and distribution on a set of single-product firms that are endowed 
with an “internal” scale potential of two different types (large-scale or small-scale), 
but whose potentiality is enabled or inhibited according to the resource distribution 
shape, and the position firms take in the resource space. Scale advantages, coupled 
with firm-to-firm competition in a consumer maximising rendering, allows us to 
study how certain market structures unfold over time. We stress that the brief model 
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presentation here is made for the sake of convenience. A fuller description of the 
model’s equations and rationale can be found in Chapter 2. 
3.3.1 Market entry and initial set up 
We assume that firms compete in a market where consumers are distributed 
along a set of n discrete positions. Such a consumer distribution is called the 
resource space (Carroll et al. 2002). The resource space is generated with a Beta 
distribution f(X;η), where η is the distribution parameter. Each position k, k = 
1,…,n, has an demand level of bk, k = 1,…,n, which represents the number of 
consumer units located at each taste position. Total demand Σbk is equal to 5400 
consumer units, independent of the resource space shape. The simulation starts with 
one single firm and subsequent entries follow a stochastic entry with a density-
dependent rate. This mechanism is based on empirical work on organisational 
founding (Hannan and Carroll 1992; Carroll et al. 2002). The density-dependence 
mechanism assumes that firm entry is set according to an arrival rate that is a 
function of the current number of firms in the market (market “density”). This rate 
is represented by λ(t) = exp[δ0 + δ1N(t) + δ2N(t)2], where N(t) is density at time t. 
The number of entrants is drawn from a negative binomial distribution with a 
success probability of O/(O + λ(t)), where O (O = 2) is the inverse of the 
“overdispersion” parameter (Harrison, 2004). Parameter values for entry rate 
coefficients δo, δ1 and δ2 are derived from Lee and Harrison (2001). 
Once the set of firms that will enter the market is established, it needs to be 
distributed along the resource space by another mechanism. We assume that firms 
try to initially locate themselves where “unused resources” (the set of potential, 
inactive consumers) are more abundant. Entrants always pick up one single position 
for entry and, if they survive, they expand towards other attractive positions based 
on estimations of expected sales. We consider three effects: (a) The proportion of 
inactive consumers at preference k, 1-CBPk(t), (b) a competition effect, which 
implies that the probability of founding a firm at position k decreases with the 
already observed number of incumbent firms at position k, and (c) an indication of 
“sharpness” in the decision making process carried out by the entrant, represented 
by a power coefficient (which is set to 2), indicating how accurate a firm’s 
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judgment is when attempting to find abundant resource spots.28 These three factors 
contribute to building a probability distribution that represents the likelihood that a 
firm is founded at position k at time t, ρk(t). Then, spatial distribution of entrants is 
modelled by drawing random numbers from the above mentioned distribution ρ1(t), 
ρ2(t), ρ3(t),…,ρn(t). 
 
Figure 3.1: Example of a density-dependent entry mechanism. 
3.3.2 Resource space heterogeneity 
Resource heterogeneity indicates (a) how large the set of consumer tastes is, and 
(b) how evenly the total demand is distributed across such a set. Following van 
Witteloostuijn and Boone (2006), we assume that total demand might be distributed 
according to three different resource space types: a flat, a unimodal, and a 
condensed resource space. These three cases are stylised representations of real 
world markets that have allowed the formulation of a resource-based view of market 
structures (van Witteloostuijn and Boone 2006). The shape of the space is modelled 
by selecting a value for selection of the distribution parameter η. We start by 
                                                     
28
 The power coefficient has to be at least 2 if the probability of founding is largely inclined 
to the option with higher consumer base potential. The rationale behind its use and the 
selection of the numerical value is given in Chapter 2. 
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considering as a base case n = 100 positions and η = 1, which results in a flat space. 
Since the area under the Beta distribution is equal to 1, independent from any value 
of η, alternative spaces resulted by manipulating only this parameter (and not the 
number of positions). The higher the value of η, the more condensed the space gets, 
and the fewer the number of positions with a positive demand. Also, the more 
concentrated the demand is around fewer positions, the less diverse the set of 
consumer tastes gets, implying that the resource space becomes less heterogeneous. 
Therefore, along with the flat space we also considered a very condensed space (η = 
35) and the same unimodal space that we used in Chapter 2 (η = 3). A summary of 
the resource space typology is presented in Table 3.1. Figure 3.2 illustrates these 
resource spaces.  
3.3.3 Firms’ cost structure 
A firm’s cost function is a sum of two different components: one related to 
production costs, CiPROD(Qi, t), and another related to niche-width expansion costs, 
CiNW(t). The production cost component is set according to a Cobb-Douglas 
production function (Mas-Colell et al. 1995), in which two production factors are 











(with a base of n 
= 100) 
Flat 1 100 0 
Unimodal 3 96 0.38 
Condensed 35 42 0.81 
Table 3.1: Resource space typology. 
 
The cost of each fixed unit F is WF and the cost of each variable unit V is WV. 
Total production costs are the sum of fix and variable costs: 
)(),( tVWFWtQC iViFiiPROD += .      (3.1) 
Total production is calculated as: 
βα )()( tVAFtQ iii = .     (3.2) 
A corresponds to a scale parameter and α + β > 1, which is needed to produce a 
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downward-sloping long-run average cost curve (LRAC), and, consequently, positive 
scale economies (Mas-Colell et al. 1995). Calibrated values for α, β, WF, WV and A 
defined the LRAC curve and are simultaneously set in order to produce a minimum 
(normalised) average cost for the whole industry equal to 1, with total production 
equal to ∑bk. The amounts F and V are determined according to two factors: (i) the 
firm’s degree of the scale advantage, which is defined as the intersection quantity 
point of the firm’s cost curve and the LRAC. This quantity automatically sets up the 
firm’s fixed cost; (ii) the firm’s current production quantity, which determines the 
variable cost. This procedure simply follows standard microeconomic theory, so 
that we suggest the reader to see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2, for further details. As 
discussed below, we consider two types of firms in the model with different scale 
advantages: large-scale and small-scale firms.  
 
Figure 3.2: Resource space typology. 
 
The niche-width related costs, CiNW(t), are simply computed as the niche width 
(i.e., the distance between the upper and lower niche positions covered by firm i at 
time t) multiplied by a constant NWC, the niche-width cost coefficient. Value 
calibration for the size of the large-scale advantage and NWC is discussed in the 
next section. The size of the small-scale advantage, Qo, is subject to parameter 
explorations throughout the simulation runs. 
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3.3.4 Consumer behaviour 
Consumer j at taste position k has a utility function: 
nkbjtPtiBtiU kikjkj ,...,2,1 and ,...,2,1 with )(),(),( ,, ==−= .  (3.3) 
The term Bj,k(i,t) is the positive benefit he or she receives at time t, and Pi is firm 
i’s price. The benefit decreases with distance (Hotelling 1929). Thus, independent 

















.    (3.4) 
The terms Bo and γ are constants, pi(t) is firm i’s niche centre, ||pi(t) – k|| denotes 
the distance between the firm’s niche centre and the position k, and εijk is an error 
term that represents the inability of consumer j to exactly evaluate “product 
dissimilarity” of firm i’s offering with respect to her or his own taste k. For further 
comparison purposes across the different resource spaces, it is important to note that 
distance is normalised with respect to the “metric” of a flat space (that in our 
specific case is n = 100).  
The term Bo is needed in order to produce a positive utility value, but according 
to our specific purposes where we have defined Bo as a constant, it can be shown 
that our model is independent of whatever value Bo takes, since it is crossed out 
after algebraic manipulation of equations (specific details are given at the end of 
Chapter 2). Parameter γ is calibrated along with the size of the large-scale advantage 
and the coefficient NWC in such a way that the largest firm in the market is able to 
catch approximately two thirds of the whole space in a unimodal space (with 
expansion probability equal to 1). This is a qualitative argument consistent with the 
market-partitioning imagery (see Carroll 1985; Carroll and Hannan 2000; Carroll et 
al 2002).  
The term εijk is distributed as N(0,σ2), and allows for the existence of the “niche 
overlap” concept in OE. This is because it allows two or more firms to share one or 
more taste positions. Consumers have a participation threshold defined as Uo = Bo – 
Po. Po is a price defined according to a mark-up of 20% over the highest value of 
the LRAC curve, as justified in Chapter 2. This mark-up is also used for firms’ 
price updates throughout the course of time. 
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3.3.5 Price setting 
Prices are computed by setting a new production level based on expected sales 
for the next time period. The easiest case is when a firm picks an entry position. 
Since the firm starts with a single taste position, it only has to explore the demand 
and price status of incumbents at that location and then evaluate which price to set. 
For instance, a firm might choose a very low price and capture the whole market at 
that position, but without being able to cover its fixed costs. On the other hand, a 
firm might select a high price, earning a high margin per unit, but with a low 
probability of getting consumers due to price competition with the other firms. 
Thus, a firm is only able to choose from a limited number of scenarios with 
different prices and see which one produces the highest expected profit. The firm is 
aware of both the consumers’ utility threshold Uo and the LRAC curve, so the range 
of applicable prices is also known.  
Thus, if a firm enters the market, it will initially seek to maximise profits 
according to the setting described above.29 Next, we give a generic explanation 
about the way firms form expectations. Let us define Qi(t) as the quantity firm i 
expects to get upon entry at time t, Uki(t) as the utility that entrant firm i is offering 
to taste position k at the beginning of time t, and Ukj(t) the utility the incumbent firm 
j, i≠j, is offering to position k. The term Sk(t) denotes the set of indices of incumbent 
firms at k, at time t (so that Nk(t) = Sk(t)). If firm i targets a given taste position k, 
the calculation of Qi will include both information from incumbent firms already at 














tUtUUtUbtQ .  (3.5) 
After a limited number of samples of the profit function (say, m), the firm gets a 
set of resulting prices, denoted by Pi,1, Pi,2,…, Pi,m. Entrant i will select the initial 
                                                     
29
 In order to have firms exploring their range of feasible operations of their respective cost 
functions and to avoid unrealistically large start-up firms, we constrain entrants’ production 
capacity to the intersection point of their cost function with the LRAC curve. This 
intersection point is the most cost-efficient point, given the firm’s possibilities and 
somehow demarcates the region of downward average costs. This initial upper-bound 




entry price, Pi*, according to the highest expected profit from the sample of size m. 
The value of m is set only to produce a starting (entry) price and does not have any 
implications for the remainder of the simulation. The maximisation algorithm – 
omitted in Chapter 2 – is illustrated in Table 3.2. 
On the other hand, when firms expand, additional price updates might not follow 
the same approach since firms face a multiple rivals in all their niche positions that 
offer different prices (as justified in Chapter 2). Thus, we suggest firms might 
follow a simpler and adaptive approach to update their prices in a profit-seeking 
fashion (Kirzner 1997), using probabilities derived from previous transactions from 
which expectations are inferred about the next time period. This is discussed below. 
Profit_Option ← -∞; 
for j1=1 to m 
     Select Price_of_Scenario randomly from uniform distribution. 
     [1+MarkUp, Po] 
     Compute Ui 
     QScenario ← min {Qo, bk*Pr(Ui > Uo)}      
     if Number of inactive consumers at k ≠ 0  
         for j2=1 to Nk 
               QScenario ← QScenario*Pr(Ui > U(j2)) 
         end 
     end 
     Compute Cost_of_Scenario  
     Profit_of_Scenario ←  
     Price_of_Scenario*QScenario – Cost_of_Scenario 
 
     if Profit_of_Scenario > Profit_Option 
        Profit_Option ← Profit_of_Scenario 
        New_Quantity ← Q_of_Scenario 
        New_Cost ← Cost_of_Scenario 
        New_Price ← Price_of_Scenario 
     end  
end 
Table 3.2: Pseudo-code for firm’s profit maximisation mechanism at entry. 
3.3.6 Firm expansion 
Firms might keep, lose or gain taste positions and update their niche centre pi(t) 
after price competition. Then they determine their direction of expansion, based on 
market expectations. In a unimodal space, for example, it can be shown that firms 
with enough expansion capabilities move to the market centre (see Chapter 2). 
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When the firm decides where to expand, it also updates its niche limits and niche 
centre. Firms are engaged in both vertical and horizontal expansion. Firms try to 
completely fill taste positions that they have already occupied (vertical expansion) 
considering (a) the set of unserved consumers on those taste positions, and (b) the 
current probability of catching an additional consumer (given the consumer’s utility 
constraint).  
Moreover, firms try to expand into other niches (horizontal expansion) in a way 
similar to when they enter the market. Firm i considers expansion either to the upper 
(u) and lower (l) adjacent positions of its current niche and estimates the expected 
additional quantity to be sold. This quantity is used to set the next production level. 
For instance, if utility Uid, d = u,l (upper or lower) is offered and expansion is 
attempted to either the upper or lower slot, the firm expects to catch an additional 
















Firms may expand to the taste position that offers larger scale advantages. After 
the expected quantity after expansion has been determined, production and cost 
levels are updated, and the computed price is set up as the mark up over costs 
(20%). The updated price is the average between such a computed (new) price and 
the old price. Once firms have stepped into a position, it is logical to assume that it 
will try to attract the highest possible amount of consumers in it in subsequent time 
periods.  
We also assume that a firm doesn’t try to open new niche positions (i.e. new 
consumer segments) in every time period. This is reflected by the fact that 
horizontal expansion is controlled by an expansion coefficient, while vertical 
expansion is subject to proportional sales expectations based on current operations. 
Vertical expansion might occur in every time period, provided that the firm can gain 
scale advantages. Trials with the model reveal that this pair of assumptions works 
well when the demand is fairly distributed among all the positions, which enable us 
to see firm growth as a gradual process. However, they might become problematic 
under the presence of extremely low heterogeneity (e.g., when the space is totally 
concentrated in only one position), since one single firm at the very beginning of the 
industry might quickly take over the whole market. Although the way the model is 
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built avoids including unnecessary coefficients for vertical expansion, it also has the 
limitation of rapidly introducing expanding firms under extremely condensed 
spaces, which might distort the natural growth of the industry. This situation 
generates a limitation in the type of condensed spaces we want to deal with. For that 
reason, we have our condensed space as an extreme case.30  
There are two more important features of the model worth mentioning. Firstly, 
firms have what OE calls “endowment” (Hannan 1998): they have a cash reserve 
when they enter the market, so that they can cope with negative profits until 
reaching an acceptable operation point. We assume that such an endowment is 
constant in all the models/scenarios and is proportional to fixed costs, so a large-
scale firm has a higher endowment than a small-scale firm (we apply the same 
endowment values adopted in Chapter 2). Secondly, we also assume a Bernoulli 
process for deciding firm type. We assume that the probability of founding is a 
function of market occupation. That is, in alignment with Carroll and Hannan 
(1995a)’s ideas, we  have all firms at the beginning to be more likely to be founded 
as large-scale firms. But as the market gets crowded, the probability of founding a 
large-scale firm decreases as an inverse function of the proportion of the total 
covered market. This means that the probability of founding a small-scale firm 
when the market is near saturation is higher than the probability of founding a large-
scale one (details are provided in Chapter 2).  
3.3.7 Simulation research design 
Every simulation was run for 400 time periods. For calibration purposes, it was 
taken into account that each time period corresponds to years’ quarters, as justified 
in Chapter 2. There are four varying parameters in the simulation model: (a) the 
niche expansion coefficient (ExpCoef, an expansion probability per time period), (b) 
the degree of consumers’ imprecision or fuzziness at evaluating offerings (σ), (c) 
the degree of small-scale advantage (Qo, the intersection of the firm’s cost curve and 
                                                     
30
 We experimented with the model with the extreme case of having the whole consumer 
population placed in one position. Results indicate that, almost from the beginning, markets 
are set to be a monopoly or a duopoly, mainly without the presence of any small-scale firms. 
Although those industries that have quickly become monopolies from the very beginning do 
exist in the real world (e.g., Microsoft and the PCs operating systems business), they are 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
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the LRAC), and (d) the Beta distribution parameter of the resource space, as 
mentioned previously. For each resource space scenario, we used three degrees for 
the small-scale advantage Qo (low = 5, medium = 10, high = 20), two levels for the 
niche expansion coefficient ExpCoef (low = 0.05, high = 0.125) and two levels for 
the degree of consumer fuzziness σ (low = 0.05, high = 0.1). The calibration of 
these value ranges is explained in Chapter 2. The mixture of the number of 
possibilities generates: 3 x 2 x 2 = 12 simulation scenarios (see Table 3.3). For each 
combination we run the model 10 times, so that we get 12 x 10 = 120 simulation 
runs per resource space distribution. In addition, we repeated this process for each 
of the three different resource spaces (flat, unimodal and condensed). In total, we 









1 Low High Low 
2 Low High High 
3 Low Low Low 
4 Low Low High 
5 Medium High Low 
6 Medium High High 
7 Medium Low Low 
8 Medium Low High 
9 High High Low 
10 High High High 
11 High Low Low 
12 High Low High 
Table 3.3: Simulation scenarios. 
  
Some of the behavioural properties of the model are explored by observing the 
effects of covariates on mortality (or hazard) rates. Failures are counted as those 
events where firms leave the market because of negative profits. As in Chapter 2, 
we use a piecewise constant exponential rate model for this purpose, following 
standard practices in OE. Piecewise constant models allow for a convenient 
representation of hazard rates when not all the time effects are explicitly included in 
the model, when the baseline hazard function is not known or when proportionality 
assumptions might not hold (Blossfeld and Rower 1995; Carroll and Hannan 2000). 
The firm’s hazard rate is defined as the instantaneous rate of exit between time t and 
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 .   (3.7) 
Since the inclusion of changing resource spaces adds another element of 
variation, testing the model with finer intervals proved to offer a better ground to 
compare results across the different spaces. We adopted twelve age pieces defined 
as T1, T2, …, T12 in the intervals [0, 10), [10, 20), [20, 30), [30, 40), [40, 50), [50, 
100), [100, 150), [150, 200), [200, 250), [250, 300), [300, 350) and [350, +∞), 











The term Ij represents the baseline hazard effect when t ∈ Tj, j = 1,2,…,12. We 
are interested in knowing the effects of niche-width, firm size, market concentration 
and firm type, on mortality rates. Thus, we gathered information for every single 
firm in the model, at every point of its duration time, regarding the following 
explanatory variables: NW (firm’s niche width), S (firm’s size measured in terms of 
current sales), C4 (industry’s market concentration ratio measured as the aggregated 
market share of the four largest firms in the market), and Type (a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the firm is a small-scale firm; otherwise zero). We also included the 
same control variables we used in Chapter 2, with the purpose of isolating specific 
market conditions that might affect the effects on the above-mentioned variables. 
That is, main effects can vary depending on the current firm population, that is the 
current level of market occupation. Specifically, since the entry process depends on 
density (N) and density squared (N2), we want to isolate the effects of N and N2 on 
mortality rates. Density is a common control variable in OE studies (cf. Hannan and 
Carroll 1992). Also, we include the variable OrgMass, the aggregated total sales for 
the industry, as a control for market size. Additionally, we also take IndAge 
(industry age) as a control variable that accounts for those market effects not 
explicitly absorbed by the other control variables and is equal to the number of 
simulation time steps. Coefficients were obtained through maximum-likelihood 




3.4.1 Behaviour of market concentration 
Figure 3.3 reveals the stochastic nature of the model simulation. In the case of 
market concentration under a flat resource space, both highly concentrated (i.e., few 
firms taking over almost the entire space) and fragmented markets (i.e., the market 
is divided among a number of rather small players) might occur. The market 
concentration behaviour depends on the combination of specific values of the size 
of the small-scale advantage, the niche expansion coefficient and the degree of 
consumer fuzziness, which makes the flat space case very volatile (see Table 3.4). 
The variance of results in every scenario appears to be higher in the flat space case 
vis-à-vis the low variability observed in the condensed space case, as seen in Figure 
3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 (hereafter, the figures show average behaviour along with shaded 
regions, whose boundaries denote the maximum and minimum registered values).  
As mentioned earlier, we do not rule out potential scale advantages from the flat 
space, neither do we exclude the negative scope effect under condensed spaces. On 
the contrary, we explore the relative dominance of two opposing forces, scale 
economies and scope effects, under different degrees of resource space 
heterogeneity. Although we have highlighted our difference from van Witteloostuijn 
and Boone (2006)’s work in terms of the treatment of scope effects, we also make 
explicit that the potential scope effect depends on the shape of the resource space 
and not only on the characteristics of the firm’s technology (in fact, van 
Witteloostuijn and Boone relate the scale and scope effects to the resource space 
types, not to the firm characteristics). In our modelling framework, those effects 
depends on how large the relative increase of the cost component CiNW(t) is, relative 
to the proportion of the gained amount of consumers, and also how relatively large 
it is to the scale gain.  
This is a simple example: in a flat space with no competitors, a large-scale firm 
in any location of the space will add an extra cost of NWC = 200 to CiNW(t) every 
time it expands one position further. It has the possibility of gaining a maximum 
additional amount of 5400/100 = 54 consumers in every attempt. If the niche width 
is equal to 1, the average niche-width cost would be 200/(54+54) = 1.8; if the niche 
width is 2, the average niche-width cost would be (200+200)/(54+54+54) = 2.46 > 
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1.8; and so on. In the presence of competitors, the amount of consumers that every 
firm gets will probably be less, meaning that our model exhibits negative scope 
effects on average costs in a flat space. In a condensed space, these average niche-
width costs at the centre might be, say, 200/(358+358) = 0.28 for a niche-width 
equal to 1, and (200+200)/(358+358+348) = 0.38 for a niche-width equal to 2. This 
implies that, relative to a flat space, the scope effect is weakened under condensed 
spaces (and offset by scale effects as we will observe later).  
In a unimodal space these two forces are more balanced. This is because large-
scale firms realise scale advantages only at the market centre while at the same time 
experiencing negative centre-periphery scope effects. Large-scale firms at the centre 
are not able to completely cover the space, which leaves  room for a high small-
scale firm density at the periphery. This usually generates increasing concentration 
coupled with high density (see Figure 3.3). It is more likely that the scope effect 
offsets the scale advantage in flat spaces than in condensed spaces, so that the 
likelihood of finding a concentrated market in a condensed space is higher than 
observing it in a flat space (see Table 3.4). 
Based on these results, we can conclude that a highly concentrated market is 
more likely to come from a space where a reasonable level of homogeneous 
resources is available. In addition, the fact that a resource space presents high taste 
diversity (as in the flat space) does not always imply the emergence of a non-
concentrated market. This set of simulated results appears to be consistent with 
empirical studies on the effects of resource distributions regarding the first 
implication: a high concentration of resources leads to a higher concentration of 
large-scale firms (Boone et al. 2002). However, simulation results indicate that the 
reversed implication is not true. 
It is important to note how the results in the condensed resource space 
consistently show a high-concentration market behaviour and appear to gain 
independence from the designated initial conditions. This leads one to think that the 
form of the space is the main force that determines the market structure in such 
cases.  
  
Proposition 1: In a market characterised by firms with both large and small scale, 
the presence of spaces with low heterogeneity implies highly concentrated markets 
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with few dominant large-scale firms, but the reverse is not true. Flat spaces are more 
volatile and do not necessarily undermine the dominance of large-scale firms, which 
depend on specific value combinations of expansion, consumer fuzziness and scale 
advantage. 
 
Sc. Qo ExpCoef σ Flat Unimodal Condensed 
1 Low High Low > 0.80 > 0.80 > 0.80 
2 Low High High > 0.80 > 0.80 > 0.80 
3 Low Low Low < 0.20 > 0.60, < 0.80 > 0.80 
4 Low Low High < 0.20 > 0.60, < 0.80 > 0.80 
5 Medium High Low > 0.20, < 0.40 > 0.80 > 0.80 
6 Medium High High > 0.20, < 0.40 > 0.80 > 0.80 
7 Medium Low Low < 0.20 > 0.60, < 0.80 > 0.80 
8 Medium Low High < 0.20 > 0.60, < 0.80 > 0.80 
9 High High Low > 0.20, < 0.40 > 0.60, < 0.80 > 0.80 
10 High High High > 0.20, < 0.40 > 0.60, < 0.80 > 0.80 
11 High Low Low < 0.20 > 0.60, < 0.80 > 0.80 
12 High Low High < 0.20 > 0.60, < 0.80 > 0.80 
Table 3.4: Average market concentration (C4) at t = 400. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Sample runs from a unimodal space (scenario 8). 
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3.4.2 Behaviour of market density 
Consistent with the observed market concentration behaviour, the flat space 
tends to reflect more volatile density behaviour, while the condensed space tends to 
reveals a consistent pattern of rather low density. With the exception of the first two 
scenarios, flat spaces reflect an increasing and then stabilising density pattern. 
Although density in unimodal spaces shows an increase and an apparent subsequent 
decline, longer simulation trials reveal that density stabilises at a point near the 
value observed at t = 400. It is also observed that unimodal spaces are the most 
likely to reproduce markets with both high concentration and high density31. Sample 
density patterns are seen in Figure 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9. Flat spaces registered both on 
average high-concentration and high-density patterns at t = 400 in 17% of the 
scenarios. Unimodal spaces registered similar concentration and density patterns in 
67% of the cases, while condensed spaces did not registered a single case. This 
result supports van Witteloostuijn and Boone (2006)’s hypothesis about peaked 
spaces. They hypothesise that spaces with centre scale or scope economies and 
centre-periphery scope diseconomies generate dual markets with high concentration 
(either with large single-product or multi-product generalists) and high density (with 
small single-product or multi-product specialists). See also Figure 3.3. 
 
Proposition 2: In a market where profit-seeking, large and small-scale firms 
compete in a world of utility-maximising consumers, unimodal spaces are the most 
likely space type (but not the only one) to provide the appropriate conditions for the 
emergence of dual structures, with both high concentration and high density.  
                                                     
31
 A very intuitive explanation to justify what we mean with a “concentrated market” with 
“high density” is given by considering the case where the biggest four large-scale firms take 
most of the market (reflecting a C4 ratio of at least 50%). At the same time they allow the 
rest of the market to be served by small-scale firms. A rough calculation of the number of 
small-scale firms would be the total market available to small firms, 5400 x (1 - 0.50), 
divided by an indication of their size (e.g., the value of Qo). If we take the highest Qo value 
with the minimum C4 ratio, this gives 4 + 5400 x (1 - 0.50) / 20 = 139 firms. Alternatively, 
we might also have 4 + 5400 x (1-0.90) / 5 = 112 with the highest C4 average values and the 
smallest value for Qo. However, these rough calculations might change given specific 
simulation outputs. Therefore, we assume that, given the numbers observed in the 
simulation trials, a concentrated market with roughly more than 100 firms may be assumed 




Figure 3.4: C4 behaviour for scenario 1 in flat (left), unimodal (middle) and 
condensed (right) resource spaces. 
 
Figure 3.5: C4 behaviour for scenario 5 in flat (left), unimodal (middle) and 





Figure 3.6: C4 behaviour for scenario 12 in flat (left), unimodal (middle) 
and condensed (right) resource spaces. 
 
Figure 3.7: Density behaviour for scenario 1 in flat (left), unimodal (middle) 





Figure 3.8: Density behaviour for scenario 5 in flat (left), unimodal (middle) 
and condensed (right) resource spaces. 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Density behaviour for scenario 12 in flat (left), unimodal 
(middle) and condensed (right) resource spaces. 
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3.4.3 Resource heterogeneity and efficiency 
Next, we analyse the effects on industry efficiency, in terms of industry average 
unit operational cost (van Witteloostuijn 1998). For flat and unimodal spaces it 
appears to converge to the same value in some cases (scenario 1, 2, 9, 10, 11 and 
12), while in the remaining cases it appears that such unit cost is higher under the 
flat space. However, it is clear that the condensed space values always reflect a 
much lower unit cost than those in the flat space (see Figure 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12). A 
complementary view is shown in Figure 3.13, since all the scale advantages are 
translated into lower prices in our models. Figure 3.13 reveals that the average price 
for the industry is lower as the space heterogeneity decreases. This suggests that less 
heterogeneous markets prove to be more efficient, as might be expected. However, 
this is not an effect completely due to market dominance: a closer comparison of 
scenario 1 and 2, where high concentration is a characteristic for all the three 
spaces, suggests a complementary effect of consumer heterogeneity, showing that 
scale dominated markets lose efficiency (in terms of industry average unit costs) as 
consumer heterogeneity increases. Although flat spaces in scenario 1 and 2 show 
that they might reach higher concentration than condensed spaces, Figure 3.10 to 
3.12 reveal that the range of values for the average unit cost in the condensed space 
is always lower (again, shadowed regions indicate range delimitated by maximum 
and minimum values). In other words, even if market A is more concentrated than 
market B (higher scale dominance), it might happen that A is less efficient than B 
because of having a more heterogeneous set of consumer tastes. 
 
Proposition 3: Condensed spaces always generate more cost- efficient markets, 
but higher cost- efficiency does not necessarily imply a higher market dominance of 





Figure 3.10: Average unit cost, scenario 3; flat (solid line), unimodal 
(dashed line) and condensed (dotted line) resource spaces. 
 
 
Figure 3.11: Average unit cost, scenario 5; flat (solid line), unimodal 





Figure 3.12: Average unit cost, scenario 9; flat (solid line), unimodal 
(dashed line) and condensed (dotted line) resource spaces. 
 
Figure 3.13: Average unit sales price; flat (solid line), unimodal (dashed 
line) and condensed (dotted line) resource spaces. 
3.4.4 Strength of size (S), concentration (C4) and firm type 
(Type) marginal effects 
In this section we analyse the main statistical results of the survival model. We 
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specifically focus on the strength of S (firm size), Type (firm type) and C4 (market 
concentration) effects across the different resource spaces. We obtained maximum-
likelihood estimators of covariates for every simulation run (that is, we ran 360 
survival regressions) and separately analysed the data for each of the twelve 
different scenarios.  
To see a rather straightforward comparison, we executed non-parametric 
statistical tests to see if the marginal differences between the high heterogeneity 
case (the flat space) and the low heterogeneity case (the condensed space) are 
significant. The marginal effect βi (i.e. the estimated coefficient) is defined as the 
rate of change of the log hazard rate when the covariate xi changes, provided that 
everything else is kept constant, ∂ln(h)/∂xi = βi. Since we have collected ten 
observations per scenario/per resource space type, we test (per scenario) if there is a 
significant difference between the median of the marginal effects that come out of 
the high-resource heterogeneity scenario (the flat space) vis-à-vis the one that results 
from the low-resource space heterogeneity scenario (the condensed space). For such 
a purpose we perform a series of Mann-Whitney tests. Every Mann-Whitney test 
was performed with a sample size of twenty observations.  
First we focus on understanding size effects. It is important to say that the size 
coefficients tested significant in 100% of the runs, so we have a nonzero value for 
each of the twenty observations in each test. A summary of the results is reported in 
Table 5. We observed that in 11 out of 12 scenarios, the difference between 
marginal effects of size tested significant (this represents 91.7% of the cases). This 
suggests that the marginal effect of size on the log hazard rate is more negative 
under a condensed space than under a flat space. The intuitive explanation behind 
this result is that the strength of size in lowering the hazard rate should be higher 
under low heterogeneity, since the differentiation advantages of heterogeneous 
spaces vanishes and size and scale effects become the only source of competitive 
advantage. Van Witteloostuijn and Boone (2006) cite examples that we may place 
under the category of spaces with low heterogeneity (say, mineral mining markets) 
to illustrate that condensed spaces with overall scale economies should produce 
concentrated markets. This result is also complementary to Wezel and van 
Witteloostuijn (2006)’s results, with which it is argued that strategic location is 
irrelevant to reduce mortality rates in a market characterised by high product-level 
87 
  
homogeneity. However, in contrast to their work, we observe scale effects in terms 
of firm size (not in terms of distance to the market centre). Therefore, scale 
advantages through size have a stronger marginal effect on mortality rates under 
high resource space homogeneity.  
 
Proposition 4: The negative effect of firm size on mortality is reinforced as 
resource heterogeneity decreases. 
 
The strength of the impact of market concentration was more difficult to assess 
since its coefficient did not test significant in 100% of the runs. The summary of 
results is presented in Table 3.6, in which we added two additional columns that 
illustrate (for every scenario) the percentage in which the coefficient was found to 
be significant. A marginal effect of zero is assumed for those coefficients that were 
not tested significant.  
The results also provide strong support for the marginal change in the 
concentration effect. We observed that in 8 out of 12 scenarios (which represent 
67% of the total cases) the difference between the marginal effects of market 
concentration proved to be significant. Differences between scenario 1 and 2 are not 
statistically significant because, as observed before, they both produced a highly 










(p < 0.05) 
1 -0.066 0.009 -0.146 0.100 0.011 Rejected 
2 -0.049 0.004 -0.145 0.091 0.002 Rejected 
3 -0.051 0.002 -0.142 0.066 0.002 Rejected 
4 -0.051 0.002 -0.121 0.070 0.023 Rejected 
5 -0.102 0.011 -0.147 0.061 0.123 Not rejected 
6 -0.074 0.004 -0.157 0.077 0.007 Rejected 
7 -0.080 0.009 -0.144 0.041 0.000 Rejected 
8 -0.076 0.006 -0.131 0.077 0.023 Rejected 
9 -0.096 0.006 -0.172 0.061 0.000 Rejected 
10 -0.091 0.007 -0.174 0.063 0.004 Rejected 
11 -0.090 0.008 -0.173 0.067 0.000 Rejected 
12 -0.094 -0.094 -0.159 0.050 0.000 Rejected 



















(p < 0.05) 
1 4.487 2.512 90% 13.430 6.493 60% 0.529 Not rejected 
2 4.071 1.684 60% 3.363 6.928 40% 0.436 Not rejected 
3 1.460 0.104 20% 4.834 2.893 70% 0.023 Rejected 
4 0.000 N.A. 0% 5.968 3.526 60% 0.023 Rejected 
5 -2.057 0.146 50% 10.396 5.931 80% 0.000 Rejected 
6 -2.072 2.744 60% 5.818 13.995 90% 0.004 Rejected 
7 0.000 N.A. 0% 4.290 1.050 90% 0.000 Rejected 
8 1.894 N.A. 0% 3.063 0.695 90% 0.000 Rejected 
9 1.949 N.A. 0% 8.031 3.256 80% 0.000 Rejected 
10 5.256 1.248 40% 8.581 3.525 90% 0.009 Rejected 
11 1.854 2.095 90% 3.710 1.201 80% 0.143 Not rejected 
12 3.188 0.942 80% 3.553 1.007 90% 0.353 Not rejected 
*Mean and S.D. values are calculated on significant figures only.  
**The M-W test was executed assuming zeros on non significant values 
Table 3.6: Marginal effect of C4 on log hazard rate. 
 
Results in scenario 11 and 12 also reported non-significant differences. For the 
condensed space, scenario 11 and 12 reflect a lower concentration coefficient than 
the remaining scenarios (except scenario 2). We argue that those non-significant 
statistical results might partially be explained by the fact that, in condensed spaces, 
small-scale firms are endowed with an increased growth capacity and thus offset the 
negative consequences of operating in a concentrated market. For those scenarios, 
however, and alike the volatile behaviour in the flat space, market concentration 
always reaches a high value in a condensed space as industry ages. Regardless of 
the statistical disparity in the above mentioned four cases, market concentration 
tends to strongly reflect a higher marginal effect in condensed spaces than in flat 
spaces. 
 
Proposition 5: Market concentration effects on mortality rates are more likely to 
increase as resource heterogeneity decreases.  
 
We now proceed to analyse the marginal effect of the firm type. Only scenario 2 
reveals no statistical significance in the marginal effect difference. A comparison of 
scenario 5, 6 and 9 to 12 show an opposite effect with respect to the observations 
about scenario 1, 3, 4, 7 and 8 (see Table 3.7). For the sake of clarity, let us name 
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scenario 1, 3, 4, 7 and 8 group A; scenario 5, 6 and 9 to 12 are group B. In group A, 
it seems that under a condensed space, type has a higher marginal effect (i.e. less 
negative) than observed in a flat space. This means that the beneficial marginal 
effect of being a small-scale firm is diminished under low heterogeneity. However, 
the opposite is seen in group B: the marginal effect of firm type becomes more 
negative. In other words, type has a lower marginal effect (i.e. more negative) under 
a condensed space.  
The inconclusiveness of these results is further clarified when considering the 
effect of the extent of the small-scale advantage. When the extent to which a small-
scale firm has an advantage is low, we observed results like the ones illustrated in 
group A. However, as the level increases (so the capabilities for reaping scale 
economies as a small-scale firms increase as well), the benefit of being a small-scale 
firm vanishes or is reversed. From a different angle, we also observed that firm type 
has a lower marginal impact on the log hazard rate (i.e. more negative) when the 
degree of the small scale is low. The differences among three groups of data were 
inspected by direct visualisation in box plots (see Figure 3.14) and confirmed with a 
Kruskall-Wallis test, which implies that at least one of the groups has a median 
significantly different to the others. For every resource space type (flat, unimodal 
and condensed) we divide coefficient values in three groups: low, medium and high 
small-scale advantage. Every Kruskal-Wallis test was performed with 120 
observations. The resulting Chi-square values were χ22 = 92.14 for flat spaces, χ22 = 
59.99 for a unimodal space, and χ22 = 38.00 for a condensed space, implying that 
the difference is significant. This suggests that “large” small-scale firms might do 
better when the resource space concentrates, and that the smallest might see how 
their marginal beneficial get diminished as heterogeneity decreases. 
Such results intuitively connect to two strands of OE theory. First, large 
specialists might not find a way to properly differentiate from generalists and might 
fall within their scope of operations, which may make them weaker than smaller 
specialists (Boone et al. 2004). Second, according to scaled-based selection 
arguments, both firms with both large size and specialisation advantages might 
enjoy lower mortality rates (Dobrev and Carroll 2003). In our model, the “large” 
small-scale firms might find differentiation disadvantages with other small-scale 
firms, while at the same time they are not able to reap enough scale advantages to 
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face large-scale firms. 
 
Proposition 6: Higher resource heterogeneity improves survival chances for very 
small firms, but those advantages are reduced or even reversed as the value of Qo 










(p < 0.05) 
1 -1.288 0.182 -1.094 0.160 0.035 Rejected 
2 -1.340 0.311 -1.135 0.154 0.089 Not rejected 
3 -1.928 0.306 -0.981 0.116 0.000 Rejected 
4 -2.322 0.292 -1.021 0.103 0.000 Rejected 
5 -0.757 0.103 -1.029 0.088 0.000 Rejected 
6 -0.838 0.157 -1.084 0.163 0.007 Rejected 
7 -1.307 0.224 -0.910 0.093 0.000 Rejected 
8 -1.315 0.158 -0.923 0.099 0.000 Rejected 
9 -0.492 0.063 -0.872 0.094 0.000 Rejected 
10 -0.501 0.056 -0.877 0.098 0.000 Rejected 
11 -0.551 0.058 -0.839 0.133 0.000 Rejected 
12 -0.557 0.038 -0.808 0.141 0.001 Rejected 
Table 3.7: Marginal effect of firm type on log hazard rate. 
 
 
Figure 3.14: Marginal effects of firm type on log hazard rates. 
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3.5 Concluding remarks 
Attempts to better understand the effect of resource space features have been 
recently developed in the literature (Boone and van Witteloostuijn 2004; van 
Witteloostuijn and Boone 2006). However, efforts to develop a more rigid 
formalisation linking economic variables to this approach by modelling a micro-
founded inter-firm interaction have not yet been pursued. Therefore, we introduced 
a formal model and used agent-based modelling as a linking tool to develop a 
computational approach to the resource-based view of markets. Through the explicit 
definition of firm-level rules of interaction and firm’s endowed (i.e., internal) 
characteristics, we have been able to explore and measure the external (i.e., resource 
space shape) effects on firm viability. 
Following van Witteloostuijn and Boone’s ideas, we formally introduced a 
“demand side” story of scale and scope effects, complementing the traditional IO 
conceptualisation only at the technological side of the firm and its cost function 
properties. We explore how the behaviour of two constantly opposing forces (scale 
economies in quantity, and scope effects in niche breadth) unfold under different 
resource space shapes. We thus illustrate how consumer taste heterogeneity does 
affect the impact level of scale and scope advantages. We found that (i) flat spaces 
are more volatile with market structures being more sensitive to specific 
combinations of parameter values, (ii) condensed spaces are more cost efficient, 
although the highest market concentration values were registered in flat spaces, and 
(iii) size, concentration and firm type effects on hazard rates depend on the specific 
resource space shape. 
As mentioned earlier, we do not claim that the “monotonicity” of our results 
holds if an extreme space condensation is assumed. The reason is that the vertical 
expansion mechanism used in the simulation avoids vertical expansion coefficients 
for the sake of simplicity, in order to avoid the need to explore additional 
parameters in our already complicated scenario building exercises. We assumed a 
rather simple criterion for niche penetration that is based on a rather well distributed 
consumer set among the different taste slots. Under extremely low heterogeneity, it 
is likely that a coefficient for niche penetration is also needed since the taste 
diversity loses all relevance in the model representation (consequently, niche 
expansion becomes rather irrelevant). This can be proved by running the model 
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under an extreme case: in a resource space with a Gini coefficient equal to 1 (that is, 
all the space is concentrated in only one taste position), we observe that the market 
quickly collapses, high collinearity appears among some of the explanatory 
variables, total extinction of small-scale firms is produced and no statistical 
convergence is reached. Such scenarios are beyond the scope of our present model, 
since a reasonable pace of growth is central in our context for the explanation of 
evolutionary behaviour.  
Our model results also reveal potential extensions to what social scientists regard 
as the “representative agent” and its importance in modelling realistic economic 
models (see Epstein 2007). For example, we saw that flat spaces might offer a 
context for large-scale firm dominant markets with either low or high small-scale 
firm density. Although we do not exactly consider consumers as agents in our 
model, their diversity has consequences for result volatility in flat spaces, up to the 
point of generating a dependence on specific setting conditions. Moreover, we also 
observed that highly concentrated markets might not be associated with higher cost 
efficiency, simply because of the existence of such consumer heterogeneity.  
Lastly, Table 3.8 compares results from our agent-based modelling replications 



















Van Witteloostuijn and Boone 
(2006)’s 
theory fragment 
(Flat space rules out scale  
economies, 
condensed space rules out  
scope economies). 
Agent-based modelling  
replication results 
(All resource space types present  
two opposing forces:  
positive scale effects and negative  
niche-width effects).  
Condensed space, concentrated  
market, scale economies,  
dominance by  
few large single-product  
generalists (case 1). 
Condensed space, concentrated  
market, dominance of scale  
economies,  
market is taken over by  
few large-scale (single-product) 
firms.  
Flat space, concentrated market,  
scale diseconomies, scope economies,  
few dominant large multi-product  
generalists (case 3). 
Flat space, concentrated market,  
dominance of scale economies, 
few dominant large-scale  
(single-product) firms but high  
small-scale firm 
 density also feasible. 
Flat space, uniform market, no scale/ 
scope diseconomies, single-product  
specialists (case 4).  
Flat space, fragmented market,  
dominance of negative niche-width  
effects, many  
small-scale (single-product) firms. 
Peaked space, dual market,  
centre scale economies, 
centre-periphery scope diseconomies, 
single-product generalists/ 
specialists (case 6). 
Unimodal space, high concentration/  
high density, scale economies, 
negative niche-width  
effects, 
single-product large-scale/  
small-scale firms. 






4. Co-evolutionary Market Dynamics in a 
Peaked Resource Space32 
4.1 Introduction 
Market processes involve simultaneous interactions among firms and consumers. 
Firms target segments with abundant “resources” (i.e., high purchasing power or 
just high demand), while consumers search for firms’ offers that best match their 
preferences. We explore implications of this dual interaction in which large-scale 
and small-scale firms compete in an initially established peaked resource space with 
a centre, where resources (i.e., consumers) at the starting date (time = 0) are 
assumed to be more abundant at the central region than at the periphery. The 
resource space represents the distribution of consumers along a one-dimensional set 
of product characteristics. We explore the implications for the evolution of market 
structure (considered in terms of the number of firms and market concentration) by 
means of an agent-based simulation model. Our results are twofold. First, when 
firms move to the best spots in the market and consumer mobility along resource 
space positions is prohibited (i.e., the resource distribution shape is constant over 
time), the market exhibits high concentration with a first increasing and then 
declining number of firms. The number of firms remains relatively high all the time. 
Second, when consumers can update their locations in space while searching for the 
best match, the tendency that concentration increases may disappear parallel to a 
definite small-scale firm proliferation. In addition, consumer mobility reinforces 
large-scale firms’ space contraction. Space contraction is the number of the 
positions of the resource space that the large-scale firms release, through the scale-
based competition process, in favour of the small-scale firms. It is used as a proxy to 
assess the resource release hypothesis of resource-partitioning theory. 
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4.2 Theoretical background 
In the recent years, co-evolutionary processes of markets and organisations have 
begun to draw more attention, both from theoretical and empirical perspectives. 
Researchers address co-evolutionary issues related to, among others, empirical 
designs (Lewin and Volberda 1999), price dispersion effects (Kirman and Vriend 
2001), joint ventures (Inkpen and Currall 2004), strategic alliances (Koza and 
Lewin 1998), mutual effects of individual behaviour (Snijders et al. 2007), and 
market dominance (Harrington and Chang 2005).  
Organisation Ecology (OE, Hannan and Freeman 1989) has been mostly 
studying markets where consumers’ distribution over taste preferences is unimodal 
(Carroll et al. 2002; Boone and van Witteloostuijn 2004; van Witteloostuijn and 
Boone 2006). Firms may reap scale economies in the vicinity of resource peaks. 
Market configurations that emerge in peaked resource spaces (Carroll and Hannan 
1995) have been subject of empirical research studies in a broad variety of 
industries. The studied industries include newspapers (Carroll 1985; Boone et al. 
2002, 2004), breweries (Swaminathan 1998; Carroll and Swaminathan 2000), 
automobile manufacturers (Dobrev et al. 2001), wineries (Swaminathan 1995, 
2001) and audit firms (Boone et al. 2000). In all these industries, specialist 
organisations’ proliferation was observed as market concentration rose. Specialist 
organisations are those that serve a narrow niche, i.e., a small set of taste 
preferences. 
Specialists’ proliferation was partly due to the fact that (broad niche) generalist 
firms were unable to reach the extremes of the resource space. Moreover, it was 
partly due to specialists’ ability to exploit unused peripheral resources. These 
specialist firms also emphasised the importance of customer identity and self-
expression. Carroll and Hannan (1995) point out that resource distributions may get 
flatter with time in mature markets, as a by-product of specialists’ ability to open up 
new niches (Swaminathan 1998). Consumers may also modify their tastes (say, by 
developing anti-mass cultural sentiments, Carroll et al. 2002). In the current model, 
firms compete in a co-evolutionary process, take advantage of scale economies, 
grow larger and consolidate their positions by targeting the best spots in the 
resource space. We also assume that consumers gradually move towards firms that 
best match their evolving preferences. Large-scale firms may find it costly to cover 
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the whole space. Some consumers may find the offerings of specialised firms more 
attractive.  
A critical aspect is the extent of consumer mobility. The concept refers to 
“consumer search models” in the Industrial Organisation (IO) literature (Stahl 1989; 
Waterson 2003). According to this stream of literature, price competition in a 
single-product oligopoly context or in a perfect contestability context is extremely 
tough if consumers are perfectly mobile. Clients move from one firm to another 
only if the latter firm offers a lower price. 
Both IO and OE used to assume that consumer tastes are fixed, just like we did 
in Chapters 2 and 3. Our current approach is different. The product characteristic 
space is not exactly mapped onto the taste space. This leaves consumers some room 
to refine their product preferences by moving around in the space as the market 
evolves. We call this process consumer mobility. This individual-level possibility in 
the model allows us to examine whether or not space flattening emerges, if niche 
formation processes take place stimulating small-scale firm proliferation, or whether 
firms’ ability to influence consumer preferences has a robust impact on market 
structures.33 
Following the path set by earlier studies on industry evolution (Lomi and Larsen 
1996, 1998; Péli and Nooteboom 1999; Barron 1999, 2001; Harrison 2004; Lomi et 
al. 2005), we address the firm-consumer dynamics in an agent-based model. We 
analyse the impact of different degrees of consumer mobility on market structure 
evolution. In line with earlier ecological studies, we consider (exogenous) entry and 
(endogenous) exit processes. However, a novelty of our representation is that we 
also take into account a reciprocal interplay between firms and consumers (Lewin et 
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 Another interpretation for resource space change is that new consumers enter at highly 
attractive positions, while non-attractive positions depopulate. This interpretation, in which 
the consumer distribution is influenced by firm offerings, relates to the niche formation and 
engagement concepts in OE. Swaminathan (1995), for instance, conceives the exogenous 
changes in consumer behaviour and the emergence of new product classes through 
technological discontinuities as drivers of new niche formation. In our model, the active set 
of product characteristics influences the shape of the consumer distribution in the next time 
step. Engagement reflects the materialisation of an offering at space locations where the 
firm’s offering has some intrinsic appeal (Hannan et al. 2003, 2007). In our model, the 




al. 2004) as a driver of market structure evolution. Markets are mainly shaped by 
firm entry and exit according to the traditional ecological view (Hannan and 
Freeman 1989; Carroll and Hannan 2000). We add the firm-consumer dynamics to 
that view. 
4.3 Summary of the model 
Next, we give a brief summary of the agent-based model as already introduced in 
Chapters 2 and 3. The only additional model feature is the inclusion of different 
consumer mobility mechanisms. As before, demand is distributed along 100 
different product preferences by using a Beta distribution with parameter η = 3. 
Again, firms are of two types (large-scale and small-scale). They enter the market at 
some initial position and gradually move towards the most abundant spots (towards 
the “peak” or market centre). Consumers update their preference positions 
according to either the closest match to their current product preference or the 
highest expected utility. 
4.3.1 Firm behaviour 
The model starts with one single firm. Firm entry to the market is density 
dependent and governed by a negative binomial distribution (Harrison 2004), as in 
Chapters 2 and 3. Whether an entrant is a large-scale or small-scale firm is 
determined by another algorithm. This distribution algorithm is based on two 
considerations. First, large-scale firm founding probability is 1 when density N = 0. 
Second, this probability is a monotonically decreasing function of total industry 
output. As industry output approaches the market’s carrying capacity,34 the 
founding probability of large-scale firms decreases (see Carroll and Hannan 1995). 
Consequently, the probability of founding a small-scale firm is increasing.  
An alternative explanation for the use of this probability, besides the one 
provided in Chapter 2, is as follows. OE’s density-dependence theory states that 
overall founding rates are increasing at low density, while decreasing at high 
density. In our modelling framework, this means that both large-scale and small-
scale firms should decrease their entry rates when the carrying capacity is 
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 In Organisational Ecology, carrying capacity is defined as the maximum number of firms 
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approximated. Resource-partitioning theory claims that the founding rate of 
generalists declines with industry concentration (Carroll and Hannan 2000). 
According to the IO literature, firms with high sunk costs face an entry barrier in 
highly concentrated markets (Schmalensee and Willig 1989). However, note that 
our results will indicate, again, a nonmonotonic market concentration effect: the 
impact of concentration on founding rates can be different at low and high firm 
densities. Organisational mass (the total volume of all firms) is monotonically 
increasing in our simulation models; therefore it provides a better indicator of 
market crowding and saturation than market concentration. Thus, it seems 
reasonable to assume that as the market gets closer to the maximum possible 
volume sold (i.e., market saturation), the space for large-scale operations decreases. 
Consequently, the incentives to found large-scale firms diminish. Thus, we make 
the firm type selection at entry dependent on total organisational mass. In our 
model, the probability of founding a large-scale firm is always positive. The reader 
may recall from Chapter 2 that at the end of the simulation horizon (t = 400), when 
the resource space was fully covered, the average probability of large-scale firm 
founding was slightly less than 10%.  
The cost function of a firm has two components, one related to production costs, 
the other related to niche-width costs. Thus, for firm i at time t, total costs are 
represented by the production costs CiP(t) plus niche-width costs CiNW(t). Our 
production function is a classic Cobb-Douglas function with two production factors: 
a quantity-independent (fixed) one and a quantity-dependent (variable) one. Values 
of the Cobb-Douglas function were chosen assuming that the long-run average cost 
curve is downward sloping (in order to have scale economies) with a minimum 
(normalised) value of 1. Niche-width costs appear as the firm expands horizontally 
along the positions axis. These costs reflect the complexity (i.e., scope effects) of 
handling a large number of different product preferences. The niche is the set of 
positions where the firm sells products. Each niche has a centre. The centre location 
is updated as the firm moves in space. Firms move in the direction of abundant 
resources, so that they can benefit from scale economies and from reduced price 
levels. We define, respectively, wiu(t), wil(t) as the upper and lower niche limits of 
firm i. NWC is the niche-width cost coefficient. The niche-width costs are given as 
                                                                                                                                  
(i.e., maximum density N) that can viably operate in the market. 
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NWC times the distance between wiu(t) and wil(t). 
4.3.2 Consumer behaviour 
Consumer distribution is unimodal. So our one-dimensional resource space has a 
resource-abundant market centre. Each consumer buys only one product in each 
time period. Each position k is characterised by a number of consumers bk. With 
respect to firm i’s offering, consumer j at position k assesses its value through utility 
function Uj,k(i,t). Utility increases with the term Bj,k(i,t), the “benefit” consumer j 
receives (e.g., product functionality) at time t, and decreases with Pi(t), the price 
s/he pays to firm i. We define pi(t) as firm i’s niche centre. We assume that the 
benefit for acquiring a product is given by the distance from position k to pi(t), 
||pi(t)-k||, multiplied with a proportionality constant γ. We also include in Bj,k(i,t) an 
error term εijk that represents the inability of consumer j to exactly evaluate the 
“product dissimilarity” with respect to her or his own position. The term εijk is used 
to introduce some noise to consumers’ decision-making process. This noise allows 
for what organisational ecologists call “niche overlap”. This error term is assumed 
to be normally distributed with mean = 0 and standard deviation = 0.05 (cf. Chapter 
2 and 3). When buying, each consumer at position k maximises her or his utility 
according to a utility participation constraint Uo. This Uo is set up as a mark-up 
(20%) on the maximum value of the long-run average cost curve.  
4.3.3 Model dynamics 
Prices are initially set by estimating the expected additional quantity firms will 
obtain in the next time period. Let firm i enter the market at an empty slot k at time 
t. Let us define Qi(t) as the quantity firm i expects to sell, and Uki(t) as the utility 
that firm i offers to consumers at position k, bk. Then, 
))(Pr()( okiki UtUbtQ >= .   (4.1) 
If, alternatively, firm i enters an occupied slot, it follows the same procedure, 
except that the calculation of Qi includes information from the set Sk(t-1) (Chapter 
2). If every element of Sk(t-1) is defined as the j-th incumbent firm present at 
position k, and if such an incumbent firm offers utility Ukj(t-1) at k, then the 
















.  (4.2) 
After competition, niche limits wil(t) and wiu(t) are adjusted accordingly, 
depending on lost or gained taste positions. Firms also update their niche centre 
pi(t). Firms engage in both vertical and horizontal expansion. Vertical expansion is 
controlled by proportional expectations, given information of the latest transaction 
(Chapter 2). Horizontal expansion is assumed to be dependent on the expected 
incremental sales gain (in the direction of expansion) and an expansion probability 
that controls the speed of growth in the model. Firms start with a price that depends 
on others’ prices, but update their levels to a mark-up price depending on future 
gains of scale economies. The mark-up reflects the opportunity cost for a firm in the 
industry. Firms stay in the market as long as they have non-negative profits. A 
large-scale firm is calibrated so that it catches approximately two-thirds of the whole 
resource space in the absence of competition (NWC = 200, γ = 10). In addition, 
small-scale firms are calibrated to be on the right side of the long-run average cost 
curve, in order to reflect lower scale advantages vis-à-vis large-scale firms. For 
small-scale firms, different Cobb-Douglas function parameter values are used in the 
simulation trials. The reader may consult Chapter 2 for details. 
For the sake of convenience, we assume that positions never get totally empty 
due to mobility processes: positions always have some demand to tailor to. So, both 
total demand and the total number of active positions remain constant throughout 
the simulation experiments. The minimum demand a position has is one consumer. 
This way, we confine firms to have convex niches at any time. Non-convex niches 
might present problems that are beyond the scope of our present work (cf. Hannan 
et al. 2003).  
4.4 Simulation experiments and results 
Each simulation was run for 400 time periods. We used two different values for 
firms’ expansion probability parameters, which were taken from the approximate 
extremes of the calibrated value range (high = 0.15 and low = 0.05). Moreover, we 
experimented with three different small-scale firm cost curves, which correspond to 
three different quantity values of the long-run average cost (low = 5, moderate = 10 
and high = 20). This gave six parameter combinations in total that can be seen in 
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Table 4.1. Each combination was run five times and the results were averaged into a 
“representative” run for each simulation combination. Thus, each experiment was 









1 Low High 
2 Low Low 
3 Medium High 
4 Medium Low 
5 High High 
6 High Low 
Table 4.1: Simulation combinations for computational experiments. 
4.4.1 Experiment 1: baseline model without consumer mobility 
As our baseline, we assume that the resource space shape remains constant over 
time. That is, consumers are not mobile at all. Results show increasing 
concentration (C4 concentration ratio) coupled with an initially increasing and later 
a declining density. Few large-scale firms take over the market centre, while small-
scale firms move to the peripheral areas. This somehow reflects a market 
partitioning process similar to that found in OE’s resource-partitioning theory 
(Carroll 1985; Carroll et al. 2002; Hannan et al. 2007), although overall density 
declines after reaching a peak, which does not follow from the theory’s original 
prediction. According to the results presented in Figure 4.1 (dashed lines represent 
average runs per simulation combination and solid lines represent aggregate average 
behaviour), we observed that organisational density, on average, tends to slightly 
decline below 150 firms. Market concentration shows an increasing trend with a 
value above 70 per cent after the 400 time periods. 
4.4.2 Experiment 2: consumer mobility according to the closest 
match 
Next, we assume that consumers move towards the direction where they expect 
to find firms that are a closer match with their current position. In this case, the 
mobility decision does not involve prices, although consumers maximise their utility 
in order to assess the best option when purchasing. Empirical evidence in the U.S. 
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brewery and wine industries shows that consumers might be inclined to gradually 
move to “peripheral positions” heavily based on identity reasons as a consequence 
of, say, processes of anti-mass-production cultural sentiment, customisation or 
conspicuous status consumption (Carroll et al. 2002), regardless of premium prices 
(Carroll and Swaminathan 2000; Swaminathan 2001).  
For instance, Carroll and Swaminathan (2000) illustrate how the microbreweries 
and brewpubs in the U.S. brewery industry took advantage of the perceived 
authenticity of handcrafted beer among consumers, placing a feature that consumers 
might search but that the large beer producers were incapable to offer, due to the 
nature of their organisational form (Carroll et al. 2002). There is evidence that these 
identity-related effects can also appear when the degree of customisation generates a 
higher degree of consumer satisfaction. Small firms are sometimes able to better suit 
customer needs, beyond the standardised solution that the large ones offer as a result 
of their large-scale strategy (for instance, see the strategies played by large and 
small companies in the Dutch audit industry, Carroll et al. 2002; Boone et al. 2000). 
These identity-related effects are nicely embedded into our spatial representation. 
Consumers inspect adjacent positions (one to the left, and one to the right) and 
move to the position where a closest-to-own product characteristic is being offered, 
according to a nominal constant mobility rate of θ per time period (θ = 0.05) per 
position.35 The real rate is drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and θ. 
Formally, consumers at position k observe, at time t, the standing niche centres of 
offering firms at time t-1 in positions k-1, k and k+1. Let us assume that Sk’(t) is the 
set of firms that have offerings at position k’ at time t. Then, consumers at position k 














   (4.3) 
                                                     
35
 Alternatively, we could have used a mobility probability per consumer, instead of a 
mobility rate per position. But this would require us to take into account, say, sophisticated 
consumer behaviour (e.g., individual-level interactions, network externalities, et cetera), 
which is beyond the scope of this work. Our simulation trials indicate that this θ rate should 
be rather low in order to represent a slow preference adjustment over time. Alternative 
values are left for future research. 
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More specifically, consumers at every position, at every point of time, evaluate 
the possibility of updating their product characteristic preference in the face of the 
current offerings. The algorithm consumers use to decide where to move is 
presented in section 4.6. 
The results reveal that the scale effect of large-scale firms does not diminish with 
consumer mobility. The average evolution of market concentration (C4 ratio) still 
has an increasing trend to a level above 70 per cent at the end of the simulation 
horizon. Comparisons per simulation scenario reveal that, in 3 out of 6 scenarios, 
there is a significant difference between the final concentration levels between 
Experiment 1 and 2. These results were derived from Mann-Whitney tests 
performed on the simulation trials of every scenario. We considered two-tailed tests 
with significance level of 0.05. Those are scenario 1, 5 and 6 (p-values are 0.008, 
0.016 and 0.032, respectively). However, the contribution of the mobility process to 
concentration change is inconclusive. Scenario 1 had a significantly higher 
concentration level in Experiment 1, while scenario 5 and 6 ended with higher 
concentration in Experiment 2. 
 
Figure 4.1: Consumer immobility. 
 
The mobility process seems to affect the way firms proliferate. Average density 
tends to stabilise at about 200 firms, well above the average level in the case 
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without consumer mobility. Taking into account the very low number of large-scale 
firms at time t = 400, this result indicates small-scale firm proliferation. Figure 4.2 
plots market concentration and density for the different scenarios. In section 4.4.4, 
we explore the conditions of small-scale firm proliferation in more detail. 
 
Figure 4.2: Match-improving consumer mobility. 
4.4.3 Experiment 3: consumer mobility according to highest 
expected utility 
We now assume that consumers move towards the direction of higher utility 
spots. That is, consumers inspect others’ utility offerings in adjacent taste positions 
and decide to move according to a maximum (nominal) mobility rate θ per time 
period (θ = 5%) per position, just as in the previous experiment. Formally, 
consumers at position k observe, at time t, the standing utility offerings at time t-1 in 
positions k-1, k and k+1. Again, let us assume that Sk’(t) is the set of firms that have 
offerings at position k’ in time t. Then, consumers at position k move to k*, where 
k* is the argument that solves the following expression (again, Ukj(t) is the utility 

















   (4.4) 
Unlike the previous experiments, the market now may evolve into a non-
concentrated structure, with a concentration level of about 30 per cent (Figure 4.3). 
Now, average concentration does not display an increasing trend. Concentration 
falls well below the levels observed in the previous two experiments, indicating a 
weakened large-scale firm advantage. Note, however, that the market is divided 
among rather similar small firms. Hence, low concentration is associated with a 
tendency to fragmentation. Small-scale firm proliferation is facilitated by the 
decreasing scale advantages. Again, we conducted a series of Mann-Whitney tests 
to see if there was a significant difference between final concentration levels of 
Experiment 1 and 3 (p = 0.05, two-tailed p-values). We observed that in four out of 
six scenarios (in all but scenario 5 and 6), the market concentration was 
significantly lower in Experiment 3 than in Experiment 1 (the registered p-value for 
all these scenario comparisons was 0.008).  
4.4.4 Effects on small-scale firms’ proliferation 
In this section, we use the same nonparametric tests as before to assess the 
impact of consumer mobility on firm proliferation. We consider the six simulation 
scenarios as separate cases; each of them provides sample runs of a population with 
the same initial conditions. Since density levels have a stochastic variance (due to 
the interplay between entry and exit processes), we run the Mann-Whitney tests 
considering the average density levels during the final 25 and 50 time periods of the 
runs (see the respective Table 4.2-3). Again, we choose a significance level of 0.05.  
We take Experiment 1 as baseline. Comparisons with Experiment 2 show that 
match-improving consumer mobility significantly increases small-scale firm 
proliferation in 3 out of 6 cases (concerning the final 25 periods) and 4 out of 6 
cases (concerning the final 50 periods). Comparisons with the utility-maximising 
mobility model (Experiment 3) reveal a statistically significant difference in 5 out of 
6 cases concerning the final 25 periods, and in all cases concerning the final 50 
periods. Density levels of scenario 1, 2 and 3 are plotted in Figure 4.4-9.  
We conclude that consumer mobility can enhance the proliferation of small 
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firms. The effect is stronger when the difference between small-scale and large-
scale advantage (i.e., their cost curve intersection point with the LRAC curve) is 
maximal. We did not find that the resource distribution gets flatter with time, as 
Carroll and Hannan suggest (1995:218). Still, the simulation results suggest a 
‘bottom-up’ explanation, based on consumer behaviour, for small firm proliferation 
in crowded markets. 
 












1 & 2 MW 
Test 
p-value 
1 & 3 MW 
Test 
p-value 
1 104.72 243.24 210.84 0.008 0.008 
 73.16 259.28 180.4   
 93.92 203.88 214.64   
 88.40 196.88 258.08   
 104.92 260.84 214.80   
2 177.64 271.80 297.96 0.016 0.016 
 108.84 304.24 323.76   
 155.24 235.16 197.64   
 177.56 297.96 278.24   
 230.00 225.16 255.48   
3 73.12 186.24 130.72 0.008 0.056 
 92.60 190.20 181.36   
 61.72 170.48 104.68   
 133.72 158.56 162.56   
 107.04 152.00 145.20   
4 170.88 153.76 231.48 0.095 0.008 
 167.04 228.24 226.48   
 186.00 253.04 192.12   
 108.64 213.20 238.96   
 159.64 204.52 211.96   
5 86.32 136.16 109.00 1.000 0.032 
 127.92 98.88 132.16   
 101.64 114.24 142.16   
 124.64 92.76 153.24   
 104.12 119.40 149.72   
6 157.4 185.84 217.6 0.310 0.008 
 128.08 143.80 195.40   
 177.44 182.68 210.92   
 130.52 146.48 203.72   
 157.68 168.28 221.00   
 
Table 4.2: Mann-Whitney test results (two-tailed) from market density 














1 & 2 MW 
Test 
p-value 
1 & 3 MW 
Test 
p-value 
1 104.30 229.50 212.76 0.008 0.008 
 76.62 253.74 178.32   
 98.44 205.24 208.80   
 90.76 206.44 260.74   
 103.44 258.34 216.10   
2 175.96 269.94 295.54 0.008 0.016 
 109.56 300.90 323.44   
 166.06 238.42 203.12   
 175.88 297.26 279.08   
 222.78 226.54 262.24   
3 72.44 181.68 130.26 0.008 0.016 
 91.58 189.56 175.68   
 64.24 171.42 103.28   
 128.14 155.20 166.68   
 99.92 159.30 144.26   
4 167.80 175.86 240.32 0.016 0.008 
 161.96 223.78 221.72   
 179.18 255.74 192.72   
 109.20 205.32 239.16   
 161.64 208.24 205.62   
5 87.58 135.40 104.64 0.690 0.032 
 132.36 110.54 137.94   
 98.56 112.80 148.32   
 125.58 89.96 149.34   
 103.02 117.98 139.86   
6 162.66 177.00 211.46 0.548 0.008 
 133.66 142.82 197.12   
 173.62 180.38 207.86   
 130.72 152.48 202.86   
 157.18 155.80 221.84   
 
Table 4.3: Mann-Whitney test results (two-tailed) from market density 





























4.4.5 Effects on large-scale firms’ spatial positioning 
Resource partitioning theory posits that the total space occupied by generalist 
organisations decreases (i.e., contracts) as market concentration rises (Carroll and 
Hannan 2000; Carroll et al. 2002). We now investigate large-scale firms’ effects on 
space contraction under the three experimental settings specified before. We define 
large-scale firms’ total space as the aggregated number of positions these firms 
serve.  
In absence of consumer mobility (Experiment 1), large-scale firms’ space 
reduction depends on the expansion capacity of small-scale firms. Our interpretation 
is that the more small firms’ expansion capacity increases, the more likely it is that 
small-scale firms appropriate chunks of large-scale firm space. This is because small 
firms are in a better position to come up with attractive offerings to consumers at the 
centre vicinity.  
Results from Experiment 2 and 3 show that consumer mobility reinforces such 
space contraction. Large-scale firms’ average space clearly contracts over time, as 
can be seen from Figure 4.10. The detailed analysis per parameter combinations 
indicated that the difference in space contraction is statistically significant whenever 
the outcomes from Experiment 1 did not indicate any contraction (that is, when the 
small-scale advantage tended to be low). In most other cases, we found space 
contraction with all three experimental settings in place; then the differences 
between experiments were non-significant. We performed, again, a non-parametric 
statistical test (Mann-Whitney) on every simulation scenario to see if the difference 
in large-scale space contraction is significant across experiments. We measured 
every “space contraction” data point Yi,j in simulation trial j of combination i as: 
)400())400(),...,2(),1(max(
,,,,, jijijijiji XXXXY −= .  (4.5) 
The term Xi,j(t) corresponds to the total amount of positions owned by large-scale 
firms at time t. That is, we measured how much large-scale firms’ niche positions 
depart from the maximum value observed. The amount of “lost positions” over time 
can be seen as a proxy for space contraction. Data and p-values are reported in 
Table 4.4. We ran Mann-Whitney tests comparing Experiment 1 (the baseline 
model) with Experiment 2 and 3. When small-scale firm advantage was set low 
(that is, when the difference between small and large scale was maximal), we only 
observed space contraction with consumer mobility in place (Figure 4.11 and 4.14). 
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In both case 1 and 2, differences with respect to Experiment 1 were significant.  
 
Figure 4.10: Large-scale firms’ total space for Experiment 1 (left), 2 
(centre) and 3 (right). 
 
Small-scale firm advantage was set high in case 5 and 6. Then, all three 
experiments indicated space contraction; so no significant difference was found 
between them (Figure 4.13 and 4.16). For cases 3 and 4, Experiment 1 did not, 
while Experiment 2 and 3 did, indicate space contraction (Figure 4.12 and 4.15). 
However, the differences were mostly found to be non-significant (except for case 4 
in Experiment 3).  
In summary, the larger the distance between the large and the small potential 
scales, the less likely it is that large-scale firms’ space contraction takes place due to 
a lack of consumer mobility. With consumer mobility in place, comparisons of the 
baseline Experiment 1 to Experiment 2 and 3 reveal statistical differences. This 
finding supports our claim that consumer mobility contributes to large-scale firms’ 
space contraction, complementary to what resource-partitioning theory posits 















Exp 1 & 2 
M-W Test 
p-value 
Exp 1 & 3 
M-W Test 
 p-value 
1 12 20 26 0.008 0.008 
 2 32 33     
 8 26 17     
 12 24 38     
 11 24 25     
2 11 22 33 0.008 0.008 
 5 30 41     
 5 18 26     
 12 26 27     
 16 19 22     
3 13 15 18 0.222 0.095 
 19 38 36     
 16 25 18     
 20 18 28     
 13 19 26     
4 9 23 27 0.056 0.016 
 10 25 27     
 25 27 27     
 2 19 30     
 0 23 18     
5 19 18 17 1.000 0.841 
 23 20 18     
 16 19 19     
 21 20 28     
 20 25 24     
6 34 25 31 0.548 0.310 
 13 12 24     
 28 18 30     
 16 12 25     
 23 31 28     
 





Figure 4.11: Large-scale firms’ space, simulation combination 1. 
 
 




Figure 4.13: Large-scale firms’ space, simulation combination 6. 
 
 








Figure 4.16: Large-scale firms’ space, simulation combination 6. 
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4.5 Concluding remarks 
The simulation results show that firm-consumer interactions can have a strong 
impact on market structure evolution. The key findings are: (i) consumer mobility 
can enhance large-scale firms’ space contraction, complementary to the main 
arguments of resource-partitioning theory, (ii) individual-level consumer mobility 
mechanisms can robustly contribute to the proliferation of small firms, and (iii) 
consumer mobility can reduce the influence of scale effects. 
Industry evolution theories typically focus on the supply side, without 
considering consumer effects and firm-buyer dynamics. In line with the parallel 
findings of Harrington and Chang (2005), our simulation runs in Experiment 2 
indicate that market dominance (that is, increasing market concentration) can well 
emerge along with the collapse of a few representative positions. This outcome 
results from dual dynamics: firms try to reach the most resource-abundant spots 
while consumers try to find firms that best matches their product preference 
locations. Figure 4.17 shows the evolution of resource concentration by means of 
the Gini coefficient (Damgaard 2007): the plots indicate how consumers get more 
unevenly distributed along the resource space. 
However, some of our results also differ from those of Harrington and Chang 
(2005). We found that non-concentrated market patterns can also emerge and that 
mobility can lessen scale advantages (Experiment 3). Although Harrington and 
Chang argue that firm-consumer dual dynamics always lead to the above-mentioned 
market dominance, we also have to understand that the context and assumptions of 
the two models differ. Harrington and Chang’s model examines consumer loyalty. 
They consider two firms that adapt, search for innovations in an attribute space, and 
aim to maximise profit while dealing with two different consumer types in the 
absence of a price mechanism.  
Further research along the lines set in this chapter may aim at explaining the 
empirically observed flattening of the resource space with time. Moreover, it may 





Figure 4.17: Average behaviour of the consumer distribution along the 
space. 
 
The insights gained from our agent-based simulation framework in this chapter 
are fourfold. The first is that small-scale firms may very well proliferate in markets 
dominated by large-scale firms, provided that consumer mobility allows for local 
exploration and for the gradual adjustment of product preferences. Second, 
consumer mobility can weaken firms’ potential scale advantages and thereby further 
stimulate small-scale firm proliferation.  
Third, as seen in Experiment 1, scale economies may not be enough to produce 
resource-partitioning theory’s resource-release effects without, for example, some 
mechanism of consumer mobility. This suggests, again, that the explanation of a 
“supply-side” resource release might be complemented by a “demand-side” 
consumer mobility explanation. This is consistent with the empirical findings of 
Swaminathan (1995) who explained small organisations’ upsurge by niche 
formation driven by consumer preference change. 
Fourth, we offered a framework in which consumer mobility can be influential if 
concentrated or non-concentrated market structure emerges. The outcome depends 
on the choice of mobility assumptions. This is not a surprise since agent-based 
models can be sensitive to individual-level interaction subtleties (e.g., 
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synchronisation and reaction delays, c.f. Huberman and Glance 1993). Therefore, 
although we obtained intuitively appealing mobility effects, future empirical testing 
should identify the feasible mobility mechanisms.  
The mobility mechanisms used in this chapter are meant to be computational 
illustrations. The goal was to show the power of consumer mobility effects on 
small-scale firm proliferation and on the contraction of large-scale firms’ resource 
space. Future simulation research may perform sensitivity analyses, for example, 
with different mobility rates and also with mobility “windows” of different breadths 
(i.e., when consumers look beyond adjacent cells when deciding on moving).    
4.6 Background information: mobility algorithms 
Next, we describe the two pseudo-codes that describe how consumers decide on 
moving to a new resource space position. Again, n is the total number of positions 
of the resource space; CBPk(t) is the proportion of consumers already served at 
position k, at time t; Sk(t) is the set of firm indices of those that are serving position 
k at time t; pj(t) is the niche centre of firm j at time t; Ukj(t) is the utility value of firm 
j’s offering at position k at time t; and b1…, bi…, bn stand for the demand 
distribution along the n positions before mobility. 
4.6.1 Match-improving mobility algorithm 
b_old ← b  
for i =1 to n 
   if CBPi(t-1) ≠ 0 







   else 
      MinDistanceCenter ← ∞ 
   end 
   MinDistanceRight ← ∞ 
   if  i+1 ≤ n  
      if CBPi+1 (t-1) ≠ 0 
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      end 
    end 
        
    MinDistanceLeft ← ∞ 
    if i-1 ≥ 1  
      if CBPi-1 (t-1) ≠ 0 









      end 
    end 
    Set rand as a random number between 0 and 1 
    ChangedConsumers ← round(0.05*rand*b_oldi) 
 K* ← min (MinDistanceLeft, MinDistanceCenter, MinDistanceRight) 
    if K* = MinDistanceLeft      
      if (b(i)-ChangedConsumers) ≥ 1 
       b(i) ← b(i)-ChangedConsumers 
       b(i-1) ← b(i-1) + ChangedConsumers 
      end 
    end 
    if K* = MinDistanceRight 
      if b(i)-ChangedConsumers ≥ 1 
       b(i) = b(i)-ChangedConsumers 
       b(i+1) = b(i+1) + ChangedConsumers 
     end 







4.6.2 Utility-maximising consumer mobility algorithm 
b_old ← b  
for i =1 to n 
   if CBPi(t-1) ≠ 0 









   else 
      MaxUtilityCenter ← -∞ 
   end 
   MaxUtilityRight ← -∞ 
   if  i+1 ≤ n  
      if CBPi+1 (t-1) ≠ 0 












      end 
    end 
        
    MaxUtilityLeft ← -∞ 
    if i-1 ≥ 1  
      if CBPi-1 (t-1) ≠ 0 












      end 
    end 
    Set rand as a random number between 0 and 1 
    ChangedConsumers ← round(0.05*rand*b_oldi) 
 K* ← max (MaxUtilityLeft, MaxUtilityCenter, MaxUtilityRight) 
    if K* = MaxUtilityLeft      
      if (b(i)-ChangedConsumers) ≥ 1 
         b(i) ← b(i)-ChangedConsumers 
         b(i-1) ← b(i-1) + ChangedConsumers 
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      end 
    end 
    if K* = MaxUtilityRight        
     if b(i)-ChangedConsumers ≥ 1 
        b(i) ← b(i)-ChangedConsumers 
        b(i+1) ← b(i+1) + ChangedConsumers 
     end 
    end 
 end  
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5. Market Dimensionality and the 
Proliferation of Small-scale Firms36 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we focus on the changing number of product features that 
characterise the resource space and on the effects of this change on firm viability. In 
the previous chapters, we treated the resource space as being one-dimensional. 
Products have m different possibilities to be positioned along the feature represented 
by the single dimension (e.g., automobile engine capacity measured in cc, and 
computer processing capacity in GHz). But each dimension in space can represent a 
particular product feature. 
Studying the effects of changing space dimensionality on how social structures 
are shaped has also been a source of ideas in OE. It has been argued that the 
evolution of the number of spatial dimensions might generate market structural 
changes. For instance, Péli and Nooteboom (1999) use a geometrical (sphere-
packing) model to demonstrate that increasing dimensionality opens up new spots 
for specialist organisations. In the context of voluntary organisations, Péli and 
Bruggeman (2006) demonstrate that the benefit of a given organisation can be 
nonmonotonic with respect to dimensionality change. That is, it might be the case 
that a decrease in dimensionality positively influences a specialist, while negatively 
affecting a generalist organisation, or vice versa. 
Although studying the impact of spatial features is an interesting direction for 
studying social structures (Freeman 1983; McPherson 1983, 2004; Carroll et al. 
2002), investigations of dimensionality effects still remain very abstract, being 
disconnected from empirical research. We now build an agent-based model to 
explore how the increasing diversity of product options in a product characteristic 
space impacts firm strategies (i.e. on the decision of being a large-scale or a small-
scale firm). 
 We study firm strategy performance via profits and market population densities 
                                                     
36
 This chapter is a slightly revised version of García-Díaz et al. (2008). 
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(recall that organisational ecologists define “density” as the number of firms in the 
market). Our computational model contributes to the understanding as to: (i) how 
profit-seeking behaviour influences firm type distribution and location search in the 
resource space, (ii) how changing product space dimensionality affects firm 
performance, and (iii) how endogenous dimensionality changes may take place in 
organisational markets. 
We propose a novel approach to measure the evolution of the number of 
dimensions in the product space. Our assumptions are: (i) not all m possibilities 
(product versions) along a dimension are available at a given point of time; and (ii) 
new product attributes, that is, new spatial dimensions, can start to emerge when 
existing dimensions have not yet been fully developed (having fewer product 
versions than m). Accordingly, space dimensionality n might not be restricted to 
natural numbers; dimensions may be “fractions” of the Euclidean dimensions. We 
use the concept of similarity dimension (Mandelbrot 1983) to characterise product 
space dimensionality. The market will start with a single product variant offered (n 
= 0) and evolves up to maximum of m2 product variants (n = 2). 
We aim to measure (i) the number of firms per firm type in the market over time 
and (ii) the relationship between profits, costs and (fractional) dimensionality. The 
key results of our simulations are twofold. First, low dimensionality has a positive 
relationship with large-scale firm performance, while high dimensionality reflects a 
negative relationship with such performance. Second, dimensionality has a slightly 
positive relationship with small-scale firm performance.  
Below, we first present a brief theoretical background. Then, we present the 
computational model, the analysis of the results, and the concluding remarks. 
5.2 Theoretical background 
Organisational ecologists posited that the scope of environmental resources 
within which firms operate, along with resource change dynamics, is a determinant 
of organisational form performance (Freeman and Hannan 1983; Hannan and 
Freeman 1989). As we have explained in the previous chapters, an environmental 
resource distribution may represent the distribution of consumer purchasing power 
over a set of preferences. These preferences are often mapped onto a space of socio-
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economic characteristics (Blau space; c.f. McPherson 1983, 2004).37 The 
environment’s effect on generalist or specialist performance has been explored by 
niche-width and resource-partitioning theories, as described in earlier chapters. 
In addition, the effect of the increasing number of dimensions has also been 
studied. Péli and Nooteboom (1999) demonstrate, by using geometrical concepts, 
that an increasing number of Euclidean dimensions may make it difficult for 
generalists to cover the whole space. Under the assumption that generalists’ 
catchment areas are hyperspheres (e.g., circles in two dimensions), and that overlaps 
are avoided, the total space covered by all the hyperspheres declines with increasing 
dimensionality, leaving empty spots suitable for specialist entry. 
Several empirical studies have pointed at resource heterogeneity effects on 
market structures (see for example Boone et al. 2002). However, the influence of 
the changing number of resource space features (product dimensions) on market 
structure is less well-understood and far removed from theories of economic 
behaviour.  
Next, we model the evolution of the number of dimensions in a space and its 
effect on firm performance. Again, we use the term “resource space” to represent 
the consumer distribution in an n-dimensional product characteristics space 
(Lancaster 1966). We assume that consumers are re-allocated in the product space 
depending on firms’ influence upon them. As newly offered product versions 
appear accordingly, fractional space dimensions will increase endogenously. Firms 
try to understand consumer behaviour accordingly by developing new market 
segments, deploying advertisement campaigns, and ultimately, shaping consumer 
preferences over time (Basmann 1956; Zinam 1974; Lachaab et al. 2006).38 We 
assume that firms target new spots in the product space (differentiated sufficiently 
from incumbent product positions), invest in opening demand at such positions (by 
coming up with a new product version) and, consequently, contribute to the re-
distribution of total demand along product space locations. 
                                                     
37
 For instance, Boone et al. (2002) considered a four dimensional resource space in their 
study on the Dutch newspaper industry: age, education, political affiliation and 
geographical location. 
38
 Organisational ecologists have also described ways how specialists unlock new tastes at 
the periphery of the market (see Carroll and Hannan 1995a). 
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Firms’ niche width change over time (contract or expand), according to current 
market conditions. As is customary in this book, firms may have scale economies 
and be classified as small-scale or large-scale firms, accordingly.39 
By applying the concept of fractional market dimensionality in combination with 
micro-level rules on profit-seeking behaviour, we demonstrate how increasing 
dimensionality raises small-scale firm profitability. These benefits add to those that 
specialists get in terms of “spatial gain” in the model of Péli and Nooteboom 
(1999). We also show that the effect of increasing dimensionality on large-scale 
firms’ performance is nonmonotonic. Large-scale firms increase their performance 
up to some (fractional) dimension, but from then on face a subsequent decrease. 
This means that large-scale firms also benefit from increasing dimensionality up to a 
point. In the next section, we present the agent-based model. 
5.3 The model 
5.3.1 The resource space 
The resource space is, as before, the n-(Euclidean) dimensional arrangement of 
product characteristics, along which consumers are distributed. That is, every 
product characteristic or attribute represents an Euclidean dimension of the space. 
However, we do not use the Euclidean metric to capture the actual dimension of the 
space, which depends on the active set of product offerings. In our model, the actual 
dimension of the space can take any value between 0 and 2. The distribution of 
consumers along the space changes over time, according to firm actions. Assuming 
that each Euclidean dimension (attribute) has m possible different values, the two-
Euclidean dimensional space has m x m possible product attribute combinations, 
each representing a potential product variant in the space (Dawid et al. 2001). Every 
combined value of two different attributes corresponds to one cell in the space. 
However, not all attribute combinations correspond to an existing product variant, 
i.e., not all cells are active all the time.  
In order to make room for product differentiation, firms “open up” new product 
combinations (activate cells in the space). They make the product variant known 
                                                     
39
 Recall that scale economies are also important drivers of firm growth in resource-
128 
 
and desirable for potential customers by promotion (engagement, Hannan et al 
2007), persuading consumers to move across the product space (i.e., to change their 
current product preferences). A space with only two Euclidean dimensions, 
supported by our dimensionality measure, involves enough dynamics to explore the 
dimensionality effect, and provides a convenient way to visualize results. The fact 
that dimensions are fractional avoids unnecessary complications associated with 
high multidimensionality settings.  
We usually assume that markets start with one firm at the outset of the industry. 
A new product attribute may appear in the market even when the possibilities for 
the other attribute have not yet been exhausted (not all cells are active along existing 
dimensions). So, a new Euclidean dimension may start to emerge when the existing 
ones are still underdeveloped. This consideration will lead us to introduce non-
integer dimensions to measure dimensionality in such “patchy” resource spaces. 
5.3.2 Dimensionality computation 
Summarising the considerations above, we assume that (a) the market possibly 
starts with one or very few product varieties, (b) not all the possible product 
varieties are active all the time, and (c) varieties along a new dimensions may start 
to emerge when the values from the other dimensions have not been exhausted yet. 
That is, the second dimension might start to be developed by firms even when the 
first dimension has not been fully exploited.  
We adapt the dimensionality concepts associated with fractal geometry 
(Mandelbrot 1983). Fractal dimension is already applied to measure resource space 
heterogeneity in bio-ecology (Haskell et al. 2002, Olff and Ritchie 2002). We use 
the concept of similarity dimension (Mandelbrot 1983:37), which assumes the space 
divided into H hypercubes with identical area rDIM, where r is the edge of the 
hypercube and DIM is the corresponding Euclidean dimension.  
Let the total multidimensional space volume (“content”) be normalised to 1; then 
HrDIM = 1. Solving this equation for DIM gives DIM = ln(1/H)/ln(r). Since H = m2, r 
= 1/m. Now, if H(t) (H(t) ≤ m2) corresponds to the number of active cells at time t, 
the dimension of the space at t is: 
                                                                                                                                  











tDIM == .   (5.1) 
The integer values of the similarity dimension coincide with the Euclidean 
dimension values. In our model, if one dimension is fully operating in the market 
while the other is absent, then there are m active cells. So Equation (5.1) yields DIM 
= ln(m)/ln(m) = 1. If all the possible two dimensional m2 combinations are active, 
then Equation (5.1) yields DIM = ln(m2)/ln(m) = 2. Consider that m = 25, so that the 
space has 25 x 25 possible preference cells. Figure 5.1 displays a resource space of 
dimension 1 in which the horizontal dimension is complete. Higher space usage 
means having a higher dimension (see Figure 5.2 and 5.3). 
5.3.3 Demand distribution 
We adopt the calibrated values from previous works (cf. García-Díaz and van 
Witteloostuijn 2006 and Chapter 2 and 3 of this book). We assume a constant total 
market size with QT = 5500 consumers. As the number of active positions increases 
in the space, this fixed QT is distributed among more active cells in the market. 
Our model aims to explain specialist firm proliferation, just like resource-
partitioning theory (Carroll 1985; Carroll and Hannan 2000; Péli and Nooteboom 
1999). Therefore, we explore two cases: (a) when a uniform demand distribution 
evolves above the active positions (flat space), and (b) when a demand distribution 
with a mainstream product preference evolves, surrounded by scarcer peripheral 
demand (unimodal space). By reviewing several empirical studies, Carroll et al. 
(2002) illustrate the presence of unimodal spaces in partitioned markets.  
We assume that at t = 0, there is only one active position at the centre of the 
resource space that contains all QT total demand. That is, the model starts with 
dimension zero. As the number of active cells increases due to firms’ actions, QT is 
re-distributed along the set of currently active positions. Let Ω(t) denote the set of 
active positions at time t. In the flat space case, the re-distribution simply means 
assigning demand to each active cell Di,t = QT /Ω(t), where i ∈Ω(t) and Ω(t) 
represents the number of elements of Ω(t). In the unimodal resource space case, the 
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where (iX, iY) denotes the X-Y coordinates of cell i, and (xo, yo) denotes the 
location of the initially active cell (the market centre) at t = 0. Equation (5.2) and 
(5.3) imply that opening a position far from the market centre (i.e., far from the 
mainstream position) might be less attractive than opening a position near the 
centre. In other words, the incremental cost of convincing one consumer to buy a 
product with attributes different from the mainstream characteristics increases with 
the distance to these mainstream characteristics. It can be shown that with equation 
(5.2) and (5.3) in place, a unimodal demand distribution, with abundant central and 
scarce peripheral resources, evolves over the two-Euclidean dimensional space. 
 





Figure 5.2: Resource space with m = 25, dimension = 1.29 (active cells are 
black). 
 
Figure 5.3: Resource space with m = 25, dimension = 1.81 (active cells are 
black). 
5.3.4 Market entry 
In order to model firm entry to the market, we used the density-dependent 
mechanism explained earlier. The parameter values are, again, derived from earlier 
density-dependence models (cf. Lee and Harrison 2001, Harrison 2004) and 
calibrated to monthly events. The parameter values are presented in Table 5.2 in 




5.3.5 Firm behaviour 
As in the previous chapters, the cost function of a firm has two components: 
production cost CiPROD(Qi,t) and niche-width expansion cost CiNW(t). The production 
function is a Cobb-Douglas function. The production cost function also has two 
components, F and V. Recall that the cost of each unit F is WF and the cost of each 
unit V is WV. The total production costs are: 
)(),( tVWFWtQC iViFiiPROD += .    (5.4) 
Production Qi is calculated as: 
βα )()( tVAFtQ iii = .     (5.5) 
Parameter A is a scale parameter. Moreover, α + β > 1 is assumed to ensure 
positive scale economies. Parameters of the LRAC (the long-run average cost curve) 
are calibrated to produce a minimum average cost for the whole industry that equals 
1 when Q is at its maximum (α, β, WF, WV and A), as illustrated in García-Díaz and 
van Witteloostuijn (2006), and Chapter 2 and 3 of this book. The values are 
summarised in Section 5.7.  
We assume that there are two firm types: large-scale and small-scale firms. 
Taking advantage of the fact that different F values produce cost curves with 
different scale advantages, we assume a fixed F value for each type to differentiate 
their scale advantage. Assuming F is fixed, the amount of V units is computed 
according to the solution of an optimisation problem, which gives the representation 
of the firm’s short-run average costs, SRAC40. Figure 5.4 shows two different 
“scale capacities”: SRAC2 reflects a large-scale firm, SRAC1 reflects a small-scale 
firm; the former has a higher potential scale advantage. In order to avoid firms from 
starting abnormally large, we set an upper limit on firm production at entry, which 
corresponds to the intersection point of the SRAC and the LRAC curves. This 
constraint also forces firms to explore the value range of their economically 
attractive operation zone: the downward-sloping part of the average cost curve. 
                                                     
40
 Recall that a SRAC curve reveals the behaviour of the average production cost curve 
when one of the factors is kept fixed, while the other is allowed to vary according to the 
desired production level. The LRAC curve is the envelope function of all the SRAC 
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Upon entry, we let a firm decide (with equal probability) to be either a large-scale or 
a small-scale firm. 
We call the “scale” value the quantity at which the firm’s SRAC and the LRAC 
intersect (Figure 5.4). These values are chosen in a way that the cost production 
efficiency points of the two SRACs are located at opposite extremes of the quantity 
axis. For instance, the small-scale value is set to QSS = 10 and the large-scale is set 
to QLS = QT/2. With this QLS value choice, a firm may cover approximately half of 
the whole market at entry at t = 0. We perform a sensitivity analysis with QSS. QLS is 
kept fixed in order to retain the nature of what a large-scale firm represents. Thus, 
the scale distance of the two firm types will be changed by changing QSS.  
The second cost component reflects niche-width costs. Let the constant NWCost 
denote the niche-width cost coefficient. Then, the niche-width related costs are 
calculated as NWCost times niche breadth. The latter is the Euclidean distance of 
the two niche limit values. 
 
Figure 5.4: Long-run average cost (LRAC) curve and two examples of 
short-run average (SRAC) cost curves. 
 
Recall that a firm that occupies a single position has no niche cost. Since each 
firm has at least one position, each faces a “default operation cost”, regardless of the 
                                                                                                                                  
possibilities (see Figure 5.4). 
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firm type. Consequently, its effect could be taken into account by a simple re-
calibration of the parameters of interest. Therefore, we can just exclude it without 
confining model generality. We focus on the relative differences on firms’ niche 
spanning costs. Thus, niche-width costs are the costs of operating in more than one 
market position. Firms also face position-opening costs. A detailed argumentation is 
given below. 
5.3.6 Selecting an entry cell 
A demand function is assigned to each cell. Moreover, a price is associated to 
each active cell j. This price is calculated as Pj,t = Po – BΣiOi.j(t), where Oi,j(t) is the 
amount produced by firm i in cell j. Po is the highest point of the calibrated LRAC 
curve (Po = 11.7435). B is set in a way that a zero price clears the whole market (B 
= Po/QT = 0.0021). Firms stay in the market as long as they have a nonnegative 
profit. Firms also receive an endowment upon entry, which is a multiplier of their 
fixed costs. Thus large-scale firms receive a greater endowment than small-scale 
firms. We also ensure that each firm is sufficiently endowed to cover their fixed 
costs for twelve time periods (one year) without sales41. 
Upon entry, a firm may decide to either enter an occupied cell or to open a new 
one. 
 
(a) Entering an occupied cell. For each active cell, the firm builds a probability 
distribution on the amount of the unserved demand. If there was no unserved 
demand at time t-1, the firm treats every active position as an alternative with equal 
probability at time t; otherwise, a random number is drawn from the distribution and 
a position is selected. Formally: at time t, each firm builds a probability distribution 
from the sales percentage per cell at time t-1 (SPCj,t-1). This is computed as the total 
sales at position j divided by demand Dj,t-1. Firms assemble a (discrete) probability 
distribution Pentj,t, j ∈Ω(t-1) as follows: 
                                                     
41
 Although not reported here, we also experimented with endowments of 6 months and 24 















































As far as active cells are concerned, a firm is more likely to enter a cell with a 
larger potential (unserved) amount of consumers. Let us name j* ∈ Ω(t) the position 
randomly selected according to the probability function mentioned above. Then, if a 
















The term Tr is the number of scenarios the firm executes (Tr = 10). P
 j* is price. 
Q-ij*,t-1 is the quantity sold by the other firms (all but firm i) at position j* at time t -
1. 
 
(b) Opening a new cell. The second option is to open a new position. This would 
generate a redistribution of demand if the position were effectively opened by the 
firm. First of all, the firm has to decide which inactive cell to open. We assume that 
firms are more inclined to open cells adjacent to active ones. This is because firms 
try to take advantage of the existent positions by attempting to pull consumers with 
closely similar product preferences and to bring up a new market segment with 
minimum (but sufficient) differentiation. That is, firms take advantage of current 
product similarities. Moreover, in order to generate sufficient differentiation from 
current market segments, firms influence consumers to slightly modify their product 
preferences.42 This generates new and active market positions. The firm randomly 
                                                     
42
 As in Chapter 4, the concept of “engagement” also has some connections here (Hannan et 
al. 2003, 2007). Engagement is the effort of an organisation to “materialise” an offering to 
an audience when observing a market opportunity (through, for example, investment in 
production capacity). According to other arguments, in line with endogenous sunk costs 
effects (Sutton 1991), firms advertise or spend on R&D in order to increase consumer 
willingness to purchase. Although our model is not directly related to any of these concepts, 
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chooses an adjacent inactive position k* from the set of adjacent-to-active cells Φ(t). 
Whenever this happens, the firm pays a one-time extra cost NewPos (the cost of 
opening a new market segment). If more than one firm enter the same inactive cell, 































.  (5.8) 
That is, a firm decides to pay an extra cost to open a new cell if this alternative 
results in higher expected profits than those obtained by entering an already 
occupied cell.43 We call “innovators” those firms that open new cells. Note that 
firms also assume that the (expected) aggregated new production level of an 
associated position is the observed sold amount of the last period. Based on the 
latest iteration prices and sales, firms build market expectations for the next round. 
Recall that we assume firms building a number of scenarios (Tr = 10) for each entry 
option, drawing a quantity to produce from a uniform distribution. From each set of 
scenarios, firms choose the quantity that maximises its utility. In summary, firms 
evaluate between (a) entering an already active (occupied) cell and (b) paying an 
extra cost to open a new cell and “pull” consumers to a new market segment, away 
from current competition. Then, firms compare the two alternatives in terms of 
expected profits and choose the option with higher expected profit. 
One more computational detail is still left open. If the position’s total expected 
production is less than the total available demand, each firm may assume that it 
could sell everything it produces. However, how does a firm compute its profits if 
                                                                                                                                  
we do assume that firm offerings affect the demand distribution, thereby rendering space 
dimensionality endogenous. 
43
 The reader may ask what happens if NewPos costs differ along a number z of periods, so 
that firms can better calculate expected profits in the horizon of z periods and check if the 
net present incremental profit value is positive. Such a procedure would imply a re-
calibration of the model and adding a mechanism to forecast market trends. We ignore this 
alternative for the sake of simplicity. 
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the total expected production surpasses the total available demand at a given cell? 
How much sales does a firm expect to receive in such a scenario? We answer this 
question in the next section. 
5.3.7 Market competition and profit calculation 
Once the firms have set their production quantities and target positions, 
competition starts and new profit calculations take place. Since firms choose 
quantities while seeking for profits, competition resembles Cournot competition in 
Industrial Organisation Theory.44 As mentioned above, a crucial point is to 
determine how firms split quantities when there is overproduction and they target 
the same cell(s). Two cases are worth analysing in this section: (a) when aggregated 
production in a given cell (the result of summing the production levels of all 
participating firms in this cell) does not surpass total demand in that cell, and (b) 
when aggregated production surpasses total available demand in that cell. 
In case (a), we assume that firms sell everything they produce, since there will 
anyway be a portion of unserved consumers. Thus, total realised sales equal total 
production. In case (b), when aggregated production exceeds total available demand 
in a given cell, sales are split according to the firm’s contribution to total 
production.45 Firms also take this information into account when setting their 
production quantities for next time period. 
5.3.8 The organisational niche 
If successful in market competition, a survivor firm (i.e., one with nonnegative 
cumulative profits) might look for further expansion at other points of the resource 
space, as explained later. An incumbent firm decides to expand only horizontally or 
only vertically, which implies that niches have a rectangular form. We can interpret 
                                                     
44
 Cournot competition usually relates to one-shot game-theoretical models where firms 
choose quantities in order to maximise their profits, in the presence of a downward-sloping 
demand curve (Tirole 1988).  
45
 The reason for doing so is to assign sales participation according to some measure of 
“scale advantage”. Firms with a stronger scale advantage are usually larger, with larger 
supply networks. Consequently, they are logistically better prepared to distribute their 
products. In our model, scale is reflected by the cost-efficient production capacity of the 
firm. Other scale advantage measures have also been used in the literature  (e.g., Carroll and 
Swaminathan 2000 and Dobrev and Carroll 2003). 
138 
 
this as if firms have a main product feature with which they develop their business, 
while they generate product variations along the other (complementary) feature. 
This is a modelling convenience but also has some sensible arguments to support it. 
First, by avoiding expansion in any direction we also avoid potential issues like 
having non-convex niches (Hannan et al. 2003). This choice also simplifies the 
rules of niche expansion, which can only take place in the direction of the firm’s 
main feature. The possibility of having “rectangular” niches is well supported by the 
sociological literature (Freeman 1983, McPherson 1983). In marketing, for instance, 
metrics generalisation (i.e., the Minkowski-metric) in optimal product positioning in 
an attribute space may show that firms’ catchment areas may be “square-like” 
(Albers 1979). Moreover, Péli and Nooteboom (1999:1148) argue that Euclidean 
renderings that use rectangular niches are reasonable only if the number of 
dimensions is low: “[g]eometrically: if staying close to a niche edge is bad, then 
staying close to a niche vertex is even worse in rectangular niches. The misfit gets 
bigger as N [the number of dimensions] increases”. All these arguments support our 
rectangular approach. 
Although some of the above-mentioned explanations take the distance between 
the firms’ niche centre and the potential consumer into account, the implication of 
distance in our model is embodied in the complexity of handling a wider niche and 
so having higher operational costs. An example of rectangular niches can be seen in 
Figure 5.5. 
5.3.9 New production level and eventual niche reduction 
After transactions have taken place and firms have computed their profits, they 
set a new production level for the current niche for the next time period. In a similar 
fashion to the market entry procedure, firms evaluate Tr trials to re-adjust their 
quantities; moreover, they also take into account the latest iteration profit and the 
aggregated sold amounts. The projected quantities are drawn from a uniform 
probability distribution and then evaluated. To avoid unrealistic jumps in quantities, 
firms set the next production level as the average of those projected quantities and 
the amount last sold. Firms set those quantities that result in higher expected profits 
for the next iteration with respect to the latest transaction.  
If firms are able to expand, they should be able to pull back as well. Since the 
space distribution is transformed by simultaneous firm interaction, all firms evaluate 
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if adjusting the upper or lower position of their niche brings incremental profit. On 
the one hand, this holds especially for large-scale firms, which may enjoy high 
production levels with a low number of active cells. But as the market develops, 
they might prefer to contract since maintaining a broadly spread demand with a very 
heterogeneous set of consumers might prove to be costly. On the other hand, before 
expansion or reduction procedures, at time t firms adjust production for time t+1 
according to other firms’ realised sales, which constitutes a basis for next time 
period’s quantity estimations. Let firm j’s niche positions be ordered from the 
lowest (position 1) to the upper (position k). The firm computes its expected 
incremental gains for the case of dropping the lowest position of its niche, as 
described in Table 5.1. In the same fashion, the firm computes the expected profits 
for dropping position k. Then the firm compares the two values and chooses the 
action that generates higher incremental profits. If reduction is not attractive to a 
firm (because dropping positions lowers its profits), the firm considers expanding. 
We also assume that niche reduction does not turn an active position into an 
inactive one. This means that once a position is opened, no other firm has to pay to 
open it again. 
 
Figure 5.5: Two firms and their niches. 
5.3.10 Niche expansion 
Those firms that decided not to reduce their niche are candidates for 
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expansion.46 With niche expansion, the firm evaluates the niche’s upper and lower 
adjacent cells, which can be occupied or empty cells. Since niches are rectangular, 
expansion can only take either a horizontal or a vertical direction. We treat the 
following two cases separately: 
 
(a) Expansion to an already active cell. Firms evaluate Tr trials and choose the 
one with the highest expected incremental profits. Each trial consists out of 
randomly selecting a quantity (from a uniform distribution) to produce in the newly 
targeted cell. Let us assume that a firm attempts expansion to an adjacent active cell. 
Then, the firm takes into account the additional cost of adding a new position 
(NWCost), the new production cost that includes the newly added demand, and also 
the additional revenue. For instance, if firm i attempts expansion to the upper 
adjacent position j, it checks if this operation brings positive incremental profit. 















  (5.9) 
The term Q-ij,t-1 represents position j’s total sold amount at t-1, qu is the expected 
quantity at the niche’s upper adjacent position, and qi,t is firm i’s baseline 
production amount at t. The rules for expected sales calculations explained in 
section 5.3.7 and Table 5.1 also apply here. Please note that we assume that Q-ij,t-1 + 
qu is lower than the total available demand at position j in this example. 
 
(b) Expansion to an inactive cell. If the cell is inactive, the procedure is more 
complex since the expansion causes a redistribution of the demand over the whole 
active space. Again, a firm makes Tr trials in order to decide how much to produce. 
Qualitatively, in every trial a firm proceeds as follows: 
 
(i) The firm builds an “expected space”. Based on this, the firm computes the 
                                                     
46
 The reader might ask why firms do not compare niche reduction to niche expansion 
directly, and chooses the one that serves highest profits. The reason for opting for sequential 
evaluation is that preliminary computer experimentation confirms that the profit function is 
non-convex with respect to quantity. This means that the decision processes of niche 
reduction and expansion are mutually exclusive, as we have modelled it here. 
141 
  
expected incremental sales. That is, potential sales derived from the expected space 
(which includes the attempted new position) minus the expected sales from the 
current space. 
(ii) The firm computes incremental costs (the additional production cost, the 
additional niche width NWCost and the cost of opening a new position NewPos). 
(iii) If incremental sales surpass incremental costs, the firm considers the 
position as a candidate for expansion. 
 
x1 ← lowest_niche_position_row; 
x2 ← lowest_niche_position_column; 
 
// CostSaving is computed as –{C(new estimated production) - C(last 
production)} 
 
CostSaving ← -(CostCalculation(sum([firm(j).q])-firm(j).q(1))- 
CostCalculation(sum([firm(j).q]))); 
 
//TotalQ is the total expected amount in (x1,x2); QuantityPerCell(x1,x2) is the 
available demand at (x1,x2); Q(x1,x2) is the total sold volume at (x1,x2) in last 
iteration. The field qsold is firm’s sold amount 
 
TotalQ = Q(x1,x2)- firm(j).qsold(1) + firm(j).q(1);  
 
if TotalQ ≤ QuantityPerCell(x1,x2)  
  ExpMarginProfit ← max(0, NWCost + CostSaving - max(0,(A - 
B*TotalQ))*firm(j).q(1)); 
else 
  QProp ← firm(j).q(1)/TotalQ; 
  ExpMarginProfit ← max(0, NWCost + CostSaving - max(0,(A - 
B*TotalQ))*QProp*QuantityPerCell(x1,x2)); 
end  
Table 5.1: Pseudo-code for firm’s niche reduction. 
 
Firms evaluate the net effect and compute incremental profits for the lower and 
upper adjacent cells. Firms decide to move towards the cell where incremental 
profits are positive and larger. A cell is always discarded if it brings negative 
incremental profits.47 
                                                     
47
 When a firm is already in the market and attempts to open a new cell, it also attempts to 
pull consumers from their existing niche positions. This produces “cannibalisation” effects. 
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5.4 Experimental design 
We set a resource space with 100 different positions (m = 10). We run every 
simulation for 300 time periods. We deal with two parameters in our simulation 
trials: the cost of expanding NWCost and the cost of opening a new taste position 
NewPos. To determine the range of values for NWCost, we experimented with the 
model to determine which value will give positive profits to a large-scale firm that 
expands up to the boundaries of the resource space. We determine the range of 
values for NewPos in a way that a small-scale firm would be able to find positive 
profits when opening a new position, at least initially. That is, NewPos should not 
exceed the initial endowment of a small-scale firm. Those explorations suggested 
the following ranges: NWCost ∈[0, 850] and NewPos ∈[0, 400]. 
We first consider a scenario with costless expansion (NewCost = NewPos = 0). 
Among the positive set of values, we “sweep” the range of NWCost using 200, 400, 
600 and 800. Likewise, we use 100, 200, 300 and 400 for NewPos. All of this gives 
a total of 4 x 4 = 16 simulation combinations of parameter values. We run 30 
simulation runs for each combination. We perform the same procedure for two 
scenarios: (a) when the consumer distribution evolves into a flat space, so demand is 
equally distributed, and (b) when the consumer distribution evolves into a unimodal 
space, with a dominant product attribute combination. The simulation run plot in 
Figure 5.16 shows the shape of the unimodal resource space. Thus, the total number 
of simulation runs is 1 x 30 x 2 + 16 x 30 x 2 = 1020. 
5.5 Findings 
5.5.1 Costless scenario 
This scenario reveals that small-scale firms are unable to proliferate when 
dominant large-scale firms can freely expand without incurring any “scope 
diseconomies”. This result holds for both flat and unimodal spaces. Figure 5.6 
illustrates the aggregated data for the average profit/cost ratio, that is, the average 
profit/cost ratio per firm type of the latest transaction (latest iteration). As observed 
                                                                                                                                  
A firm considers opening a new cell if the net effect of the whole re-distribution generates 
positive incremental profits. 
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in the figure, an initial increase in dimensionality enables large-scale firms to 
benefit from some degree of product differentiation. Further differentiation splits 
total demand among a number of players. This reduces large-scale firms’ profit/cost 
ratio, but without getting necessarily worse than that of small-scale firms. Figure 5.7 
reveals the behaviour of the large-scale and small-scale firm populations over time, 
illustrating the difficulty faced by the small-scale firms to proliferate. It is apparent 
that the decline in profit/cost ratio for the large-scale firms is due to the presence of 
more large-scale firms competing and sharing the market than at the initial stages of 
the simulation. Specifically, a higher entry rate leads to the presence of more large-
scale firms and, thus, to higher incentives to differentiate. This triggers larger 
product diversity and an increase in dimensionality.  
Additional experiments with different entry rates and mechanisms (e.g., a 
stochastic entry process with a constant rate) confirm these results. For instance, an 
extreme case with an entry according to a Bernoulli process with probability p = 
0.01 shows that the profit/cost ratio does not necessarily decrease for the large-scale 
firms. In that case, entry is very unlikely and incumbents only attempt to 
differentiate enough to increase profitability. Figure 5.8 shows a simulation run in a 
unimodal space with a Bernoulli entry process of probability 0.01. We also 
experimented with larger starting populations (other than 1) and, again, observed 
that the large-scale firm ratio can increase with dimensionality (up to a certain 
point), while the small-scale population gradually disappears over time.  
 
Proposition 1: (a) In a costless expansion scenario, large-scale firms take over 
the whole market, (b) average large-scale firms’ profit/cost ratio increases with 
dimensionality up to a level of product differentiation but declines as long as entry 
becomes more intensive, (c) average large-scale firms’ profit/cost ratio always 











Figure 5.7: Costless expansion/flat space. Averages are represented by 
circles (large-scale firms) and dots (small-scale firms). Solid and dashed 






Figure 5.8: Costless expansion/unimodal space/Bernoulli entry with p = 0.01 
(circles ≡ large-scale firms; dots ≡ small-scale firms). 
5.5.2 Costly expansion 
Inclusion of expansion costs leads to a series of robust results across different 
parameterisations, resource space shapes (either flat or unimodal) and entry 
mechanisms. Under the entry mechanism explained in section 5.3, a proliferation of 
small-scale firms is observed over time (Figure 5.9). Experiments with other 
parameter values revealed behaviour similar to that presented in Figure 5.9. 
Nonmonotonic behaviour of the profit/cost ratio for large-scale firms was also 
observed. Again, large-scale firms benefit from some degree of product 
differentiation at low dimensionality, but at higher dimensionality their performance 
decreases even below that of the small-scale firms. Figure 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12 
reflect this pattern of results. Similar to the costless scenario, nonmonotonic 
behaviour of large-scale firms’ profit/cost ratio was observed at all times. Those 
results are not even sensitive to the choice of alternative entry mechanisms (for 
example, a Bernoulli process with constant entry and a low probability of success 




Figure 5.9: Population evolution in unimodal space (circles ≡ large-scale 
firms, dots ≡ small-scale firms), NWCost = 200; NewPos = 100. Solid and 
dashed lines indicate confidence intervals at 95%. 
 
Figure 5.10: Average profit/cost ratio in unimodal space (circles ≡ large-





Figure 5.11: Average profit/cost ratio in unimodal space (circles ≡ large-
scale firms, dots ≡ small-scale firms), NWCost = 200; NewPos = 400. 
 
 
Figure 5.12: Average profit/cost ratio in unimodal space (circles ≡ large-





One more reason why the large-scale type is more profitable than the small-scale 
firm at low dimensionality is because large-scale firms are able to implement price 
discrimination: if a large-scale firm attempts to open a new position, it may have the 
benefit of having a small set of consumers paying a higher price. This may justify 
the expansion of large-scale firms at low dimensionality. However, these benefits 
are undermined with respect to those of the small-scale firms at high dimensionality, 
since niche-width costs become substantial. 
 
Proposition 2: (a) When expansion is penalised with niche costs and position 
opening costs, small-scale firms’ profit/cost ratio is likely to become higher than 
that of large-scale firms as dimensionality increases; (b) small-scale firms are able to 
proliferate in resource spots where scale dominance does not compensate the cost of 
expansion. 
5.5.3 Who are the innovators? 
The last question we investigate is, which firm type is the major innovator force 
(i.e., that opens more new positions in the space) over time? Is it the large-scale or 
the small-scale type? Is innovation influenced by any factors like costs of expansion, 
resource space type or the relative difference between niche costs and new cell 
opening costs? 
The average behaviour under the costless expansion is displayed in Figure 5.13: 
many small-scale firms become innovators; however, the cumulative number of 
small-scale innovators never surpasses that of the large-scale firms.  
In the costly expansion case, we observed similar patterns for all parameter 
combinations and for both types of resource spaces. In the costly expansion case, all 
innovators are large-scale firms. This result complements the argument above 
regarding the interpretation of the initial increase of large-scale firms’ profit/cost 
ratio. When the population of incumbent firms grows, the incentives for product 
differentiation increase. It is also clear that the increase in expansion costs leave 
small-scale firms unable to benefit from any position openings. Figure 5.14 shows 
the innovation pattern for the costly expansion case. 
However, it is important to emphasise that these results are dependent on the 
way we typologise firms into the small-scale and the large-scale categories. Further 
sensitivity analyses with increased scale advantages of small-scale firms tend to 
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modify the results. That is, taking advantage of the robustness of previous results to 
different parameterisations, and using a unimodal space with NWCost = 200 and 
NewPos = 100, we varied the limit size of small-scale from QSS = 10 to higher 
values (50, 70, 75, 80, 100, 250). For small-scale firms, we found that their 
incentive to innovate became higher than that of large-scale firms beyond the value 
range of [70 80]. Moreover, their market density figures sharply declined. When 
their scale advantage surpassed the value range of [70 80], even naming them 
“small-scale” becomes inappropriate. Similarly, talking about a real “proliferation” 
may also be out of context. Beyond the value of 250, these firms’ behaviour 
resembles that of the large-scale firms as far as dimensionality effects are 
concerned, but they are no longer “small-scale” firms.  
Under a costless expansion scenario, increasing the values of QSS generated 
inconclusive results that deserve a further separate experimental design. However, 
we are aware of the fact that the costless expansion scenario might not bring any 
real-world insights about innovation forces. In any case, these results never proved 
to alter the profit/cost behaviour previously observed in the costless expansion 
scenario with the QSS = 10 default value.  
 
Proposition 3: When expansion is costly and the difference in scale between the 
large and the small is big, only large-scale firms have incentives for opening new 
positions as a means of product differentiation. The collective innovation effect of 
large-scale firms generates enough product diversity to stimulate small-scale entry. 
Small-scale firms tend to increase their incentives to innovate as their scale 
advantage (QSS value) increases.  
5.6 Concluding remarks 
We presented an agent-based modelling approach of a market where the number 
of active product features changes over time. We investigated the impact of 
increasing dimensionality on small-scale and large-scale firms. The model 
demonstrates (i) an approach to account for dimensionality in economic markets, 
and (ii) a consistent set of findings related to previous research that complement 
other modelling approaches (Péli and Nooteboom 1999; Péli and Bruggeman 2006). 
The model also makes dimensionality change endogenous and dependent on firm-
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level interactions. In a sense, it resembles repeated spatial Cournot competition 
where expectations are updated according to previous market transactions.  
 
Figure 5.13: Average cumulative number of innovators per type under 
costless expansion in unimodal space (circles ≡ large-scale), QSS = 10. 
 
The model also reveals that (i) the advantages of increasing dimensionality for 
small-scale firms are not due to their improved strategy or capabilities but to the fact 
that large-scale firms suffer more from the proliferation of their product offerings 
across the resource space; (ii) large-scale firms can benefit from a small 
dimensionality increase that softens competition with other large-scale firms and 
also allows for a small degree of differentiation. Such a small increase in 
dimensionality raises their profit/cost ratio. However, a larger increase in 
dimensionality weakens their scale advantage and provides better chances for non 
scaled-based competitors. A graphical summary of the results is presented in Figure 
5.15. 
The results also reveal that, when expansion is costly, large-scale firms open 
more new cells than small-scale firms. This makes the former the major innovation 
force. In our model, large-scale firms tend to have larger size. The empirical 
literature is inconclusive with respect to the relation between firm size and 
innovation. For instance, the classical Schumpeterian hypothesis states that large 
firms are more innovative than small firms (van Cayseele 1998). Many empirical 
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studies argue the opposite, and even highlight that small innovative firms enjoy 
larger positive effects on survival probabilities (Cefis and Marsili 2006). Some 
others illustrate that, even in studies where small firms appear to be the major 
innovation force, large firms feature higher innovativeness patterns, if such patterns 
adopt a weighted mechanism based on firm size (Tether 1998). Possible extensions 
of the present model might look into the patterns of innovation themselves, apart 
from the already shown endogenous resource space dimensionality change effects. 
 
Figure 5.14: Average cumulative number of innovators per type under 
costly expansion in peaked space (circles ≡ large-scale firms). NWCost = 






Figure 5.15: Graphical representation of propositions (big circles ≡ large-
scale firms; small dots ≡ small-scale firms). 
 


















Figure 5.16: Unimodal resource space. 
 
 




6. Appraisal and Conclusions 
6.1 Summary 
Agent-based modelling (ABM) has notably increased in popularity among the 
research methodologies in social sciences in the last twenty years (Samuelson 2005; 
Windrum et al. 2007). Yet, it is a relatively new approach to modelling industry 
evolution. ABM is suitable to study evolutionary industry behaviour, as it allows for 
(i) representing firm heterogeneity across many different characteristics (location, 
size, scale advantage, niche width, price levels, firm type density, expansion type, 
endowment levels, etc.), (ii) including information-processing limitations associated 
with firm behaviour (future actions are based on heuristics and past information), 
(iii) studying convergence properties in terms of high or low concentration and 
density, and (iv) the endogenous treatment of resource space change. With ABM, 
we were able to develop an explicit micro-foundation of meso-level ecological 
processes, linking IO principles of direct competition with OE insights as to 
population-level evolution.   
Our agent-based models addressed evolutionary processes that shape industry 
dynamics, while paying special attention to market-partitioning processes and the 
resource-based changes of market structures. We combined (i) explicit firm-level 
behaviour (applying some basic concepts of Industrial Organisation, IO, particularly 
microeconomic principles), (ii) adaptive heuristics that limit firm capabilities (in 
contrast to perfectly rational firm behaviour), (iii) elements of population-level 
dynamics (considering entry and exit in the spirit of Organisational Ecology, OE), 
and (iv) resource space dynamics (shape, as well as dimensionality). The strong 
reliance on OE stems from our main motivation: the exploration of resource space 
configuration effects on market structures. Thus our motivation was ecological per 
se. 
6.2 Contributions 
Chapters 2 and 3 provide a theoretical reconstruction of macro-behaviour from 
micro-level rules applied to exogenously defined resource spaces. Chapters 4 and 5 
155 
  
explore endogenous effects of resource space change. The findings underscore the 
advantages of combining IO and OE in an agent-based computational framework. 
The dissertation also illustrates that adaptation and selection theories of organisation 
can be reconciled, to some extent (Lewin et al. 2004). Recent research has explicitly 
built some implications of organisational adaptation into the OE framework 
(Hannan et al. 2007). OE’s empirical studies on industry evolution are also heavily 
influenced by firm-level selection aspects through the interplay of entry and exit 
rates. The results of Chapter 4 are consistent with a co-evolutionary view of industry 
dynamics, where micro-behaviour is an important driver of market processes (Lomi 
and Larsen 1997). The results are also connected to complexity theory (Baum and 
Amburgey 2002) in the sense that the firm can be viewed as an adaptive entity that 
operates in an environment of decentralised interactions. We now provide a detailed 
summary of each chapter’s contribution. 
Chapter 2 illustrates how market-partitioning outcomes emerge in a pure scale-
based competition framework, in unimodal resource spaces with a market centre. In 
a world with firms with a uniform, large capacity (large-scale firms), the mortality 
rate increases with the distance to the market centre. We added small-scale firms to 
the model that could locate at peripheral spots, out of the reach of scale-based 
competition. In this two-type case, mortality decreases with firm size and firm type 
while increasing with market concentration. We also illustrate that the pure-
selection process is more sensitive to parameter values than the process associated 
with entrepreneurial intervention in the form of type founding. The pure-selection 
process might show a tendency towards market fragmentation, while the 
entrepreneurial-based one proves to reinforce the partitioning outcomes. 
Cost efficiency effects were also explored in Chapter 2 (and also in Chapter 3). 
We found that while large-scale firms pushed less inefficient firms out of the market 
centre, not-so-efficient firms could still make a foothold at the market fringes 
because of strategic positioning. This could happen because large-scale firms were 
not interested in the exploitation of scarce peripheral resources. Thus, selection did 
not take place purely on the basis of cost efficiency in heterogeneous resource 
spaces with a centre and peripheries. 
Because of our focus on scale effects, some complementary effects (like liability 
of newness: see Stinchcombe 1965; Hannan 1998) were not taken into account. For 
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instance, Levinthal (1991) proved that simple random walks might explain the first 
increasing and then decreasing age dependence of mortality rates. Also, Carroll and 
Hannan (1995: 120) mention that “organisations pushed to the fringe of the industry 
by initially intense competition are likely to exhibit higher mortality rates at all 
ages”. This remark suggests higher mortality rates for small-scale firms, at least 
until rising concentration changes this trend as resource-partitioning theory predicts 
(Carroll 1985). In our model, the magnitude of the mortality rate depends on firms 
having enough room ‘to settle and grow’. In our models, we do not expect a lone 
small-scale firm to fail in an otherwise empty market: firms have no ‘inherent 
mortality hazard’ in absence of competition. This simplification was necessary to 
keep the model manageable. After all, the integration of the ecological view on 
industry evolution with IO aspects, on its own, has rendered the model quite 
complex already.  
Chapter 3 proceeds with the firm-level reconstruction of population-level 
processes, now focusing on the resource-based view of markets structures (van 
Witteloostuijn and Boone 2006). Here, we investigated how different resource 
distributions affect the survival perspectives of large-scale and small-scale firms. 
We observed that, in flat resource spaces, the emergence of concentrated or 
fragmented market structures is subject to specific parameter values. Condensed 
spaces showed less volatile evolution patterns, and a unique trend towards high 
market concentration values. Notwithstanding this observation, flat spaces 
registered even higher concentration values with some parameter combinations. 
However, those simulation runs with higher concentration values never beat the cost 
efficiency levels that condensed spaces recorded.  
This implies that this volatility gets significantly smaller as heterogeneity (in 
terms of the number of different positions) decreases. The strength of the size 
effects appears to decrease as the resource space gets more condensed. It is also 
shown that small-scale firms reduce their survival chances in such condensed 
spaces, but this disadvantage fades away as those small-scale firms are able to 
become larger.  
In ecological parlance, this means that the ‘middle-size firms’ (e.g., the ‘larger’ 
small-scale firms) increase their chances relative to the ‘smaller’ ones in condensed 
spaces. Earlier research has already pointed out that these firms suffer the 
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consequences of being ‘stuck in the middle’ in heterogeneous spaces (Boone et al. 
2004). Our research has revealed, however, that middle-size firms’ disadvantage 
diminishes as resource space heterogeneity declines. These results are consistent 
with other work in this field (Boone et al. 2002; van Witteloostuijn and Boone 
2006). The novelty of the current model is that it generates various market 
structures, closely reflecting changing space heterogeneity, from firm-level 
interactions of agents with constant endowment. One main goal of this dissertation 
was exploring the (exogenous) impact of resource space features on the emergence 
of market structures. 
In Chapters 4 and 5, we dropped the assumption that tastes are operationalised as 
fixed product characteristics. In Chapter 4, we observed that the scaled-based 
competition process did not always generate resource release, which could have 
favoured small-scale firms at the market margins. Even if resource release were 
present, the resources available to small-scale firms should increase at a rate higher 
than the rate of small-scale firm entry in order to have an overall lower mortality 
rate for the small-scale type. The occurrence of the resource-release effect had to be 
facilitated by some consumer mobility effects in the product space. This was the 
case, for example, when the entry probability of large-scale firms decreased with 
their organisational mass–that is, when the number of large-scale firms could not 
increase (eventually generating resource release). Note that empirical research has 
also confirmed that processes complementary to resource release also contribute to 
the proliferation of (small-scale) specialist organisations. For instance, Carroll and 
Hannan (1995:219) posit that “[s]pecialist appeals to the peripheries of the market 
unlock new tastes and tap new consumers”. Swaminathan (1995), who calls this 
process ‘niche formation’, adds density dependence-based and institutional support 
to the explanation of specialist proliferation. 
In absence of consumer mobility, the space contraction effect seems to emerge 
when the difference between large-scale and small-scale advantage is minimal. But 
market concentration effects tend to be low in these cases. We argue that medium-
sized firms are outcompeted easily by the small-scale firms when the space 
contraction effect is generated. However, these ‘larger’ small-scale firms have some 
modest scale advantages that enable them to face large-scale firms in the ‘middle 
spaces’ between centre and periphery. Since market concentration does not increase 
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sharply in those cases, there is a resource appropriation of those firms in the middle 
spaces that generate a more uniform sales distribution among the surviving firms. 
However, this is not the same as the resource-release argument that resource-
partitioning theory emphasizes.  
What we found is that including consumer mobility mechanisms reinforces the 
large-scale firms’ space contraction, letting the density of small-scale firms increase 
in the long run. Market concentration showed an increasing trend with the first 
mobility mechanism (match-improving scenario) in place. With the second 
mechanism in place (utility-maximising scenario), the resource distribution became 
‘patchy’, undermining the advantages of large-scale players.  
Chapter 5 focused on another endogenous resource change effect. The chapter’s 
model was based on a novel way of product space dimensionality representation. In 
this approach, high dimensionality is linked to (potentially) high product diversity 
and, consequently, to high space heterogeneity. We considered that the resource 
space has a fractional dimensionality (Mandelbrot 1983) that is located between 0 
and 2. Large-scale firms’ performance turned out to be a non-monotonic function of 
fractal dimensionality. It increased at low dimensionality, but declined at higher 
dimensionality, in the end even undercutting the performance of small-scale firms. 
Chapter 5 has novel results on two accounts. First, large-scale firms may improve 
their performance relative to small-scale firms when the fractional dimensionality 
increases along the low-range. So, some initial degree of space heterogeneity 
increase is favourable to large-scale firms, in spite of their niche costs that 
monotonically increase with their niche width. Second, small-scale firms are 
unlikely to open new cells (products); their improved relative performance comes 
from the market demand distribution that is generated by large-scale firms. 
6.3 Methodological and simulation issues  
We argued that ABM is a suitable tool to explore industrial evolution. ABM can 
also support policy-making on economic issues when strong stochastic components 
are involved. ABM is also suitable for contexts where spatial heterogeneity and 
agent interaction are the key drivers of behaviour. We hope that the dissertation 
sufficiently exemplifies the benefits of agent-based modelling. 
Since ABM is a relatively new element in the toolbox of social sciences, a 
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number of related methodological issues still have to be settled. For example, some 
researchers argue that the extensive exploration of the parameter space renders 
ABM a tool that can only suggest something, but not prove anything.  
However, note that simulations often study parameter combinations that have not 
yet been studied in empirical research (empirical studies may only encompass a 
fraction of the scientifically relevant parameter space). But beyond simulation, there 
are other formal methods for parameter space research. For instance, many 
mathematical models with closed forms can perform nontrivial parameter 
exploration jobs. An example is the work of García-Díaz and Beltrán (2007) on 
system behaviour, policy choice and decision-making. In our view, ABM and 
computer simulation, in general, can be further developed with an application to 
policy design. Realistic agent behaviour may be part of feasible scenarios. Potential 
implications of decisions in these scenarios can be studied. As system-dynamics 
expert John Sterman puts it: “[w]hen experimentation is too slow, too costly, 
unethical, or just plain impossible, when the consequences of our decisions take 
months, years, or centuries to manifest, that is, for most of the important issues we 
face, simulation becomes the main—perhaps the only—way we can discover for 
ourselves how complex systems work, where the high leverage points may lie.” 
(2002: 525). Mainstream economics has not yet completely accepted computational 
approaches to policy design or to theoretical exploration in general (Windrum et al. 
2007). Economics often takes, with good reason, physical sciences as the 
benchmark because of their balanced deployment of mathematical precision and 
rigorous testing (Lazear 2000). But physical sciences have already acknowledged 
simulation methods as mainstream and legitimate methodological devices (see, for 
example, the intense use of computer simulations in statistical physics). However, 
the community of economists supporting computational methods for theory 
development is growing, coupled with the available computational technology tools. 
This trend has also taken the approach to start addressing old philosophical issues: 
the existence of “social laws”, parallel to the physical sciences (Kirman and Vriend 
2001), the assumption of structural stability and closure of social systems (Valente 
2007) and the notion of equilibrium (Batten 2000) are questioned now more than 
ever. 
Still, computer simulation modelling has several unsolved issues concerning 
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model validity (Windrum et al. 2007). In the present dissertation, we used some 
parameter values without an empirical grounding in order to develop insights for 
theoretical and empirical research. These parameter values were calibrated not by 
data inputs, but by keeping an eye on output consistency. This is normal practice in 
ABM. Accordingly, our results are interpreted according to qualitative behavioural 
properties of the models in question. We aimed at linking our outcomes to empirical 
regularities in a qualitative sense–nothing more, nothing less.  
Another methodological criticism is that ABM’s flexibility in dealing with 
mathematically intractable systems usually opens up too many modelling 
possibilities. This can lead to a lack of methodological robustness (Windrum et al. 
2007). The solution can be a better model standardisation at a meta level, applying 
to different research lines (Richiardi et al. 2006). Standardisation would allow for 
better model replications by peer researchers. Having a broad array of similar, but 
still somewhat different, model settings could allow for testing if different 
assumption alternatives (e.g., different level of discretisation) or different modelling 
options (e.g., different programming platforms) generate consistent results. 
The simulation models in this thesis do not escape from the same kind of 
problems for which the computer simulation methodology generally has been 
criticised. For instance, the stylistic behaviour revealed in Chapter 2 needed a 
calibration of many parameters, including those regarding scale economies, growth 
speed, market entry generation and firm types. The exploration of the complete 
parameter space is near to impossible, which implies that only the consideration of 
sub-spaces (like the ones considered in this thesis) doable. Of course, the sub-spaces 
explored should make theoretical or empirical sense. In all chapters, we have argued 
why we believe this is the case. In line with Valente (2007), moreover, we do not 
think that simulation in the social sciences should be regarded as a methodology 
where only quantitative regularities can be studied (different, for instance, from 
what we observe in the simulation literature as to queuing systems policies and its 
cost-benefit analysis in industrial engineering). With Valente (2007), we do not 
think that models with many parameters should be considered valid only if 
exhaustive statistical tests results are carried out. In many cases, the focus may be 
purely on the qualitative pattern of outcomes, which may be related to events that 
are not necessarily the most likely to happen in the real world. An example from 
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this thesis is the observation in Chapter 3 that higher market concentration in a 
scale-based market does not always lead to higher cost market efficiency. Finding 
such unexpected outcome patterns is one of the strengths of the simulation 
methodology. 
Another issue is that we decided to keep our specification of firm-level 
behaviour relatively simply. Alternatively, we could have opted for more 
sophisticated firm behaviour models, particularly by increasing the time horizon to 
more than one period would. In principle, with such firm-level models that are 
closer to what is standard in IO, we could have brought the overall backbone of the 
simulation experiments more in line with mainstream IO. After the intensive 
experimentation with such models, however, our feeling is that there is only a 
marginally decreasing gain from adding more elements to the models in terms of the 
model’s predictive quality, at the expense of an exponentially increasing complexity 
reflected in simulation running time and re-calibration processes. Although it is true 
that firms only look at the latest transaction to make inferences about the immediate 
future, it is important to recall that such transactions reflect an accumulated 
sequence of decisions that, over time, make the firms gradually grow, take 
advantage of scale benefits and position themselves in the resource space. So, in the 
end, we believe that the ultimate evolutionary pattern of outcomes would not be 
much different in model specifications with longer time horizons. 
This thesis concentrates on the effects of resource spaces on market structures 
through the integration of concepts from OE and IO. However, it does not really 
focus on specifying what kind of micro-economic features trigger particular patterns 
of the industry evolution. We leave this for future work, as here our main objective 
was to bring OE closer to IO by developing a plausible micro-foundation for macro-
level OE processes. Hence, our primary perspective is OE, and not IO. In any case, 
we were always conscious in adopting general rules of behaviour that can be refined 
in future research if we would like to change the primary perspective to IO. In our 
simulations, for example, firms decide on the basis observable information. Firms 
adopt heuristics based on that information, including the latest rivals’ choices, and 
then define the next course of action. In few cases, some of the adopted micro-rules 
did indeed produce specific effects on the market evolutionary pattern. For instance, 
entrepreneurial intentionality at founding, instead of a pure randomised firm type 
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generation, proved to reinforce the market-partitioning mechanism (Chapter 2). 
Also, the fact that consumers update their product preference has an important 
effect on resource release outcomes (Chapter 4). It is this kind of work that can be 
expanded greatly in the future by bringing in more advanced insights from IO. 
Moreover, the amount of computational time that the models consume forced us 
to decide conservatively on the number of simulation runs per experiment. In the 
model-building process, we decided to use an interpreter (i.e., MATLAB) instead of 
a compiler (e.g., Delphi), because of the exhaustive test of firm-level rules and 
model calibration. The use of the MATLAB interpreter significantly reduced the 
design time of the many models used in this thesis. However, the running time of 
interpreters is known to be long. Due to this, in Chapter 2, we decided to average 
the different parameters value outcomes, being conscious about the implications for 
the explanation of the results. In Chapters 3 and 4, the simulation trials were so 
lengthy that we decided to use simple non-parametric statistical tests based on the 
runs we did. In future work, we like to explore the implication of this trade-off in 
more detail, running simulations experiments with longer runs, producing data that 
offer the opportunity to apply more sophisticated statistical techniques. 
Despite the criticisms that can always be directed at the simulation method, like 
the ones discussed above, the list of insights we derived in this thesis is difficult to 
obtain through other methods. Tests of the resource release hypothesis and effects of 
consumer mobility on such a resource release, for instance, are difficult to obtain 
with methods different from computer simulation. Also, it is difficult to see any 
other way to build theory about hazard rate effects without compiling 
computational-generated datasets over an industry’s lifetime (see Chapters 2 and 3). 
For future research, building sound theory on market structures with a focus on both 
demographic effects (size and age dependence) and ecological processes may be 
hardly done without the help of computer simulation models. Computer simulation 
allows for what Valente (2007) refers to as learning by coding. We live in a world 
where choices are discrete, and the programming exercise that forces us to think 
how this sequence of discrete choices operates tell us a great deal about how social 




6.4 Future Research 
6.4.1 Demographic characteristics, agent-based modelling and   
      market structures 
The agents in our simulation models accumulate profits that buffer them against 
adverse conditions in future periods. Surviving firms increase their slack capacity 
over time. This is in line with theoretical models and empirical findings by 
Levinthal (1991) on the negative age dependence of mortality. However, the 
sociological concepts of age and size dependence were not fully taken into account 
in the current approach. Future research in this direction may make further 
significant advances in understanding market structure evolution. For instance, the 
theoretical work of Hannan (1998) specified a number of mortality age-dependence 
patterns (‘liabilities of newness, adolescence, senescence and obsolescence’), for a 
number of contexts. First-mover organisations (assumed to be smaller and less 
resistant to environmental shocks) used to have higher mortality rates than efficient 
producers (Péli and Masuch 1997). Organisational Ecology’s models usually 
proposed exogenous explanations for such effects without considering firm-level 
interactions (Barron 1999, 2001).  
Studying ways how firms set their behaviour by taking into account others’ 
demographic characteristics (beyond taking into account the competition 
framework) is another interesting topic fur future research. We would like to 
emphasise that there is an incipient but growing literature on using agent-based 
computational models to understand human demographic processes (cf. Billari and 
Prskawetz 2003). This line of research may provide insight as to how to elaborate 
on OE’s models concerning firm demographics. Also, it can help to link lower and 
higher-level demographic and ecological processes (see Boone et al. 2006).  
6.4.2 Organisational growth and agent-based market structure 
modelling 
Industry dynamic research obviously includes organisational growth processes. 
However, organisational growth is still poorly understood, and still subject to 
modelling explorations (McCloughan 1995; Barron 2001; Harrison 2004; Harrison 
and Carroll 2001, 2006). As has been demonstrated throughout this dissertation, 
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firm growth is crucial for modelling market-partitioning processes. We have 
represented growth in terms of Bernoulli processes with respect to horizontal 
expansion. We have also represented growth in terms of sales expectations with 
respect to vertical expansion. As noted in Chapter 3, these processes may work well 
when consumers are reasonably distributed across the set of one-dimensional 
possibilities. However, if consumers crowd around a few taste positions, then the 
Bernoulli trials might lead to hectic ‘jumps’ in the production levels. That is why 
we had to be careful when having outcomes with very high Gini coefficients. 
Although involving Bernoulli processes allowed us to manage complex growth 
specifications, we would like to point out that this way of modelling is still an 
interesting and not fully explored avenue for future research.  
6.4.3 Co-evolution and Organisational Ecology 
The results have confirmed our initial claim that empirical studies should address 
change and influence both in terms of consumer choice and entrepreneurial forces 
in studies concerning industry evolution patterns. However, this can generate a 
tension between selection and adaptation theories (Lomi and Larsen 1997). On the 
one hand, the selection-based approach has been dominant in OE (with some 
exceptions), positing that evolution is driven by selection. On the other hand, the 
Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) approach and certain behavioural theories 
(Lewin et al. 2004) claim that individual-level actions heavily contribute to the 
shaping of social structures.  
But as Lomi and Larsen put it (1997:152): “Unfortunately this accumulation of 
knowledge about macro and micro-organisational processes has not generated a 
comparably detailed understanding of how these levels of analysis may be linked, 
i.e., of the laws of composition according to which micro units interact to create 
macro structures”. This dissertation points out the need for a genuine co-
evolutionary approach to explore market evolution processes in general, and 
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Samenvatting (summary in Dutch) 
 
Dit proefschrift mengt ecologische processen met aannames uit de industriële 
organisatie om bepaalde aspecten van de evolutie van industrieën te modelleren. De 
aandacht richt zich met name op de rol van heterogeniteit van consumenten en de 
ruimtelijke verdeling daarvan in het ontstaan van marktstructuren. De paden naar 
evenwicht , meer dan het evenwicht zelf, zijn de kern van onze evolutionaire 
processen.  In zo'n evolutionair kader is het gedrag van bedrijven vooral reactief en 
heuristisch, gebaseerd op beperkte rationaliteit; meer dan vooruitziend en volledig 
rationeel (Dawid 1999). Gegeven dat er problemen te verwachten zijn voor de mate 
waarin een mathematische aanpak handelbaar is, hebben we gekozen voor een 
computationele (agent-based) aanpak om de evolutionaire dynamiek van industrieën 
te bestuderen. 
 Ten aanzien van heterogeniteit van consumenten benadrukken ecologische 
processen de opkomst van gesegmenteerde markten. De theorie van segmentatie van 
middelen (resource-partitioning theory) wijst drie noodzakelijke voorwaarden aan 
voor het ontstaan van gesegmenteerde markten: i) een voldoende hoge mate van 
heterogeniteit van consumenten; ii) een unimodale verdeling van de vraag; en iii) de 
aanwezigheid van schaalvoordelen. Deze drie elementen drijven het evolutionaire 
proces naar een stadium waar twee organisatievormen, generalisten en specialisten, 
naast elkaar bestaan in één markt. Binnen onze computationele aanpak hebben we 
een kader ontwikkeld waarbinnen ecologische processen plaatsvinden tussen 
bedrijven die zich expliciet winstmaximaliserend gedragen. Om de concepten van 
de organisatie-ecologie en die van de industriële organisatie  met elkaar te 
verbinden, maken we gebruik van het beeld van een middelenruimte (resource 
space). Dit is de ruimtelijke ordening waarbinnen bedrijven concurreren, en 
consumenten met verschillende maten van heterogeniteit zijn verdeeld. Allereerst 
verkennen we het gedrag van het model in een exogeen gedefinieerde (vaste) 
middelenruimte (hoofdstukken 2 en 3), om vervolgens de effecten te bestuderen 
binnen ruimtes die aan endogene veranderingen onderhavig zijn (Hoofdstukken 4 
en 5). 
 Onze resultaten laten niet alleen zien dat het reproduceren van ecologische 
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regelmatigheden op marktniveau mogelijk is vanuit een model van gedrag en 
interactie op individueel niveau, maar geven ook het idee weer dat de ecologische 
theorie van marktsegmentatie goed aangevuld zou kunnen worden met andere 
aspecten. Organisatie-ecologie stelt dat selectie de evolutie van industrieën sterk 
beïnvloedt, dat schaal-gebaseerde competitie in het centrum van de markt tot gevolg 
heeft dat er middelen vrijkomen die specialisten ten goede komen, en dat een 
toename van heterogeniteit in termen van het aantal ruimtelijke dimensies van de 
middelenruimte het gezamenlijke marktaandeel van de generalisten monotoon doet 
afnemen, zonder daarbij economische prestaties in acht te nemen. Ons model levert 
een unimodale middelenruimte op van een populatie van consumenten, waarbinnen 
twee typen organisatie (grootschalig en kleinschalig) met elkaar concurreren. Onze 
computationele resultaten suggereren daarentegen dat een puur selectieproces 
waarin bedrijfstypen volledig willekeurig worden opgericht gevoeliger zijn voor 
variaties van de parameters in het model dan een niet-willekeurig, 
dichtheidsafhankelijk oprichtingsproces. Voor bepaalde combinaties van waarden 
van de parameters is een gesegmenteerde uitkomst van het model (dat wil zeggen, 
een markt met zowel een hoge concentratiegraad als een groot aantal bedrijven) 
alleen mogelijk als de omstandigheden in de markt informatie geven over het type 
bedrijf dat het beste opgericht kan worden (Hoofdstuk 2). Deze bevinding 
suggereert niet alleen dat selectie niet altijd goed functioneert als de voornaamste 
drijvende kracht achter de ontwikkeling van de markt, maar laat ook zien dat het 
proces van toetreding van bedrijfstypen belangrijke mechanismen weerspiegelt die 
de uitkomst van de segmentatie van de markt beïnvloeden. Resultaten in hoofdstuk 
2 bevestigen ook dat het sterftecijfer afneemt met bedrijfsomvang en -type (ten 
faveure van kleinschalige bedrijven), en dat het sterftecijfer toeneemt met de 
concentratiegraad van de markt. 
 De theorie van segmentatie van middelen stelt ook dat de totale ruimte die 
wordt ingenomen door generalisten wordt beperkt als gevolg van hun verschuiving 
naar het midden van de markt en op schaal gebaseerde mededinging, wat sommige 
generalisten --- diegenen die onvoldoende schaalvoordelen hebben kunnen bereiken 
--- dwingt de markt te verlaten. De resultaten van onze simulaties in hoofdstukken 2 
en 4 laten zien dat deze uitkomst niet noodzakelijk is, maar afhangt van de 
specifieke waardencombinaties van parameters. In hoofdstuk 4 laten we de een-op-
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een relatie tussen voorkeuren van consumenten en productkenmerken los, en 
introduceren we mobiliteit van consumenten binnen de middelenruimte. In 
hoofdstuk 4 laten we de gevolgen hiervan zien door middel van een vergelijking 
van drie gevallen van dekking van de middelenruimte door grootschalige bedrijven: 
een waarin consumenten immobiel zijn (het basismodel), en twee waarin 
consumenten mobiel zijn. Eerst beschouwen we het geval waarin consumenten 
bewegen in de richting van het bedrijf dat het best overeenkomt met hun huidige 
productvoorkeur. Ten tweede beschouwen we het geval waarin consumenten 
bewegen in de richting van het bedrijf dat hun nutswaardefunctie het meest laat 
toenemen. 
 De uitkomsten van hoofdstuk 4 wijzen er op dat mobiliteit van consumenten 
de schaalvoordelen van grote bedrijven doet afnemen, en de verbreiding van hun 
kleinschalige tegenhangers versterkt. Wanneer de ruimtelijke dekking van 
grootschalige bedrijven gemeten wordt als het aantal posities dat grote bedrijven 
innemen, wijzen de resultaten er ook op dat mobiliteit van consumenten leidt tot 
versterking van het zogenaamde resource space release effect dat de theorie van 
middelensegmentatie versterkt. Tegen de verwachting in dat zo'n afvlakking van de 
ruimte middelenwinst in de periferie zou kunnen opleveren (Carroll en Hannan, 
1995a), laten de mobiliteitsscenario's zien dat de populatie van consumenten 
samenvalt in minder posities. 
 Computationele modellen tonen ook dat strategische positionering in de 
middelenruimte kan compenseren voor kosteninefficiëntie. Hoofdstuk 2 laat 
bijvoorbeeld zien dat kleinschalige bedrijven, die geen schaalvoordelen kennen, 
kunnen overleven in de periferie, buiten bereik van hun efficiënte grootschalige 
concurrenten. Zoals verwacht vergroot een afname van de ruimtelijke heterogeniteit 
(dat wil zeggen, een afname van de verzameling van mogelijke productposities in 
de middelenruimte) de kostenefficiëntie. Een hogere efficiëntie heeft echter niet 
altijd een hogere concentratiegraad tot gevolg (hoofdstuk 3). 
 In hoofdstuk 3 wordt duidelijk dat heterogene middelenruimtes tot meer 
wispelturige  marktstructuren kunnen leiden, in termen van zowel de 
concentratiegraad als het aantal bedrijven, of van de densiteit van de markt. Met 
andere woorden, de resultaten tonen dat zeer homogene ruimtes al hun stochastische 
kenmerken verliezen, en altijd een zeer geconcentreerde markt met weinig 
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overlevenden tot stand zullen brengen. Uitkomsten van simulaties ondersteunen ook 
de stelling dat unimodale ruimtes de hoogste waarschijnlijkheid kennen dat binnen 
zo'n ruimte een gesegmenteerde markt zal ontstaan. 
 Het feit dat de marginale effecten op sterftecijfers veranderen met de vorm 
van de middelenruimte toont aan dat deze vorm de levensvatbaarheid van bedrijven 
beïnvloedt (hoofdstuk 3). Deze resultaten liggen op een lijn met de opvatting dat 
middelen aan de basis liggen van marktstructuren (Van Witteloostuijn en Boone 
2006). Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft een studie waarin twee tegengestelde krachten 
(schaalvoordelen en breedtenadelen) interacteren onder wisselende maten van 
heterogeniteit van middelen. Meer in het bijzonder wordt aangetoond dat wanneer 
de heterogeniteit afneemt, i) het negatieve effect van omvang op het sterftecijfer 
versterkt wordt, ii) het positieve effect van marktconcentratie op het sterftecijfer 
waarschijnlijk toeneemt, en iii) de overlevingskansen van kleine bedrijven afnemen. 
 In hoofdstukken 4 en 5 is de vorm van de middelenruimte endogeen. 
Hoofdstuk 5 bespreekt veranderingen in dimensionaliteit en het effect daarvan op de 
prestaties van de organisatietypes. Eerdere studies van het dimensionaliteitseffect op 
marktuitkomsten hebben de kwestie bestudeerd in termen van ruimteverlies of -
winst waarmee bedrijven geconfronteerd worden als nieuwe Euclidische dimensies 
exogeen worden toegevoegd (Péli en Nooteboom 1999; Péli en Bruggeman 2006). 
We verlaten de Euclidische metriek om dimensionaliteit te meten, en voegen de 
winst-kostenratio toe om prestaties van de organisatietypes te meten als 
veranderingen in dimensionaliteit. Door gebruik te maken van het concept van de 
similarity dimension (Mandelbrot 1983) voorzien we in niet-integere 
dimensionaliteitswaarden en endogene veranderingen in het aantal dimensies dat 
actief is in de middelenruimte. 
 Hoofdstuk 5 verkent de evolutie van dimensionaliteit in zowel platte als 
unimodale middelenruimtes. De uitkomsten tonen dat grootschalige bedrijven meer 
voordeel hebben van productdifferentiatie en prijsdiscriminatie naarmate de 
dimensionaliteit toeneemt, met betere prestaties als gevolg. Deze voordelen worden 
echter gecompenseerd door de toename in de kosten voor nichedekking (door 
nadelen van breedte) en door de toename van verdrukking op de markt. Bij zeer 
hoge dimensionaliteit behaalt de kleinschalige organisatie betere resultaten. Het lijkt 
zo te zijn dat grootschalige bedrijven een grotere behoefte hebben aan differentiatie. 
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Dit leidt ertoe dat er meer nieuwe productposities vrijkomen door grote bedrijven 
dan door kleine. Met andere woorden, het grootschalige type wordt innovatiever 
dan het kleinschalige. Toenemende differentiatie heeft tot gevolg dat het lastiger 
wordt om de heterogene middelenniche gedekt te houden, wat de prestaties van 
grootschalige organisaties ten slechte komt en kansen voor kleinschalige bedrijven 
vergroot. 
 De kruisbestuiving tussen organisatie-ecologie en industriële organisatie 
vertegenwoordigt niet alleen een beter geïntegreerd raamwerk om de evolutie van 
industrieën te bestuderen, maar opent ook de deur naar computationele technieken 
voor modelbouw die tot nu afwezig waren in beide disciplines. De toepassing van 
computationele technieken voorziet in de studie van complexe sociale systemen 
inclusief de demografische kenmerken van de samenstellende eenheden (individuen 
of organisaties), zodat zij een drager kan worden voor de ontwikkeling van sociale 
theorieën zoals co-evolutionaire dynamiek (hoofdstuk 4) of de integratie van 
adaptatie- en selectieprocessen (hoofdstuk 2). 
 
 
